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Heterogeneous Effects of Informational Nudges on Pro-social Behavior

Heterogeneous Effects of Informational Nudges on Pro-social Behavior Abstract Numerous experimental studies of informational nudges both in the lab and the field have demonstrated not just that informational nudges are effective policy tools for influencing behavior, but also that nudges have heterogeneous impacts that differ depending on the characteristics of the person involved and the situation. We adapt Andreoni’s theory of warm-glow impure altruism to account for how altruism motives respond differently depending on the disposition of the person and the situation. The model explains both positive spillovers (moral cleansing) and negative spillovers (moral licensing) for behavioral interventions, showing that targeting of informational campaigns depends on the complementarity between people’s traits and the intervention’s content. More importantly, the design of economic incentives (like Pigouvian taxes) to shift economic behavior should depend on both the distribution of social preferences in the population and the use of behavioral interventions. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy de Gruyter

Heterogeneous Effects of Informational Nudges on Pro-social Behavior

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Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by the
ISSN
2194-6108
eISSN
1935-1682
DOI
10.1515/bejeap-2014-0125
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract Numerous experimental studies of informational nudges both in the lab and the field have demonstrated not just that informational nudges are effective policy tools for influencing behavior, but also that nudges have heterogeneous impacts that differ depending on the characteristics of the person involved and the situation. We adapt Andreoni’s theory of warm-glow impure altruism to account for how altruism motives respond differently depending on the disposition of the person and the situation. The model explains both positive spillovers (moral cleansing) and negative spillovers (moral licensing) for behavioral interventions, showing that targeting of informational campaigns depends on the complementarity between people’s traits and the intervention’s content. More importantly, the design of economic incentives (like Pigouvian taxes) to shift economic behavior should depend on both the distribution of social preferences in the population and the use of behavioral interventions.

Journal

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policyde Gruyter

Published: Oct 1, 2015

References