Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

FREEDOM UNDER AN INDIFFERENT DICTATOR: INTENTIONALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

FREEDOM UNDER AN INDIFFERENT DICTATOR: INTENTIONALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY Abstract: Freedom is often analysed in terms of the absence of intentionally imposed constraints. I defend the alternative view on which the relevant constraints are those for which some agent can be held morally responsible. I argue that this best captures the relation between freedom and respect. Berlin (1969) correctly points out that intentional restrictions exhibit ill will and hence are disrespectful. However, the same holds, I argue, for restrictions that are due to indifference. Berlin also observed that it would be counterintuitive if an agent could increase her freedom by changing her preferences. I criticize the argument that Dowding and Van Hees (2007, 2008) present according to which this observation counts in favour of explicating freedom in terms of intentionality. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Economics & Philosophy Cambridge University Press

FREEDOM UNDER AN INDIFFERENT DICTATOR: INTENTIONALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

Hindriks, Frank
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 33 (1): 17 – Apr 7, 2016
Download PDF
17 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/cambridge-university-press/freedom-under-an-indifferent-dictator-intentionality-and-d19r6hwiLV

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 
ISSN
1474-0028
eISSN
0266-2671
DOI
10.1017/S0266267116000055
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract: Freedom is often analysed in terms of the absence of intentionally imposed constraints. I defend the alternative view on which the relevant constraints are those for which some agent can be held morally responsible. I argue that this best captures the relation between freedom and respect. Berlin (1969) correctly points out that intentional restrictions exhibit ill will and hence are disrespectful. However, the same holds, I argue, for restrictions that are due to indifference. Berlin also observed that it would be counterintuitive if an agent could increase her freedom by changing her preferences. I criticize the argument that Dowding and Van Hees (2007, 2008) present according to which this observation counts in favour of explicating freedom in terms of intentionality.

Journal

Economics & Philosophy – Cambridge University Press

Published: Apr 7, 2016

Keywords: freedom; indifference; intentional action; moral responsibility

References

  • Intention and intentional action: the simple view
  • Moral worth
  • Freedom, autonomy, and the concept of a person
  • How changes in one's preferences can affect one's freedom (and how they cannot): a reply to Dowding and Van Hees
    Kramer, M.
  • Liberal and republican freedom
  • Counterfactual success and negative freedom
    van Hees, M.
  • Counterfactual success again: response to Carter and Kramer
    van Hees, M.
  • Practical reasoning
  • Intentional action and the praise-blame asymmetry
  • Freedom and unanticipated consequences
  • Norms and the Knobe effect
  • Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language
  • Person as scientist, person as moralist
  • Social freedom and the test of moral responsibility
  • Judgments of intentionality and moral worth
  • Neither intentional nor unintentional
  • Judging mens rea: the tension between folk concepts and legal concepts of intentionality
    Nelson, S. E.
  • Constraints on freedom
  • What is freedom if not power
  • Praise, side effects, and intentional action
  • Effects of moral cognition on judgments of intentionality
  • In intending and side effects
  • Actions, intentions, and consequences: the doctrine of double effect
  • Intentional side-effects of action
    Webber, J.
  • The deep self model and asymmetries in folk judgments about intentional action
  • Opportunity as space for individuality: its value and the impossibility of measuring it