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Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists)
- Publisher
- Association for Computing Machinery
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2008 by ACM Inc.
- ISSN
- 1551-9031
- DOI
- 10.1145/1486877.1486883
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
In this note we report recent results on item pricing for revenue maximization in the presence of buyers with complex, unknown preferences. We focus on two important classes of settings: buyers with general valuations for the case of items in unlimited supply, and buyers with subadditive valuations for the case of items in limited supply.
Journal
ACM SIGecom Exchanges – Association for Computing Machinery
Published: Nov 1, 2008