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Bayes-Nash equilibria for m th price auctions with multiple closing times

Bayes-Nash equilibria for m th price auctions with multiple closing times In this paper we compute Bayes-Nash equilibria for first price single unit auctions and m th price multi unit auctions, when the auction has a set of possible closing times, one of which is chosen randomly for the auction to end at. Thus the auctions have one or more rounds of sealed bids. We compute such equilibria for a wide range of assumptions and demonstrate the method used by an agent to generate these strategies. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

Bayes-Nash equilibria for m th price auctions with multiple closing times

Vetsikas, Ioannis A.; Selman, Bart
ACM SIGecom Exchanges , Volume 6 (2) – Jan 1, 2007
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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/1228621.1228624
Publisher site
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Abstract

In this paper we compute Bayes-Nash equilibria for first price single unit auctions and m th price multi unit auctions, when the auction has a set of possible closing times, one of which is chosen randomly for the auction to end at. Thus the auctions have one or more rounds of sealed bids. We compute such equilibria for a wide range of assumptions and demonstrate the method used by an agent to generate these strategies.

Journal

ACM SIGecom Exchanges – Association for Computing Machinery

Published: Jan 1, 2007

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