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Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies

Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png SSRN Electronic Journal CrossRef

Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies

SSRN Electronic JournalJan 1, 2000
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Publisher
CrossRef
ISSN
1556-5068
DOI
10.2139/ssrn.1776648
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Journal

SSRN Electronic JournalCrossRef

Published: Jan 1, 2000

There are no references for this article.