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Reform Processes and Policy Change

Part of the Studies in Public Choice Book Series (volume 16)

Editors: König, Thomas; Debus, Marc; Tsebelis, George

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-5809-9

ISBN: 978-1-4419-5808-2

Publisher: Springer New York - Springer Journals

Jul 17, 2010

1 - 10 of 13 Chapters

Available

Veto Player Theory and Policy Change: An Introduction

Tsebelis, George

Pages: 3 –18

[Some months ago I had the honor to be invited to Mannheim for a conference organized by Thomas Koenig and Marc Debus. The subject matter was “Reform Processes and Policy Change,” and the organizers thought that my book Veto Players would be a good starting point for their study. I thought that...
Available

Empirical Applications of Veto Player Analysis and Institutional Effectiveness

Hallerberg, Mark

Pages: 21 –42

[Many studies consider the veto players in government and move directly to discussions of policy choice and policy change. Institutions in such studies are relevant only to the extent that they determine whether a given player is truly a veto player, and they are exogenously determined. In this...
Available

The Veto Player Approach in Macro-Comparative Politics: Concepts and Measurement

Jahn, Detlef

Pages: 43 –68

[Over the last decade, analytical tools in modern macro-comparative analysis have become increasingly sophisticated. Yet our concern with problems of causal inferences has, to a large extent, over-shadowed the equally important matters of conceptualization and measurement. Both the...
Available

Measuring Policy Positions of Veto Players in Parliamentary Democracies

König, Thomas; Luig, Bernd; Proksch, Sven-Oliver; Slapin, Jonathan B.

Pages: 69 –95

[Testing veto players theory in parliamentary systems requires researchers to have accurate estimates of policy preferences of political parties. In empirical studies, however, political scientists use remarkably context-free and invariant estimates of party positions. As a consequence, they must...
Available

Mutual Veto? How Coalitions Work

Müller, Wolfgang C.; Meyer, Thomas M.

Pages: 99 –124

[Coalition governments typically face problems from conflicting preferences of the cabinet parties. For many reasons individual ministers are likely to pursue party rather than coalition policies. Yet, the doctrine of collective cabinet responsibility ties the coalition as a whole to government...
Available

Veto Players, Agenda Control and Cabinet Stability in 17 European Parliaments, 1945–1999

Saalfeld, Thomas

Pages: 125 –143

[European democracies have experienced significant cross-national and diachronic variations in cabinet duration. Empirically, this chapter seeks to offer some new insights into the institutional sources of such variations, especially with regard to partisan veto players and the role of government...
Available

The Sources of Bipartisan Politics in Parliamentary Democracies

Bräuninger, Thomas; Debus, Marc

Pages: 145 –164

[Bipartisan bills are frequent in presidential systems, but they exist in virtually all parliamentary systems. In fact, despite the predominance of governments in legislative agenda-setting in parliamentary systems, considerable shares of both introduced and successful bills are (co-)sponsored by...
Available

Why Don’t Veto Players Use Their Power?

König, Thomas; Junge, Dirk

Pages: 165 –186

[Why do the member states with veto power usually support a policy change proposed by a Commission initiative when their own position is located closer to the status quo? Why do we frequently witness consensus in the Council and rarely observe a rejection of Commission initiatives even after...
Available

Testing the Law-Making Theories in a Parliamentary Democracy: A Roll Call Analysis of the Italian Chamber of Deputies (1988–2008)

Curini, Luigi; Zucchini, Francesco

Pages: 189 –211

[The theoretical efforts in the rational choice approach to explain the law-making process in United States Congress have been increasingly matched by attempts to test the relative explanatory powers of different theories (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Krehbiel et al. 2005). No such effort has so far...
Available

Domestic Veto Players, Commission Monitoring and the Implementation of European Policy

Steunenberg, Bernard

Pages: 213 –230

[In this chapter, I analyze implementation of European directives by focusing on the interplay between domestic political and administrative actors and the Commission as the “guardian” of European policy. Being unaware of the Commission’s true preferences, the domestic actors have to decide...

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