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- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015
- ISSN
- 1474-0028
- eISSN
- 0266-2671
- DOI
- 10.1017/S0266267115000115
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Abstract:I address an overlooked question about the structure of the cognitive/conative model of the mind that underlies much of the work in economics, psychology and philosophy: namely, whether conative states are fundamentally monistic (desire-like) or comparative (preference-like). I argue that two seemingly promising sets of theoretical considerations – namely, the structure of Rational Choice Theory, and considerations of computational efficiency – are unable to resolve this debate. Given this, I suggest that a consideration that speaks in favour of the preference-based view is the fact that it makes it easier to explain certain empirically observed patterns in decision making.
Journal
Economics & Philosophy – Cambridge University Press
Published: May 7, 2015
Keywords: decision theory; preferences; desires; transitivity; utility