Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Subscribe now for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Hospital Choices, Hospital Prices, and Financial Incentives to Physicians †

Hospital Choices, Hospital Prices, and Financial Incentives to Physicians † Abstract We estimate an insurer-specific preference function which rationalizes hospital referrals for privately insured births in California. The function is additively separable in: a hospital price paid by the insurer, the distance traveled, and plan- and severity-specific hospital fixed effects (capturing hospital quality). We use an inequality estimator that allows for errors in price and detailed hospital-severity interactions and obtain markedly different results than those from a logit. The estimates indicate that insurers with more capitated physicians are more responsive to price. Capitated plans send patients further to utilize similar quality, lower-priced hospitals; but the cost-quality trade-off does not vary with capitation rates. (JEL G22, H51, I11, I13, I18, J44 ) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Review American Economic Association

Hospital Choices, Hospital Prices, and Financial Incentives to Physicians †

American Economic Review , Volume 104 (12) – Dec 1, 2014

Loading next page...
 
/lp/american-economic-association/hospital-choices-hospital-prices-and-financial-incentives-to-GNpgWGLFHr

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by the American Economic Association
Subject
Articles
ISSN
0002-8282
DOI
10.1257/aer.104.12.3841
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract We estimate an insurer-specific preference function which rationalizes hospital referrals for privately insured births in California. The function is additively separable in: a hospital price paid by the insurer, the distance traveled, and plan- and severity-specific hospital fixed effects (capturing hospital quality). We use an inequality estimator that allows for errors in price and detailed hospital-severity interactions and obtain markedly different results than those from a logit. The estimates indicate that insurers with more capitated physicians are more responsive to price. Capitated plans send patients further to utilize similar quality, lower-priced hospitals; but the cost-quality trade-off does not vary with capitation rates. (JEL G22, H51, I11, I13, I18, J44 )

Journal

American Economic ReviewAmerican Economic Association

Published: Dec 1, 2014

There are no references for this article.