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The exposure problem appears whenever an agent with complementary valuations bids to acquire a bundle of items sold sequentially, in independent auctions. In this letter, we review a possible solution that can help solve this problem, which involves selling options for the items, instead of the items themselves. We provide a brief overview of the state of the art in this field and discuss, based on recent results presented in Mous et. al. 2008, under which conditions using option mechanisms would be desirable for both buyers and sellers, by comparison to direct auctioning of the items. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of further research directions in this field.
ACM SIGecom Exchanges – Association for Computing Machinery
Published: Jun 1, 2008
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