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Reviews Orthodox decision theorists hold that to determine what it is instrumentally rational for a person to do, we only need to know two things: how much the person desires different outcomes and her beliefs about how likely each of her alternatives1 is to realize these outcomes. Similarly, according to the received picture in many of the social sciences (in particular economics), to predict the behaviour of a rational agent we only need to know how much she desires different outcomes and her beliefs about how likely her alternatives are in producing each outcome. Decision theorists and economists of course recognize the phenomenological reality of various attitudes beside desires and beliefs. But the idea is that any attitude that affects a person's behaviour can be modelled as either being part of the person's desires or beliefs.Lara Buchak thinks that there is an important ingredient missing from this standard picture: people's willingness (or not) to accept the risk of something bad in exchange for a chance at something good. Attitudes to risk play a distinct role in rational action, she argues, and decision theorists should therefore distinguish these attitudes from both desires and beliefs. Two individuals might have the same desires http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Economics & Philosophy Cambridge University Press

Reviews

Stefánsson, H. Orri
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 30 (2): 9 – Jun 2, 2014
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Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 
ISSN
1474-0028
eISSN
0266-2671
DOI
10.1017/S0266267114000200
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Orthodox decision theorists hold that to determine what it is instrumentally rational for a person to do, we only need to know two things: how much the person desires different outcomes and her beliefs about how likely each of her alternatives1 is to realize these outcomes. Similarly, according to the received picture in many of the social sciences (in particular economics), to predict the behaviour of a rational agent we only need to know how much she desires different outcomes and her beliefs about how likely her alternatives are in producing each outcome. Decision theorists and economists of course recognize the phenomenological reality of various attitudes beside desires and beliefs. But the idea is that any attitude that affects a person's behaviour can be modelled as either being part of the person's desires or beliefs.Lara Buchak thinks that there is an important ingredient missing from this standard picture: people's willingness (or not) to accept the risk of something bad in exchange for a chance at something good. Attitudes to risk play a distinct role in rational action, she argues, and decision theorists should therefore distinguish these attitudes from both desires and beliefs. Two individuals might have the same desires

Journal

Economics & Philosophy – Cambridge University Press

Published: Jun 2, 2014

References