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Towards the Greater Good? EU Commissioners’ Nationality and Budget Allocation in the European Union†

Towards the Greater Good? EU Commissioners’ Nationality and Budget Allocation in the European Union† AbstractWe demonstrate that the nationalities of EU Commissioners influence budget allocation decisions in favor of their country of origin. Our focus is on the Commissioners for Agriculture, who are exclusively responsible for a specific fund that accounts for the largest share of the overall EU budget. On average, providing the Commissioner causes a 1 percentage point increase in a country’s share of the overall EU budget, which corresponds to 850 million euros per year. There are no different pretreatment trends and the magnitude of the bias from selection-on-unobservables would have to be implausibly high to account for the estimated coefficient. (JEL D72, F55, H61, H77) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal: Economic Policy American Economic Association

Towards the Greater Good? EU Commissioners’ Nationality and Budget Allocation in the European Union†

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 © American Economic Association
ISSN
1945-7731
DOI
10.1257/pol.20160038
Publisher site
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Abstract

AbstractWe demonstrate that the nationalities of EU Commissioners influence budget allocation decisions in favor of their country of origin. Our focus is on the Commissioners for Agriculture, who are exclusively responsible for a specific fund that accounts for the largest share of the overall EU budget. On average, providing the Commissioner causes a 1 percentage point increase in a country’s share of the overall EU budget, which corresponds to 850 million euros per year. There are no different pretreatment trends and the magnitude of the bias from selection-on-unobservables would have to be implausibly high to account for the estimated coefficient. (JEL D72, F55, H61, H77)

Journal

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy – American Economic Association

Published: Feb 1, 2018

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