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Asymmetry and Collusion in Sequential Procurement: A "Large Lot Last" Policy

Asymmetry and Collusion in Sequential Procurement: A "Large Lot Last" Policy Sequential procurement of multiple contracts/lots is widespread and often regularly repeated. We analyze how sequentiality and its interaction with asymmetries across bidders and lots affect the sustainability of supplier/bidder collusion. Sequential procurement stabilizes supplier collusion (compared to simultaneous procurement) by allowing not only to identify or punish deviations within the sequence, but also to allocate the “last lot” to the bidder with the highest incentive to defect. We then analyze how to counteract these effects by exploiting (or creating) asymmetries in the value of lots, finding that the most effective policy procures the most valuable lot at the end of each sequence. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics de Gruyter

Asymmetry and Collusion in Sequential Procurement: A "Large Lot Last" Policy

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Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
ISSN
1935-1704
eISSN
1935-1704
DOI
10.2202/1935-1704.1656
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Sequential procurement of multiple contracts/lots is widespread and often regularly repeated. We analyze how sequentiality and its interaction with asymmetries across bidders and lots affect the sustainability of supplier/bidder collusion. Sequential procurement stabilizes supplier collusion (compared to simultaneous procurement) by allowing not only to identify or punish deviations within the sequence, but also to allocate the “last lot” to the bidder with the highest incentive to defect. We then analyze how to counteract these effects by exploiting (or creating) asymmetries in the value of lots, finding that the most effective policy procures the most valuable lot at the end of each sequence.

Journal

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economicsde Gruyter

Published: Oct 7, 2010

Keywords: bid rigging; collusion; procurement; supply; sourcing

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