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[The idea that mentality is multiply realizable has long been considered a major threat to the view that mental properties are identical to properties of physics, chemistry, or neuroscience. While many philosophers of mind happily abandoned the prospect of psychophysical reduction, others have...
[According to physicalism regarding mentality, mental phenomena obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena. How can this view be true if mental properties are not physical? One highly notorious method for explaining how physicalism might be true in the absence of psychophysical property...
[Since the rise of non-reductive physicalism much talk has been made of mental phenomena being realized by physical phenomena. Can the idea that mentality is physically realized adequately explain how one can remain faithful to physicalism while denying that mental properties are physical? It is...
[Here I offer a definition of physicalism that reveals how exactly physicalism might be true even if mental properties are not identical with properties of physics, chemistry, or biology. The analysis I offer borrows from Shoemaker’s idea that there is something about mentality that is a subset...
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