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Reviews sThe available empirical evidence suggests that people give priority to assisting an identified person or group at high risk of significant harm (i.e. identified lives) over a person or group who is or will be exposed to the same risk, but has not yet been identified (i.e. statistical lives). This phenomenon is called the ‘identified person bias’ or ‘identified victim effect’. This effect leads us, for instance, to invest more effort and resources in treating sick patients than in preventative measures that avert the same harm to a greater number of people. Is this a ‘bias’ from a normative perspective? Is it an erroneous judgement we ought to correct? That is the central question of this volume edited by Glenn Cohen, Norman Daniels and Nir Eyal.sThis review is structured as follows. First I provide a brief overview of the book's objectives and structure. I will then argue that the identified victim effect is not a bias, reflecting on the insights from cognitive psychology and moral philosophy presented in the book. I will argue that the key to understanding the various positions in the lively debate is not the difference between identified and statistical lives (which have equal value). Instead, http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Economics & Philosophy Cambridge University Press

Reviews

Airoldi, Mara
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 33 (1): 8 – Aug 17, 2016
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Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 
ISSN
1474-0028
eISSN
0266-2671
DOI
10.1017/S0266267116000158
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

sThe available empirical evidence suggests that people give priority to assisting an identified person or group at high risk of significant harm (i.e. identified lives) over a person or group who is or will be exposed to the same risk, but has not yet been identified (i.e. statistical lives). This phenomenon is called the ‘identified person bias’ or ‘identified victim effect’. This effect leads us, for instance, to invest more effort and resources in treating sick patients than in preventative measures that avert the same harm to a greater number of people. Is this a ‘bias’ from a normative perspective? Is it an erroneous judgement we ought to correct? That is the central question of this volume edited by Glenn Cohen, Norman Daniels and Nir Eyal.sThis review is structured as follows. First I provide a brief overview of the book's objectives and structure. I will then argue that the identified victim effect is not a bias, reflecting on the insights from cognitive psychology and moral philosophy presented in the book. I will argue that the key to understanding the various positions in the lively debate is not the difference between identified and statistical lives (which have equal value). Instead,

Journal

Economics & Philosophy – Cambridge University Press

Published: Aug 17, 2016

References

  • Can the NICE “end-of-life premium” be given a coherent ethical justification?