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Reviews This insightful book covers an impressive range of topics in moral psychology and moral philosophy. Arpaly and Schroeder (‘A&S’) initially bill their book as defending ‘the side of Appetite in the long-standing philosophical dispute between Reason and Appetite’ (2). But it soon becomes clear that their project is something more: to present an overarching view in which the most central phenomena studied by moral philosophers are to be understood in terms of having the right desires. Along the way, they offer accounts of good and ill will, virtue and vice, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, acting for reasons, love, prejudice, addiction and more. At times, one would have liked A&S to go further in fleshing out their views. Nonetheless, they consistently engage with the literature in interesting ways, and there is likely to be something of interest here for everyone working in moral philosophy. Moreover, A&S are well-versed in the psychological and neuroscience literature and consequently are admirably attuned to the nuances of our inner experience. In this review, I sketch A&S's most important views and then raise questions about their theories of desire and blameworthiness.A&S name their package of views ‘Spare Conativism’. At its core lies their theory of good http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Economics & Philosophy Cambridge University Press

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Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 
ISSN
1474-0028
eISSN
0266-2671
DOI
10.1017/S026626711500005X
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This insightful book covers an impressive range of topics in moral psychology and moral philosophy. Arpaly and Schroeder (‘A&S’) initially bill their book as defending ‘the side of Appetite in the long-standing philosophical dispute between Reason and Appetite’ (2). But it soon becomes clear that their project is something more: to present an overarching view in which the most central phenomena studied by moral philosophers are to be understood in terms of having the right desires. Along the way, they offer accounts of good and ill will, virtue and vice, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, acting for reasons, love, prejudice, addiction and more. At times, one would have liked A&S to go further in fleshing out their views. Nonetheless, they consistently engage with the literature in interesting ways, and there is likely to be something of interest here for everyone working in moral philosophy. Moreover, A&S are well-versed in the psychological and neuroscience literature and consequently are admirably attuned to the nuances of our inner experience. In this review, I sketch A&S's most important views and then raise questions about their theories of desire and blameworthiness.A&S name their package of views ‘Spare Conativism’. At its core lies their theory of good

Journal

Economics & PhilosophyCambridge University Press

Published: May 7, 2015

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