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Investing in Ex Ante Regulation: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Patent Examination†

Investing in Ex Ante Regulation: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Patent Examination† AbstractWe explore how the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office may improve the quality of issued patents on “secondary” drug features by giving examiners more time to review drug patent applications. Our findings suggest that current time allocations are causing examiners to issue low-quality secondary patents on the margin. To assess the merits of expanding ex ante scrutiny of drug patent applications at the agency, we set forth estimates of the various gains and losses associated with giving examiners more time, including reduced downstream litigation costs and added personnel expenses, along with both the static gains and dynamic innovation losses associated with earlier generic entry. (JEL K11, L65, O31, O34, O38) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal Economic Policy American Economic Association

Investing in Ex Ante Regulation: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Patent Examination†

33 pages

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2023 © American Economic Association
ISSN
1945-7731
DOI
10.1257/pol.20200703
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractWe explore how the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office may improve the quality of issued patents on “secondary” drug features by giving examiners more time to review drug patent applications. Our findings suggest that current time allocations are causing examiners to issue low-quality secondary patents on the margin. To assess the merits of expanding ex ante scrutiny of drug patent applications at the agency, we set forth estimates of the various gains and losses associated with giving examiners more time, including reduced downstream litigation costs and added personnel expenses, along with both the static gains and dynamic innovation losses associated with earlier generic entry. (JEL K11, L65, O31, O34, O38)

Journal

American Economic Journal Economic PolicyAmerican Economic Association

Published: Aug 1, 2023

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