1 - 10 of 69 Chapters
[In the tradition of continental legal literature, the Ought is usually contrasted with the Is.]
[I will adopt and adapt a current distinction terminologically traceable to Peirce (1839–1914), among others—that between “type” and “token”—and use it to render into English the German distinction between Tatbestand and Tatsache (or Sachverhalt; cf. Kaufmann 1982—Arthur Kaufmann, 1923–2001).]
[The distinction was introduced in Chapter 1 between the reality that ought to be and the reality that is. In the reality that ought to be a further distinction was made between what is objectively right (norms and their content) and what is subjectively right, meaning rights and obligations....
[In this chapter the problem of the foundation of the binding force of positive law—and hence of what is objectively right by virtue of norms posited through human will, that is, by enactment or convention—will be brought under the purview of the wider problem of the matrix of normativeness (the...
[Let me reiterate that what I presented in the previous chapters is not my own conception of the reality that ought to be (of what is objectively and what is subjectively right) and of its interaction with the reality that is. I was rather presenting my reconstruction of the conception still...
[As was anticipated in Chapter 5, a norm is, on my view, a motive of behaviour: It is the belief (opinio vinculi) that a certain type of action must be performed, in the normative sense of this word, anytime a relevant type of circumstance gets validly instantiated. This must unconditionally be...
[It was discussed in Section 6.3, with regard to the content of norms, how an important role is played by the type of circumstance a type of action is conditionally connected with (a type of action whose performance will be believed to be binding per se anytime this condition is met). A...
[The kind of normativism maintained by the Uppsala School—a normativism occurring in similar terms in Hart 19611—I have always considered to be the most satisfactory and adequate, the way I understand norms and their role in the machinery of law: Jerzy Wróblewski (1926–1990) used to tell me,...
[Language-oriented philosophy, in its glorious stretch from logical empiricism to ordinary-language philosophy, has experienced an important season even in connection with the philosophy of law—and that even in Italy, where it yielded, from 1950 onward, significant results which I account myself...
[In this chapter I will attempt in outline to give an idea of the concurrence of, and interaction between, norms and the other factors dealt with in Chapter 9 when it comes to keeping a system of law in force in society, among the people of a certain territory.]
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