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Matching, cardinal utility, and social welfare

Matching, cardinal utility, and social welfare Matching, Cardinal Utility, and Social Welfare ELLIOT ANSHELEVICH Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and SANMAY DAS Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences General Terms: Algorithms, Economics Additional Key Words and Phrases: Matching, Game Theory, Utility 1. INTRODUCTION Matching markets have historically been an important topic in economics research. On the positive (descriptive) side, researchers have modeled everything ranging from marriage markets to labor markets using the framework of matching. Matching was also one of the rst areas in which market design made a name for itself, perhaps most famously in the redesign of the market that matches graduating M.D.s to their rst residency programs in the United States. The arrival of computer scientists to the eld of market design in general can be traced to many of the reasons suggested recently by Conitzer [2010] (in a broader context than just market design) in an article in Communications of the ACM, including the e €ects of new markets that have been made possible by advances in networking and Internet technology, a more computational mindset in general, and also the ability to view problems from a di €erent perspective. In the case of matching http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

Matching, cardinal utility, and social welfare

Anshelevich, Elliot; Das, Sanmay
ACM SIGecom Exchanges , Volume 9 (1) – Jun 1, 2010
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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2010 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/1980534.1980538
Publisher site
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Abstract

Matching, Cardinal Utility, and Social Welfare ELLIOT ANSHELEVICH Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and SANMAY DAS Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences General Terms: Algorithms, Economics Additional Key Words and Phrases: Matching, Game Theory, Utility 1. INTRODUCTION Matching markets have historically been an important topic in economics research. On the positive (descriptive) side, researchers have modeled everything ranging from marriage markets to labor markets using the framework of matching. Matching was also one of the rst areas in which market design made a name for itself, perhaps most famously in the redesign of the market that matches graduating M.D.s to their rst residency programs in the United States. The arrival of computer scientists to the eld of market design in general can be traced to many of the reasons suggested recently by Conitzer [2010] (in a broader context than just market design) in an article in Communications of the ACM, including the e €ects of new markets that have been made possible by advances in networking and Internet technology, a more computational mindset in general, and also the ability to view problems from a di €erent perspective. In the case of matching

Journal

ACM SIGecom Exchanges – Association for Computing Machinery

Published: Jun 1, 2010

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