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We present generalized secretary problems as a framework for online auctions. Elements, such as potential employees or customers, arrive one by one online. After observing the value derived from an element, but without knowing the values of future elements, the algorithm has to make an...
We describe a modular elicitation framework for iterative combinatorial auctions. The framework includes proxy agents, each of which can adopt an individualized bidding language to represent partial value information of a bidder. The framework leverages algorithms from query learning to elicit...
The exposure problem appears whenever an agent with complementary valuations bids to acquire a bundle of items sold sequentially, in independent auctions. In this letter, we review a possible solution that can help solve this problem, which involves selling options for the items, instead of the...
E-procurement platforms have been widely used in business-to-business and business-to-government transactions for many years. More recently, such platforms have become available for consumers as well. However, the question is if such platforms will be as beneficial in a consumer context as they...
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