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Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government

Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government <jats:p>Some recent theories have blamed the growth of government on budget-maximizing bureaucrats who are assumedly capable of imposing their most preferred budget-output combination on legislatures, subject to cost and demand constraints. However, theoretical examination of the range of bargaining outcomes that might occur between bureau and legislature shows that budget-maximizing behavior does not necessarily lead to super-optimal levels of production, nor do the suggested reforms of competition and privatization necessarily improve the situation. In this bargaining model, the central determinants of governmental growth are not budget-maximizing bureaucrats, but the legislature's decisions regarding mode of oversight and form of internal organization.</jats:p> http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Political Science Review CrossRef

Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government

American Political Science Review , Volume 77 (2): 297-322 – Jun 1, 1983

Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government


Abstract

<jats:p>Some recent theories have blamed the growth of government on budget-maximizing bureaucrats who are assumedly capable of imposing their most preferred budget-output combination on legislatures, subject to cost and demand constraints. However, theoretical examination of the range of bargaining outcomes that might occur between bureau and legislature shows that budget-maximizing behavior does not necessarily lead to super-optimal levels of production, nor do the suggested reforms of competition and privatization necessarily improve the situation. In this bargaining model, the central determinants of governmental growth are not budget-maximizing bureaucrats, but the legislature's decisions regarding mode of oversight and form of internal organization.</jats:p>

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Publisher
CrossRef
ISSN
0003-0554
DOI
10.2307/1958917
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

<jats:p>Some recent theories have blamed the growth of government on budget-maximizing bureaucrats who are assumedly capable of imposing their most preferred budget-output combination on legislatures, subject to cost and demand constraints. However, theoretical examination of the range of bargaining outcomes that might occur between bureau and legislature shows that budget-maximizing behavior does not necessarily lead to super-optimal levels of production, nor do the suggested reforms of competition and privatization necessarily improve the situation. In this bargaining model, the central determinants of governmental growth are not budget-maximizing bureaucrats, but the legislature's decisions regarding mode of oversight and form of internal organization.</jats:p>

Journal

American Political Science ReviewCrossRef

Published: Jun 1, 1983

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