Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
AbstractAn economy is considered in which new firms require time to learn whether they will grow in size and profitability in the long run. The labor market is imperfectly competitive. I show that inefficient levels of firm entry will generally exist. Whether under or over entry occurs is tightly related to the bargaining power of labor, but the logic behind my result differs dramatically from other work which has identified a similar link. The theory may shed some light on the continuing debate over the contribution of small firms to economic growth, and suggests that, in some cases, subsidizing small firms may be socially beneficial.
The B E Journal of Macroeconomics – de Gruyter
Published: Jun 13, 2005
Keywords: bargaining; search; job creation; entry; externality
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.