Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Congestion of Academic Journals Under Papers’ Imperfect Selection

Congestion of Academic Journals Under Papers’ Imperfect Selection Abstract This paper studies how the congestion of its editorial process affects an academic journal. In a publishing game played by researchers and editors, we assume that quality screening by editors depends on their ability to properly process the flow of submissions. When too many papers arrive, this ability declines and editors may reject good papers or accept papers with little contribution to scientific knowledge. In this game, a separating equilibrium always exists in which only good researchers submit their papers to the journal. Each paper is accepted and the quality of the journal reaches its highest level. However, when the researchers’ reward for each publication exceeds a given threshold, two hybrid equilibria are also feasible. In these equilibria, authors of low-quality papers submit their papers to the journal and, as the flow of papers exceeds the editors’ capacity of perfect assessment, the selection process becomes imperfect. This creates an opportunity for authors to submit poor quality papers, a behaviour which contributes to the congestion of the editorial process. The various strategies implemented by the editors to oppose congestion are then discussed. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy de Gruyter

Congestion of Academic Journals Under Papers’ Imperfect Selection

Download PDF
23 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/de-gruyter/congestion-of-academic-journals-under-papers-imperfect-selection-zIV2GC30VH

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by the
ISSN
2194-6108
eISSN
1935-1682
DOI
10.1515/bejeap-2013-0093
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract This paper studies how the congestion of its editorial process affects an academic journal. In a publishing game played by researchers and editors, we assume that quality screening by editors depends on their ability to properly process the flow of submissions. When too many papers arrive, this ability declines and editors may reject good papers or accept papers with little contribution to scientific knowledge. In this game, a separating equilibrium always exists in which only good researchers submit their papers to the journal. Each paper is accepted and the quality of the journal reaches its highest level. However, when the researchers’ reward for each publication exceeds a given threshold, two hybrid equilibria are also feasible. In these equilibria, authors of low-quality papers submit their papers to the journal and, as the flow of papers exceeds the editors’ capacity of perfect assessment, the selection process becomes imperfect. This creates an opportunity for authors to submit poor quality papers, a behaviour which contributes to the congestion of the editorial process. The various strategies implemented by the editors to oppose congestion are then discussed.

Journal

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy – de Gruyter

Published: Jul 1, 2014

References

  • Nine Facts About Top Journals in Economics
    Card
  • The Academic Review Process: How Can We Make It More Efficient?
    Azar
  • The Review Process in Economics: Is It Too Fast?
    Azar
  • The Slowdown of the Economics Publishing Process
    Ellison
  • The Golden Age of Nobel Economists
    Van Dalen
  • The Game Academics Play: Editors versus Authors
    Faria
  • The Inside Scoop: Acceptance and Rejection at the Journal of International Economics
    Cherkashin
  • The Game Academics Play: Editors versus Authors
    Faria
  • Scientific, Business and Political Networks in Academia
    Faria
  • The Inside Scoop: Acceptance and Rejection at the Journal of International Economics
    Cherkashin
  • How Do Editors Select Papers, and How Good Are They at Doing It?
    Hofmeister
  • Open Access and Academic Journal Quality
    McCabe
  • Facts and Myths About Refereeing
    Hamermesh
  • A Theory of Self-Selection in a Market with Matching Frictions: An Application to Delay in Refereeing Times in Economics Journals
    Lee
  • Can Incentives for Research Harm Research? A Business Schools’ Tale
    Besancenot
  • Are Delays in Academic Publishing Necessary?
    Leslie
  • Effect on the Quality of Peer Review of Blinding Reviewers and Asking Them to Sign Their Reports, a Randomized Controlled Trial
    Godlee
  • Peer Review for Journals as It Stands Today–Part 1
    Campanario
  • The Academic Review Process: How Can We Make It More Efficient?
    Azar
  • Competition, Wage Commitments, and Application Fees
    Wang
  • How Are the Mighty Fallen: Rejected Classic Papers by Leading Economists
    Gans
  • A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market
    Besancenot
  • Is Peer Review in Decline?
    Ellison
  • Proliferation of Academic Journals: Effects on Research Quantity and Quality
    Goel
  • The Review Process in Economics: Is It Too Fast?
    Azar
  • The Manuscript Review Process: The Proper Roles of Authors, Referees, and Editors
    Bedeian
  • The Influence of Peer Review on the Research Assessment Exercise
    Bence
  • The Golden Age of Nobel Economists
    Van Dalen
  • The Tragedy of the Reviewer Commons
    Hochberg
  • Multiple Equilibria in a Firing Game with Impartial Justice
    Besancenot
  • How Are the Mighty Fallen: Rejected Classic Papers by Leading Economists
    Gans
  • Nine Facts About Top Journals in Economics
    Card
  • Turning Lemons into Lemonade: Where Is the Value in Peer Reviews?
    Starbuck
  • Why Do Peer Reviewers Decline to Review? A Survey
    Tite
  • The Tragedy of the Reviewer Commons
    Hochberg
  • Reviewer Status and Review Quality: Experience of the Journal of Clinical Investigation
    Stossel
  • Peer Review for Journals as It Stands Today–Part 2
    Campanario
  • A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market
    Besancenot
  • The Manuscript Review Process: The Proper Roles of Authors, Referees, and Editors
    Bedeian
  • Is Peer Review in Decline?
    Ellison
  • Multiple Equilibria in a Firing Game with Impartial Justice
    Besancenot
  • Proliferation of Academic Journals: Effects on Research Quantity and Quality
    Goel
  • Peer Review for Journals as It Stands Today–Part 2
    Campanario
  • How Do Editors Select Papers, and How Good Are They at Doing It?
    Hofmeister
  • Effect on the Quality of Peer Review of Blinding Reviewers and Asking Them to Sign Their Reports, a Randomized Controlled Trial
    Godlee
  • Open Access and Academic Journal Quality
    McCabe
  • The Influence of Peer Review on the Research Assessment Exercise
    Bence
  • Scientific, Business and Political Networks in Academia
    Faria
  • An Examination of the Reliability of Prestigious Scholarly Journals: Evidence and Implications for Decision-Makers
    Oswald
  • Why Do Peer Reviewers Decline to Review? A Survey
    Tite
  • The Slowdown of the Economics Publishing Process
    Ellison
  • Can Incentives for Research Harm Research? A Business Schools’ Tale
    Besancenot
  • Peer Review for Journals as It Stands Today–Part 1
    Campanario
  • Facts and Myths About Refereeing
    Hamermesh
  • Are Delays in Academic Publishing Necessary?
    Leslie
  • Turning Lemons into Lemonade: Where Is the Value in Peer Reviews?
    Starbuck
  • Competition, Wage Commitments, and Application Fees
    Wang
  • A Theory of Self-Selection in a Market with Matching Frictions: An Application to Delay in Refereeing Times in Economics Journals
    Lee
  • Reviewer Status and Review Quality: Experience of the Journal of Clinical Investigation
    Stossel
  • An Examination of the Reliability of Prestigious Scholarly Journals: Evidence and Implications for Decision-Makers
    Oswald