Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Parties as Utility Maximizers

Parties as Utility Maximizers <jats:p>The article introduces two models of political party decision making. Both models assume that the parties are solely interested in policy and that winning the election is just a means to that end. In one, the parties are competitive, while in the other the parties collude. The main result, in either case, is that the parties tend to be unresponsive to the interests of the voters.</jats:p><jats:p>The models are analyzed in an intransitive case (an election concerned only with income distribution) and a transitive one (an election where all political attitudes can be put on a left-right continuum), and under the assumptions of perfect and imperfect information.</jats:p><jats:p>With perfect information the intransitive case results in the parties ending up with all the income; while in the single peaked case neither party will have a position to the left (right) of the left (right) party's most preferred position whatever the attitudes of the voters.</jats:p><jats:p>Finally it is shown that it is rational for the parties to collude and present similar platforms.</jats:p> http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Political Science Review CrossRef

Parties as Utility Maximizers

American Political Science Review , Volume 67 (2): 490-498 – Jun 1, 1973

Parties as Utility Maximizers


Abstract

<jats:p>The article introduces two models of political party decision making. Both models assume that the parties are solely interested in policy and that winning the election is just a means to that end. In one, the parties are competitive, while in the other the parties collude. The main result, in either case, is that the parties tend to be unresponsive to the interests of the voters.</jats:p><jats:p>The models are analyzed in an intransitive case (an election concerned only with income distribution) and a transitive one (an election where all political attitudes can be put on a left-right continuum), and under the assumptions of perfect and imperfect information.</jats:p><jats:p>With perfect information the intransitive case results in the parties ending up with all the income; while in the single peaked case neither party will have a position to the left (right) of the left (right) party's most preferred position whatever the attitudes of the voters.</jats:p><jats:p>Finally it is shown that it is rational for the parties to collude and present similar platforms.</jats:p>

Loading next page...
 
/lp/crossref/parties-as-utility-maximizers-8lZtxV2Dvv

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
CrossRef
ISSN
0003-0554
DOI
10.2307/1958779
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

<jats:p>The article introduces two models of political party decision making. Both models assume that the parties are solely interested in policy and that winning the election is just a means to that end. In one, the parties are competitive, while in the other the parties collude. The main result, in either case, is that the parties tend to be unresponsive to the interests of the voters.</jats:p><jats:p>The models are analyzed in an intransitive case (an election concerned only with income distribution) and a transitive one (an election where all political attitudes can be put on a left-right continuum), and under the assumptions of perfect and imperfect information.</jats:p><jats:p>With perfect information the intransitive case results in the parties ending up with all the income; while in the single peaked case neither party will have a position to the left (right) of the left (right) party's most preferred position whatever the attitudes of the voters.</jats:p><jats:p>Finally it is shown that it is rational for the parties to collude and present similar platforms.</jats:p>

Journal

American Political Science ReviewCrossRef

Published: Jun 1, 1973

There are no references for this article.