Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/cambridge-university-press/equality-versus-priority-a-misleading-distinction-mnycT7OW6z
References
References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015
- ISSN
- 1474-0028
- eISSN
- 0266-2671
- DOI
- 10.1017/S0266267115000103
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Abstract:The question for those who are concerned with inequalities is not whether to be an egalitarian or a prioritarian. That choice is mislabelled and misconceived. The relevant question is why distributive inequalities are of more than merely instrumental importance with respect to unrelated goals, such as maximizing well-being. The answer is that lessening inequalities in well-being serves a fundamental commitment to equality of moral status. Depending on the circumstances and what is to be distributed, the underlying concern with equality of moral status (coupled with non-distributional concerns about deprivation) might make one resemble a prioritarian, a non-prioritarian egalitarian, or neither.
Journal
Economics & Philosophy – Cambridge University Press
Published: May 18, 2015
Keywords: Egalitarianism; Prioritarianism; Moral Status; Well-being