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Efficiency and price discovery in multi-item auctions

Efficiency and price discovery in multi-item auctions Distributed multi-item auctions offer great opportunities for integrating fragmented online auction markets into larger markets with more efficient outcomes. We extend the theory of multiitem ascending auctions in a multi-unit demand scenario. We show that a simple greedy bidding strategy results in efficient allocation and unique prices. We also show that the strategy constitutes a Nash Equilibrium of the system with single unit demand. We discuss the implications of our results for the design of auctions on the Internet. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

Efficiency and price discovery in multi-item auctions

Bansal, Vipul; Garg, Rahul
ACM SIGecom Exchanges , Volume 2 (1) – Dec 1, 2000
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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/844309.844314
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Distributed multi-item auctions offer great opportunities for integrating fragmented online auction markets into larger markets with more efficient outcomes. We extend the theory of multiitem ascending auctions in a multi-unit demand scenario. We show that a simple greedy bidding strategy results in efficient allocation and unique prices. We also show that the strategy constitutes a Nash Equilibrium of the system with single unit demand. We discuss the implications of our results for the design of auctions on the Internet.

Journal

ACM SIGecom Exchanges – Association for Computing Machinery

Published: Dec 1, 2000

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