1 - 6 of 6 Chapters
[1.1.1 I have two main goals in this book. The first is to give an account of the moral significance of merely possible persons – persons who, relative to a particular circumstance, or possible future or world, could but in fact never do exist. I call that account Variabilism. My second goal is...
[2.1.1 It is a matter of dispute whether persons who count as existing or future, relative to a particular circumstance, or possible future or world, have a moral status that merely possible persons lack. Are persons who do or will exist the only persons who matter morally? Are they the only...
[Jeff McMahan recently has argued that a comparison between the choice of abortion and the choice of prenatal injury followed by fetal survival, in combination with certain Pareto-inspired principles, leads to an interesting paradox. I will call it the Abortion Paradox.]
[The main purpose of this chapter is to examine three arguments – from Hare, Marquis and Harman – that, whether by design or not, place the permissibility of the early abortion in doubt. Each of the three arguments is grounded in positions that seem to assign at least some moral significance to...
[In what follows, I argue for three claims. First, what I will call early abortion is ordinarily, and almost always in the case where it is what the pregnant woman wants, permissible. And that is so, whether she wants the early abortion for a good reason, a poor reason or no reason at all.]
[Consider the choice not to bring a new person into existence. Suppose that choice creates additional wellbeing for some people but does not destroy wellbeing for any person who does or will exist. A plus for Variabilism is that it enables us to explain why that choice is permissible, or indeed...
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Continue with Facebook
Log in with Microsoft
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Sign Up Log In
To subscribe to email alerts, please log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
To get new article updates from a journal on your personalized homepage, please log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.