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Abstract In this paper we present a simple game form implementing Lindahl allocations as Nash equilibrium outcomes, which has nice stability properties. We show that if the preferences of each consumer are representable by a utility function of the form a(y)xi + bi(y), where xi is the amount of...
Abstract Recent research has been motivated by the fact that the outcome function in implementation may not be “credible”. On the one hand, the players may try to renegotiate the final outcome, if there is another outcome which they prefer. On the other hand, the “social planner” may have an...
Abstract In addition to the natural requirements in mechanism design proposed by Saijo, Tatamitani, and Yamato (1995a), we introduce the simple punishment condition that requires the same feasible punishment whenever all participants simultaneously become potential deviators. First, we fully...
Abstract This paper describes a statistical model of equilibrium behaviour in games, which we call Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE). The key feature of the equilibrium is that individuals do not always play best responses to the strategies of their opponents, but play better strategies with...
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