1 - 7 of 7 articles
We describe a principal–supervisor–agent relationship in which agent and supervisor may collude. To prevent collusion, the principal may contract on a noisy signal which is correlated with the occurrence of collusion. When the signal is informative enough, the principal uses it and no collusion...
We study the design of supervisory functions in an organization with one principal and two agents. Each agent can perform supervision activities regarding the other agent. We characterize the way the principal must structure incentive payments to avoid any collusive activity between agents. In...
The private and social efficiency of two “behavioral” coordination mechanisms is examined in this paper. In Cournot oligopoly, firms prefer immediate coordination on the Nash equilibrium (interpreted as a preplay communication) over the best‐reply dynamics (and fictitous play) which converge to...
This paper addresses how an organization becomes a bureaucracy. Bureaucratization emerges from a self‐enforced norm of reciprocity between agents in an organization who exchange favors and promote subgoals which differ from the objective of the firm. Such collusive behavior becomes harder and...
Within most organizations, agents may spend time on a variety of tasks — productive and redistributive. In this paper, I derive an optimal multi‐task incentive scheme under the assumption that agents have limited liability. The wage level is shown to increase with an agent's discretion and the...
We study investment decisions in a farmers' cooperative. Farmers sell their products through the cooperative. Before production takes place the cooperative has to decide on an investment. We study whether voting on investment leads to efficient investment decisions. The answer depends on how the...
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Continue with Facebook
Log in with Microsoft
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Sign Up Log In
To subscribe to email alerts, please log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
To get new article updates from a journal on your personalized homepage, please log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.