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The output-agreement method induces honest behavior in the presence of social projection

The output-agreement method induces honest behavior in the presence of social projection The Output-Agreement Method Induces Honest Behavior in the Presence of Social Projection ARTHUR CARVALHO, STANKO DIMITROV, and KATE LARSON University of Waterloo The output-agreement method has been successfully used to reward agents in a variety of crowdsourcing settings. This method consists of a simple payment function that randomly matches two agents' reported information and rewards agreement. In this letter, we discuss how the outputagreement method might induce honest behavior when there exists social projection, i.e., when each agent believes that his private information is the most popular one amongst his peers. Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Social and Behavioral Science]: Economics General Terms: Economics, Human Factors, Theory Additional Key Words and Phrases: Output-Agreement Method, Social Projection 1. INTRODUCTION Recent years have seen an increased interest in crowdsourcing as a way of obtaining information from a large group of agents at a reduced cost. A simple payment structure that compares agents' reported information and rewards agreements, known as the output-agreement method, has been successfully used to reward agents in many different crowdsourcing scenarios [von Ahn and Dabbish 2008]. In this letter, we discuss how social projection, which is a judgmental heuristic where agents assume that others will behave as http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

The output-agreement method induces honest behavior in the presence of social projection

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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/2692375.2692384
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Abstract

The Output-Agreement Method Induces Honest Behavior in the Presence of Social Projection ARTHUR CARVALHO, STANKO DIMITROV, and KATE LARSON University of Waterloo The output-agreement method has been successfully used to reward agents in a variety of crowdsourcing settings. This method consists of a simple payment function that randomly matches two agents' reported information and rewards agreement. In this letter, we discuss how the outputagreement method might induce honest behavior when there exists social projection, i.e., when each agent believes that his private information is the most popular one amongst his peers. Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Social and Behavioral Science]: Economics General Terms: Economics, Human Factors, Theory Additional Key Words and Phrases: Output-Agreement Method, Social Projection 1. INTRODUCTION Recent years have seen an increased interest in crowdsourcing as a way of obtaining information from a large group of agents at a reduced cost. A simple payment structure that compares agents' reported information and rewards agreements, known as the output-agreement method, has been successfully used to reward agents in many different crowdsourcing scenarios [von Ahn and Dabbish 2008]. In this letter, we discuss how social projection, which is a judgmental heuristic where agents assume that others will behave as

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ACM SIGecom Exchanges – Association for Computing Machinery

Published: Nov 25, 2014

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