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Bayesian stackelberg games and their application for security at Los Angeles international airport

Bayesian stackelberg games and their application for security at Los Angeles international airport Bayesian Stackelberg Games and Their Application for Security at Los Angeles International Airport ´ Ëœ MANISH JAIN, JAMES PITA, MILIND TAMBE, FERNANDO ORDONEZ, *PRAVEEN PARUCHURI, **SARIT KRAUS University of Southern California, CA, USA ({manish.jain, jpita, tambe, fordon}@usc.edu) * Intelligent Automation Inc., Rockville, MD, USA (pparuchuri@i-a-i.com) ** Bar-Ilan University, Israel (sarit@macs.biu.ac.il) Many multiagent settings are appropriately modeled as Stackelberg games [Fudenberg and Tirole 1991; Paruchuri et al. 2007], where a leader commits to a strategy rst, and then a follower sel shly optimizes its own reward, considering the strategy chosen by the leader. Stackelberg games are commonly used to model attacker-defender scenarios in security domains [Brown et al. 2006] as well as in patrolling [Paruchuri et al. 2007; Paruchuri et al. 2008]. For example, security personnel patrolling an infrastructure commit to a patrolling strategy rst, before their adversaries act taking this committed strategy into account. Indeed, Stackelberg games are being used at the Los Angeles International Airport to schedule security checkpoints and canine patrols [Murr 2007; Paruchuri et al. 2008; Pita et al. 2008a]. They could potentially be used in network routing, pricing in transportation systems and many other situations [Korilis et al. 1997; Cardinal et al. 2005]. Although http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

Bayesian stackelberg games and their application for security at Los Angeles international airport

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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/1399589.1399599
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Abstract

Bayesian Stackelberg Games and Their Application for Security at Los Angeles International Airport ´ Ëœ MANISH JAIN, JAMES PITA, MILIND TAMBE, FERNANDO ORDONEZ, *PRAVEEN PARUCHURI, **SARIT KRAUS University of Southern California, CA, USA ({manish.jain, jpita, tambe, fordon}@usc.edu) * Intelligent Automation Inc., Rockville, MD, USA (pparuchuri@i-a-i.com) ** Bar-Ilan University, Israel (sarit@macs.biu.ac.il) Many multiagent settings are appropriately modeled as Stackelberg games [Fudenberg and Tirole 1991; Paruchuri et al. 2007], where a leader commits to a strategy rst, and then a follower sel shly optimizes its own reward, considering the strategy chosen by the leader. Stackelberg games are commonly used to model attacker-defender scenarios in security domains [Brown et al. 2006] as well as in patrolling [Paruchuri et al. 2007; Paruchuri et al. 2008]. For example, security personnel patrolling an infrastructure commit to a patrolling strategy rst, before their adversaries act taking this committed strategy into account. Indeed, Stackelberg games are being used at the Los Angeles International Airport to schedule security checkpoints and canine patrols [Murr 2007; Paruchuri et al. 2008; Pita et al. 2008a]. They could potentially be used in network routing, pricing in transportation systems and many other situations [Korilis et al. 1997; Cardinal et al. 2005]. Although

Journal

ACM SIGecom Exchanges – Association for Computing Machinery

Published: Jun 1, 2008

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