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Do College Graduates Serving as Village Officials Help Rural China?†

Do College Graduates Serving as Village Officials Help Rural China?† AbstractThis study estimates the effect of improved bureaucrat quality on poverty alleviation by exploring a unique human capital reallocation policy in China—the College Graduate Village Officials (CGVOs) program. We find that introducing CGVOs into the village governance system improves the targeting and implementation of the central government's social assistance programs. CGVOs help eligible poor households understand and apply for relevant subsidies, thus increasing the number of pro-poor program beneficiaries. Further analysis suggests that CGVOs change bureaucrat quality, rather than quantity, of village governance, and their presence reduces elite capture of pro-poor programs. (JEL D73, H83, J24, O17, O18, P25, P26) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal: Applied Economics American Economic Association

Do College Graduates Serving as Village Officials Help Rural China?†

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 © American Economic Association
ISSN
1945-7790
DOI
10.1257/app.20160079
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractThis study estimates the effect of improved bureaucrat quality on poverty alleviation by exploring a unique human capital reallocation policy in China—the College Graduate Village Officials (CGVOs) program. We find that introducing CGVOs into the village governance system improves the targeting and implementation of the central government's social assistance programs. CGVOs help eligible poor households understand and apply for relevant subsidies, thus increasing the number of pro-poor program beneficiaries. Further analysis suggests that CGVOs change bureaucrat quality, rather than quantity, of village governance, and their presence reduces elite capture of pro-poor programs. (JEL D73, H83, J24, O17, O18, P25, P26)

Journal

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics – American Economic Association

Published: Oct 1, 2017

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