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Stability of overlapping coalitions

Stability of overlapping coalitions Stability of Overlapping Coalitions GEORGIOS CHALKIADAKIS University of Southampton, UK and EDITH ELKIND Nanyang Technological University, Singapore and EVANGELOS MARKAKIS Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece and MARIA POLUKAROV University of Southampton, UK and NICHOLAS R. JENNINGS University of Southampton, UK Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.2.2 [Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity]: Nonnumerical Algorithms and Problems General Terms: Economics, Theory Additional Key Words and Phrases: Coalition Formation In multiagent systems, it is often the case that agents need to form teams in order to achieve their goals. This may happen even if the agents are controlled by di €erent parties: while in this case the agents do not necessarily share the same set of goals and priorities, they still need to cooperate, as individual agents may not possess su ƒcient resources to perform their tasks independently. In such scenarios, a natural tool for modeling agent collaboration is coalitional game theory [Branzei et al. 2008], a research area that studies collaboration and team formation among rational entities. The two main questions studied by coalitional game theory are: (1) What teams, or coalitions, of agents are likely to arise? and (2) How are the agents going to share the http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

Stability of overlapping coalitions

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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
The ACM Portal is published by the Association for Computing Machinery. Copyright © 2010 ACM, Inc.
Subject
Modeling methodologies
ISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/1598780.1598789
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Abstract

Stability of Overlapping Coalitions GEORGIOS CHALKIADAKIS University of Southampton, UK and EDITH ELKIND Nanyang Technological University, Singapore and EVANGELOS MARKAKIS Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece and MARIA POLUKAROV University of Southampton, UK and NICHOLAS R. JENNINGS University of Southampton, UK Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.2.2 [Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity]: Nonnumerical Algorithms and Problems General Terms: Economics, Theory Additional Key Words and Phrases: Coalition Formation In multiagent systems, it is often the case that agents need to form teams in order to achieve their goals. This may happen even if the agents are controlled by di €erent parties: while in this case the agents do not necessarily share the same set of goals and priorities, they still need to cooperate, as individual agents may not possess su ƒcient resources to perform their tasks independently. In such scenarios, a natural tool for modeling agent collaboration is coalitional game theory [Branzei et al. 2008], a research area that studies collaboration and team formation among rational entities. The two main questions studied by coalitional game theory are: (1) What teams, or coalitions, of agents are likely to arise? and (2) How are the agents going to share the

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ACM SIGecom Exchanges – Association for Computing Machinery

Published: Jul 1, 2009

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