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Interfirm Rivalry in a Repeated Game: An Empirical Test of Tacit Collusion

Interfirm Rivalry in a Repeated Game: An Empirical Test of Tacit Collusion http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Industrial Economics CrossRef

Interfirm Rivalry in a Repeated Game: An Empirical Test of Tacit Collusion

The Journal of Industrial Economics , Volume 35 (4): 499 – Jun 1, 1987

Interfirm Rivalry in a Repeated Game: An Empirical Test of Tacit Collusion

The Journal of Industrial Economics , Volume 35 (4): 499 – Jun 1, 1987

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Publisher
CrossRef
ISSN
0022-1821
DOI
10.2307/2098585
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Journal

The Journal of Industrial EconomicsCrossRef

Published: Jun 1, 1987

There are no references for this article.