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A STRAWSON–LEWIS DEFENCE OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES

A STRAWSON–LEWIS DEFENCE OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES This paper examines a special kind of social preference, namely a preference to do one's part in a mixed-motive setting because the other party expects one to do so. I understand this expectation-based preference as a basic reactive attitude (Strawson 1974). Given this, and the fact that expectations in these circumstances are likely to be based on other people's preferences, I argue that in cooperation a special kind of equilibrium ensues, which I call a loop, with people's preferences and expectations mutually cross-referring. As with a Lewis-norm, the loop can get started in a variety of ways. It is self-sustaining in the sense that people with social preferences have sufficient reason not to deviate. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Economics & Philosophy Cambridge University Press

A STRAWSON–LEWIS DEFENCE OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES

Economics & Philosophy , Volume 28 (3): 20 – Nov 28, 2012

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Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012
ISSN
1474-0028
eISSN
0266-2671
DOI
10.1017/S0266267112000259
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper examines a special kind of social preference, namely a preference to do one's part in a mixed-motive setting because the other party expects one to do so. I understand this expectation-based preference as a basic reactive attitude (Strawson 1974). Given this, and the fact that expectations in these circumstances are likely to be based on other people's preferences, I argue that in cooperation a special kind of equilibrium ensues, which I call a loop, with people's preferences and expectations mutually cross-referring. As with a Lewis-norm, the loop can get started in a variety of ways. It is self-sustaining in the sense that people with social preferences have sufficient reason not to deviate.

Journal

Economics & PhilosophyCambridge University Press

Published: Nov 28, 2012

References