1 - 7 of 7 Chapters
[This is a book in legal theory. Its purpose is to justify the legal method.]
[At first, I must return to the preliminary question, Why not to assume that legal conclusions can be true, even if they are fully justifiable only by a set of premises containing a norm or a value judgment? Such an assumption implies another one, namely that norms or value judgments themselves...
[In Chapter 2, I have discussed various circumstances restricting arbitrariness of moral reasoning.
A moral statement can often be presented as a logically correct conclusion of a set of premises. One can also inquire whether these premises are (a) linguistically correct and (b) logically...
[As stated before, legal reasoning is supported by reasonable premises. A reasonable premise is not falsified and not arbitrary. A premise is thus reasonable if, and only if, the following conditions are fulfilled:
The premise is not falsified.The hypothesis is not to a sufficiently high degree...
[We are now prepared to discuss the classical question, What is valid law? As a starting point, let me make an abbreviated restatement of theses defended in the preceding chapters.
Most human beings actually have a disposition to endorse coherent systems and to act as if they had intended to...
[It follows from the preceding chapters that legal practice should simultaneously fit two postulates: rationality of legal reasoning and fixity of the law. The remaining part of the book deals with the question, how these postulates affect the sources of law and legal method. An extensive study...
[In section 1.2.1 supra, I made the preliminary distinction between easy and hard cases. In easy cases, the decision follows from a set of premises solely consisting of a legal rule, a description of the facts of the case, and perhaps also some other premises that are easy to prove.]
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