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NON-REASONED DECISION-MAKING

NON-REASONED DECISION-MAKING Human behaviour, like everything else, has causes. Most of the time, those causes can be described as reasons. Human beings perform actions because they have reasons for performing them. They are capable of surveying the options available and then selecting one based upon those reasons. But invariably occasions arise in which the reasons known to the agent fail to single out a determinate option. When reasons cannot determine the option to select on their own, the agent must resort to some form of non-reasoned decision-making (NRDM). This paper distinguishes four different forms of NRDM – picking, randomizing, deferring and judging. Each form may be appropriate under different circumstances. The paper concludes by laying out the theoretical assumptions upon which this account of NRDM rests. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Economics & Philosophy Cambridge University Press

NON-REASONED DECISION-MAKING

Stone, Peter
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 30 (2): 20 – Jun 2, 2014
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Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 
ISSN
1474-0028
eISSN
0266-2671
DOI
10.1017/S0266267114000169
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Human behaviour, like everything else, has causes. Most of the time, those causes can be described as reasons. Human beings perform actions because they have reasons for performing them. They are capable of surveying the options available and then selecting one based upon those reasons. But invariably occasions arise in which the reasons known to the agent fail to single out a determinate option. When reasons cannot determine the option to select on their own, the agent must resort to some form of non-reasoned decision-making (NRDM). This paper distinguishes four different forms of NRDM – picking, randomizing, deferring and judging. Each form may be appropriate under different circumstances. The paper concludes by laying out the theoretical assumptions upon which this account of NRDM rests.

Journal

Economics & Philosophy – Cambridge University Press

Published: Jun 2, 2014

References

  • On acting rationally against one's best judgment
  • Requiring and justifying: two dimensions of normative strength
  • Normative strength and the balance of reasons
  • Allocation by lot: a conceptual and empirical analysis
  • The judgment intuitive: the function of the ‘hunch’ in judicial decision
  • Why be rational?
  • Just lotteries
    Sager, L.
  • Choosing flippantly or non-rational choice
  • Choice without preference
  • Why lotteries are just
  • The logic of random selection
  • Three arguments for lotteries
  • Varieties of indeterminacy
  • Second-order decisions
    Ullmann-Margalit, E.
  • Opting: the case of ‘big’ decisions
  • Picking and choosing
    Morgenbesser, S.