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Real Freedom for All Revisited – Normative Justifications of Basic Income

Real Freedom for All Revisited – Normative Justifications of Basic Income IntroductionThinkers occupying starkly different positions on the ideological spectrum have sought to justify some form of basic incomeAfter making the point that basic income is defined in a wide variety of ways in the introduction, my subsequent use of the term refers to the Basic Income Earth Network definition which states: ‘A basic income is a periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an individual basis, without means-test or work requirement’ ( BIEN). (BI). According to Barry (1996), p. 272: ‘It is both a strength and a weakness of basic income that it is ideologically ambiguous.’ I want to argue that this ideological promiscuity is more handicap than asset. Right-wing libertarians like Friedman (1968) and Murray (2013) who frame BI as a replacement for the welfare state have little in common with radicals like Gorz (1999) and Weeks (2011) who see BI as one step along the road to a post-capitalist future. Progressives should be up front about the redistributive implications of a meaningful BI and, therefore, which justifications of BI are valid from a progressive perspective. This paper aims to make a contribution to the ongoing debates regarding the normative justifications of BI. Table 1 provides a summary of the approach taken in this article.Table 1:Real freedom for all vs real freedom for all revisited.Real Freedom for AllReal Freedom for All RevisitedPrinciple of JusticeReal Freedom for AllReal Freedom for AllBasic PremisesCapitalist societies replete with unacceptable inequalities, freedom is of paramount importanceCapitalist societies replete with unacceptable inequalities, freedom is of paramount importanceTheoretical PerspectiveReal-LibertarianPragmatic-UtopianCriterion of compensation for unequal internal resourcesUndominated DiversityNo Single Criterion. Capabilities Approach and Participatory Parity as alternative.Legitimate sources of funding for BIRents from external resources, including jobs as assetsRedistribution of economic resources (in form of cash) from (over)remunerated forms of work and investment to (under)unremunerated forms of work (Total Social Productivity approach)Form of BIRegular Cash PaymentRegular Cash PaymentEconomic SystemOptimal CapitalismOptimal Socialism or Optimal CapitalismRelevant TheoristsJohn Rawls, Amartya Sen, Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman, G.A. Cohen, John RoemerPhilippe Van Parijs, Amartya Sen, Nancy Fraser, G.D.H. Cole, Herbert Simon, Kathi Weeks, André Gorz, Carole Pateman, Erik Olin Wright, Michael HowardSource: Henderson, 2017The paper is centred on a critical engagement with Philippe Van Parijs’ ( 1997) seminal contribution to the literature. Van Parijs, as De Wispelaere (2000, p. 238) writes, endeavours to justify BI as a ‘particular institutional solution’ to ‘the enduring competition between freedom and equality.’ I begin with a reappraisal of Philippe Van Parijs’ ( 1997) real-libertarian perspective on BI and argue that it provides an elegant linking of a principle of justice (real freedom for all) and a policy mechanism (the highest sustainable BI) that should be retained as part of any progressive case for BI.Van Parijs’ treatment of the issue of compensation for unequal internal endowments within a BI framework is less successful. Here, Sen’s (2005)capability approach and Fraser (2001) participatory parity framework may provide better alternatives to Van Parijs’ criterion of undominated diversity. The next section examines Van Parijs’ novel jobs as assets argument in relation to the legitimacy and adequacy of different sources of funding for BI. I conclude that Van Parijs’ specific argument – and the external resources approach in general – are both flawed and unnecessary. Here, I introduce the concept of total social productivity as an alternative to the external resources approach.This approach grounds a justification of BI in a commitment to deep form of social reciprocity. The paper concludes by addressing the compatibility between BI and different economic systems, arguing that BI should be framed as a pragmatic-utopian reform.Real for freedom for all – Van Parijs’ real-libertarian case for basic incomeThe Belgian philosopher Philippe Van Parijs is the pivotal figure in the BI literature of the last three decades. In his key work Real Freedom for All: What (if anything) can justify capitalism? [hereafter RFA] ( 1997), Van Parijs develops a normative justification of BI grounded in a real-libertarian theory of justice. His aim was ‘to spell out a conception of social justice that would articulate to our satisfaction the importance we attach to freedom, equality and efficiency’ that ‘would provide concrete guidance for progressive policy-making as we enter the new century’ ( Van Parijs, 2001, p. 106). The scope of Van Parijs’s ambition can be seen in two aspects of RFA. Firstly, his real-libertarian theory is the product of a sustained critical engagement with the liberal-egalitarian theories of justice developed by Rawls, Ackerman, Dworkin and Sen, among others. Second, he is interested in whether his vision of real-libertarian justice – with BI at its core – is more compatible with socialism or capitalism. The first four sections of this paper focus on the first aspect of Van Parijs’ framework, while the second aspect is explored briefly in the paper’s final section.Van Parijs begins RFA by stating his two basic premises: ‘One: Our capitalist societies are replete with unacceptable inequalities. 2. Freedom is of paramount importance’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 2). He equates social justice with freedom and states that the ‘ideal of a free society must be expressed as a society whose members are maximally free’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 24). Van Parijs (1997, p. 23, 22, 5) rejects as inadequate the narrow conception of freedom as ‘negative liberty’ (formal freedom from coercion) championed by libertarians such as Buchanan and Hayek. While he accepts that ‘security and self-ownership’ are ‘necessary’ conditions of freedom, he argues they are insufficient to ensure it ‘because doing anything requires the use of external objects which security and self-ownership alone cannot guarantee.’ This leads him to adopt the term real freedom to express a notion of liberty that combines ‘having the right to do what one might want to do’ with ‘having the means for doing it.’This is a radical and expansive conception of freedom that, while it shares with them the principle of non-discrimination between rival conceptions of the good life, goes further than many liberal theories in its non-utilitarian and non-welfarist approach to justice. Real freedom does not privilege current preferences over future preferences, or even actual preferences over possible preferences. Rather, it is centred on the principle of keeping the doorway to autonomous decisions and activities permanently ajar for all individuals throughout their lives.In summary, Van Parijs’ real-libertarian justice demands that security, self-ownership and leximin opportunity be guaranteed. To provide leximin opportunity, he argues, the real freedom of the least advantaged members of a given society should be maximinned subject to the security and self-ownership of all members of society being protected ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 21, 27).There is a clear family resemblance here between Van Parijs’ real-libertarian framework and Rawls’ ( 1985) justice as fairness approach. In Rawls’ schema, liberty takes lexical priority over equality of opportunity, while Van Parijs accords a ‘soft lexicographic priority’ to security and self-ownership over leximin opportunity. Rawls argues that inequality is only justified if it is ‘to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged’ and that access to an index of ‘primary social goods’ should be maximinned. For Van Parijs, it is access to real freedom that should be maximinned (Rawls in Callinicos, 2000, p. 46, Van Parijs, 1997, p. 27–28).Van Parijs argues that the optimal way to achieve maximin real freedom would be to provide each individual with an unconditional BI set at the highest sustainable level ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 32). He describes this as a ‘radical suggestion’ that challenges both ‘libertarians and their close kin’s desperate groping for a narrow concept of freedom’ and social democrats ‘so concerned with the real freedom to consume as abundantly as one might wish that they lose sight of the real freedom to live as unconventionally as one might fancy’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 34).The concept of real freedom and the place of BI within real-libertarian theory have been critiqued (see Barry, 1996), and alternatives to Van Parijs’s framework have been advanced (see Widerquist, 2013). Many scholars – including Gorz (1999), Pateman (2004), Wright (2006), and Weeks (2011) – stress the importance of BI providing an exit option from oppressive relationships, such as the wage relation and the sexual contract. These perspectives suggest that BI would need to reach a specific threshold level in order for it to provide effective freedom to individuals.The key implication here in relation to Van Parijs’ framework is the relationship between this threshold level of BI and his sustainability constraint. This sustainability constraint on the level of BI will never be fixed and stable due to the shifting economic, social, ideological and political conditions that obtain in a given society at different points in time.In specific contexts, this constraint may operate to ensure that only a very low universal BI is feasible and, therefore, the exit option threshold will not be reached. In such a case, while the real freedom horizons for individuals will be clearly reduced when compared with BI at the threshold level, the capacity of the least advantaged to achieve their objectives may still be enhanced due to the poverty reduction effects of even a small, regular cash payment.Barry (1996) raises issues related to the measurement of real freedom and its relationship to BI. He argues that it is ‘generally … impossible to discover who is the worst-off in terms of real freedom in a given situation’ and that Van Parijs’ treatment of ‘income at market prices as a true measure of real freedom is a heroic solution to the problem of the incommensurability of choice sets’ ( Barry, 1996, p. 256).These are serious criticisms for which there is, at best, a pragmatic response. It is possible – as a thought experiment – to imagine a real freedom super computer that could provide individualised bundles of goods and services (in cash and in kind) that generate maximin real freedom outcomes superior to a uniform BI in cash. However, such a system would obviously face major informational, political, economic and institutional barriers that make it less practically feasible than a BI in cash.Van Parijs concedes that some public goods (law and order, defence, clean air, education, infrastructure) should be supplied via collective provision, but defends a cash income paid to individuals over an exclusively in-kind provision of BI via a bundle of goods and services ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 42–46). Money incomes constitute a flexible claim over heterogeneous sets of goods and services, including leisure. For this reason, at least in a capitalist society, it is difficult to identify any clearly superior alternative to the highest sustainable BI if the goal is maximin real freedom.If real freedom is defined as the freedom to do what one might want to do and having the means to do it, a regular income will likely produce superior outcomes to those generated by a stakeholder grant. However, a regular income will clearly not suit the preferences of some individuals – including some among the least advantaged – and there may be a case for permitting individuals to receive part of their BI in the form of a grant. (For example, individuals could elect not to receive a $15,000 annual BI for five years in order to then receive a $75,000 lump sum that could be used for various purposes).These and other criticisms notwithstanding, Van Parijs has done BI scholars a great service by developing a theoretical framework that provides such an elegant linking of an egalitarian principle of justice (real freedom for all) with a practical policy mechanism (the highest sustainable BI). This debt acknowledged, his thesis could be further strengthened via a revision of his treatment of unequal internal endowments and the jobs as assets argument.Compensation for unequal internal endowmentsHaving made the case for an equal right to an unconditional BI in RFA, Van Parijs turns his attention the question of whether there are legitimate grounds for compensating some individuals for various ‘handicaps’ – unequal internal endowments – that affect their capacity to ‘pursue their conception of a good life’ ( Van Parijs, 1990, p. 344). Compensation here refers to whether some individuals should receive a higher BI (or additional transfer/service) than others on the basis of their handicaps.He deploys an adaptation of Ackerman’s criterion of undominated diversity in order to interrogate this issue. Raventós (2007), p. 42 explains the criterion as follows: ‘The internal endowments of X ‘dominate’ (can be seen as more valuable than) the internal endowments of Z if and only if every individual, given his or her conception of a good life, would prefer X’s endowment to Z’s.’Van Parijs applies the criterion to the task of differentiating the internal endowments of the ‘normal’ and the ‘handicapped.’ He argues that for ‘any “normal” person X … it is very unlikely that there will be any single person which all would regard as better endowed than X’ whereas ‘for any “handicapped” person Y … it will be easy to find people whom all would regard as better endowed.’ Therefore, he argues, ‘all the “handicapped” will be entitled to compensation from some other (less) “handicapped” and from many (not necessarily) all “normal” persons.’ He argues that compensation could be paid by reducing the universal BI until ‘for each pair of comprehensive, i. e. internal cum external, endowments, there is at least one person who prefers either endowment to the other.’ For a detailed discussion of his treatment of this criterion see Van Parijs (1990, 1997) .Van Parijs concedes that there would be ‘quite a bit of guesswork about what people’s judgements would be with full information and understanding’ but that ‘it seems plausible that a set of specific transfers to various categories of standard “handicaps”, coupled with a basic health insurance, would be the best approximation’ ( Van Parijs, 1990, p. 346–351).However, I argue that this approach is unlikely to prove workable in any practical sense and that there are preferable alternatives. Specifically, Sen’s capability approach and Fraser’s participatory parity framework may be better suited to the task of assessing the need for additional compensation on the grounds of unequal internal endowments and misrecognition.The capability approach focuses on the differing ability of individuals to convert personal, social and environmental resources into specific functionings and beings ( Robeyns, 2003, p. 543–544). It calls for a pragmatic, context-specific assessment of the different barriers individuals face in relation to achieving desired outcomes, and of the remedies that may reduce/remove these obstacles. Robeyns (2003, p. 547) argues that, unlike various liberal perspectives, the ‘capability approach could provide a useful framework when we want to address the injustice created by the gender division of labour’ because ‘preference formation, socialisation, subtle forms of discrimination and the impact of social and moral norms are not taken for granted or assumed away, but analysed up front.’Similarly, Fraser invites us to identify – and remove – the barriers that prevent individuals (often members of subordinated groups) from achieving the status of ‘a full member of society, capable of participating on a par with other members’ ( Fraser, 2001, p. 24). Thus, she argues, participatory parity requires both redistribution and recognition.Redistribution must change ‘social arrangements that institutionalise deprivation, exploitation and gross disparities in wealth, income and leisure time’, while recognition must remove the ‘institutionalised patterns of cultural value [that] constitute some actors as inferior, excluded, wholly other or simply invisible, hence as less than full partners in social interaction’ ( Fraser, 2001, p. 29, 24). Fraser (2001) rejects an identity politics that engenders ‘separatism and group enclaving’ in favour of a species of recognition that encourages participatory parity by not ‘burdening’ individuals and groups ‘with excessive ascribed “difference” or … failing to acknowledge their distinctiveness.’Robeyns (2003, p. 548–549) sees a strong overlap between the two approaches but concludes that the capability approach has wider applicability as it valorises functionings and beings that are of ‘intrinsic importance’ to individuals while not necessarily being related to their ‘participation in society.’ Whatever their relative merits, both approaches make clear that there is no single criterion on which compensation for unequal internal endowments can be based.This has obvious implications for Van Parijs’ framework as it leaves open the question of how to weight the relative importance of a universal right to a universal BI set at the highest sustainable level against the requirements of enhancing the capabilities of disadvantaged individuals and of universalising participatory parity.This is not, in my view, an argument against a universal BI which, as long as it results in a net transfer of economic resources from the most advantaged to the least advantaged members of a given society, should be expected to improve the capacity of many individuals with a disability – and of those suffering social exclusion – to better pursue their conception of the good life. However, there will still be a case for reducing the level of the universal BI in order to increase the real freedom available to the least advantaged individuals.There is no easy answer as to how to deal with this problem in practical terms. However, it is likely that, at least in wealthy societies, these goals (i. e. universal BI, expanded disability support services, universal childcare, progressive legal and educational reform) can be pursued simultaneously. The precise policy mix and distribution of resources can only be decided by the messy process of continuous democratic deliberation, complemented by ongoing analysis of the evidence regarding the relationship between specific policies and desired social ends.The legitimacy of a substantial basic incomeIn RFA Van Parijs investigates whether there are real-libertarian grounds for taxing external resources in order to fund a substantial BI. Here, he draws on Ronald Dworkin’s (1981)equality of resources approach to distributive justice, adding his own novel twist.Dworkin was concerned with theorising an ideal mechanism for equalising the external resources/endowments available to individuals in a manner that promoted ‘envy-freeness’ (i. e. individuals would not envy each other’s bundles of external resources). He was interested in articulating a scheme that would reduce the effects of brute luck (circumstances you are born into, talents you have) on an individual’s life, while allowing for option luck (choices you make, ambitions you have) to operate.Dworkin proposed the ideal mechanism of a clamshell auction, where each individual would be given an equal number of clamshells to bid for the available external resources in a given society. These auctions would be supplemented by various insurance schemes to deal with handicaps and other manifestations of brute luck. While arguing that his scheme may have some practical application, Dworkin conceded that, in its initial formulation, it was ‘in the main … entirely theoretical’ (Dworkin, 1981, p. 284–292).In RFAVan Parijs (1997), p. 102 defines external endowments broadly as the ‘external wealth with which people endowed.’ This includes everything from ‘factories … private homes and public bridges’ to ‘computer programmes, nuclear technology … beaches, pumpkins, and parrots.’ He argues that a yield-maximising tax on all gifts and bequests of these external endowments would provide a legitimate tax base for a universal BI. However, he calculates that any such BI would be ‘pathetically low to frankly negligible’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 103).At this point he introduces an innovation by proposing that jobs be treated as assets and, therefore, as part of the stock of society’s external resources. He argues that, because most labour markets are not perfectly competitive, job-holders receive a rent that could be legitimately appropriated as a source of funding for BI.Van Parijs appears to have two concepts of rent in his treatment of jobs as assets. Firstly, the ‘rents are given by the difference between income (and other advantages) the employed derive from their job, and the (lower) income they would need to get if the markets were to clear.’ Second, ‘the existence of large employment rents, as manifested by the presence of envy over job endowments, and not the fact that many people are without a job at all’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 102–103, 109–110).He puts forward the idea of a Dworkinian auction to establish ‘the competitive price for each [job]’ and ‘hence the employment rents associated to each type of job’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 114). Here again, Van Parijs concedes that in ‘practical terms … the idea of organising a large independent set of auctions, each matched to a particular type of job, does not make much sense’ and suggests instead that a yield-maximising progressive income tax could serve as a second-best option for taxing employment rents to fund a higher BI ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 116, 124–125).Van Parijs’ treatment of jobs as assets is unsatisfactory and, in my view, unnecessary. Firstly, once we accept of the second-best option of using progressive income tax as a proxy for employment rents it is clear that there is no precise, quantifiable relationship between the rents that would be established under the auctions (that do not take place) and the level of income tax that is levied at any given point in time. We have moved from a precise theoretical scheme to a second-best practical measure.Second, there are good grounds for rejecting any requirement to identify specific external resources (land, inherited wealth, carbon emissions, intellectual property, bandwidth, jobs) that can be legitimately taxed to fund BI. This is because the material wealth of a given society is the product of the overwhelmingly social character of economic relations and the evolutionary nature of economic change.On this point, I agree with Herbert Simon’s Simon (2013) contention that social capital is ‘a major source of differences in income, between and within countries.’ Simon defines social capital as ‘knowledge, and participation in kinship and other privileged social relations’ and estimates that ‘it is hard to conclude that social capital can produce less than about 90 % of income in wealthy societies’ (Simon in Widerquist et al., 2013, p. 240–241). In terms of the BI literature, this approach to conceptualising the material wealth of society can be seen in the Fabian socialist economist G.D.H. Cole’s (1935) argument for a social dividend based on ‘a recognition of each citizen’s claim as a consumer to share in the common heritage of productive power’ (Cole in Cunliffe and Erreygers, 2004, p. 235). Alperovitz (2016) has also linked this ‘gift from the past’ or ‘technological inheritance’ to the case for BI.Furthermore, all individuals are subject to the triple-accident of birth: they have no choice over the time, place and class into which they emerge. Individuals with diverse internal endowments born in mediaeval England shared a common constraint of lower material living standards when compared to individuals with diverse internal endowments born in late-twentieth century Japan.These arguments serve to demote the individual and the static in favour of the social and the evolutionary in relation to our understanding of the production and reproduction of material wealth. Put simply, it is not possible to quantify, with any rigour, the precise contribution of discrete individuals to the magnitude of social wealth and, therefore, to assign to each individual (in money terms) their legitimate share of this social wealth.On this basis, I would like to put forward the idea of total social productivity (TSP) as an alternative means of conceptualising the relationship between social wealth and individual rights. I define TSP for a given society as the sum of the value of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and unremunerated work (UW) for a given period of time (i. e. a year).This can be expressed as TSP = GDP + UWThe practical task here is two estimate the value of the magnitudes of GDP and UW (in money terms) and their ratio for a particular country or region.GDP is a measure of the final market value of all goods and services produced in a given territory within a given period of time. It is far from perfect as a measure of wealth and progress and has been critiqued on numerous grounds (see Gleeson-White, 2014). However, it remains the case that, in most instances, sustained GDP growth is positively associated with rising per capita incomes (a flow) and increasing per capita wealth (a stock) over time. While these averages tell us nothing about the distribution of income and wealth within a particular society, the magnitude of GDP is an important measure of the economic resources available to fund the highest sustainable BI for the society concerned. For example, a comparison of the respective GDP figures for Switzerland and Zimbabwe since 1950 will clearly show that Switzerland has the capacity to fund a higher BI today. In summary, GDP is one way of describing socially produced wealth and its magnitude defines one constraint on the highest sustainable BI.UW, the second component of TSP, can be defined and measured in different ways. For example, in one study based on analysis of time-use surveys, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) used three separate methods to estimate the total value of unpaid for the years 1992 and 1997. The ABS calculated a ratio of the value of unpaid work to GDP of between 43 % and 54 % for the reference years (ABS, 2001).A more recent study based on ABS data estimated the ‘imputed value’ (in Australian dollar terms) of unpaid care work (domestic activities, child care, and voluntary work and care) at ‘between $601 billion (replacement cost valuation method) and $699 billion (opportunity cost valuation method). The mid-point ($650 billion), which if actually transacted, equates to just over half of Australia’s GDP’ ( Hoenig & Page, 2012, p. vii).There are, of course, questions that can be raised regarding the reliability of the data generated by self-reported time-use surveys and the merits of the various methods employed for estimating the value of UW. However, just as GDP is an imperfect indicator of a country or region’s wealth, attempts to quantify the aggregate value of UW provide an imperfect way of representing the different activities that comprise UW as a single magnitude that can be compared to GDP, as in the examples cited above. This allows us to better comprehend both scale on which UW takes place and gives us estimates of the aggregate opportunity cost – in terms of market income, career opportunities and voluntary leisure foregone – for those who perform it.Feminist scholars, among others, have consistently pointed to evidence showing that women perform a disproportionate share of UW, and that the production and reproduction of society is heavily dependent on that labour. If we accept Van Parijs’ ( 1997, p. 5) argument that real freedom combines ‘having the right to do what one might want to do’ with ‘having the means for doing it’ – and that the highest sustainable BI is the optimal way of providing the means to real freedom – it follows that those who perform a disproportionate share of UW are more likely to be disadvantaged in real freedom terms than other members of society.Therefore, to the extent that BI results in a net transfer of economic resources (in cash) from (over)remunerated forms of work and investment to (under)unremunerated forms of work, it should be expected to contribute to a fairer distribution of the financial and non-financial benefits that accrue to individuals in the form of labour and capital income while, at the same time, enhancing the real freedom available to those who perform a disproportionate share of UW.TSP requires further theoretical development and empirical testing. For example, regarding whether Net National Income should be used instead of GDP, and the best method for estimating the value of UW. However, the TSP approach, I argue, has the considerable merit of grounding the normative justification of BI in a commitment to a deep form of social reciprocity.GDP and UW – and their interrelationship – are the product of cumulative, cyclical and heterogeneous forms of social interaction. Therefore, I argue, an individual’s right to maximin real freedom in the form of BI stems from said individual’s participation in a complex social order that produces wealth and work in different forms, magnitudes and ratios. (By participation, here I mean existence within rather than the performance of any specific activities).In summary, the TSP approach abandons any attempt to justify a substantial BI in relation to particular external resources, including jobs. Instead, this approach argues that: (1) an individual’s right to maximin real freedom in the form of BI stems from his/her (involuntary) participation in a complex social order, (2) the magnitude of GDP for a given society represents a constraint on the highest sustainable BI, and (3) the magnitude of UW (and its ratio to GDP) for a given society provides an estimate of the value (and opportunity cost) of forms of uncompensated (but socially important) activity that may disadvantage individuals in real freedom terms and, thereby, strengthen the case for BI.The capitalist road to communism?Van Parijs has a long-standing connection to Marxist analysis as evidenced by his involvement in the ‘September group’, a network ‘primarily associated with the analytical exploration of Marxian themes’ that was set up by G. A. Cohen, Jon Elster and John Roemer in 1978 ( Birnbaum, 2013, p. 345). However, it was in his paper ‘A Capitalist Road to Communism’ ( Van Der Veen & Van Parijs, 2006) that he explored the potential of BI to achieve the emancipatory outcome encapsulated in the principle of ‘from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs’ that Marx equated with the ‘higher stage of communism’ ( Marx, 1970).Van Der Veen & Van Parijs (2006, p. 4) argue that increasing the level of BI over time would result in ‘a gradual increase of the part of the social product distributed according to needs vis-à-vis the part distributed according to contribution.’ They acknowledge that inequality and exploitation would still exist with BI, but suggest that if the emancipatory aspect of Marx’s thought is given primacy ‘we need not be bothered by the persistence of substantial inequalities, because everyone’s fundamental needs are covered anyway.’ Defining ‘fundamental needs’ and setting a BI threshold adequate to meet these needs is clearly of great importance here ( Van Der Veen & Van Parijs, 2006, p. 20).Howard (2015, p. 283) is another scholar who emphasises the ‘liberatory element’ of Marx’s vision in relation to justifying BI. He contends that, with BI covering basic needs, ‘Labour that is volunteered would … count as “exploitative”, but not as “unjust”’( Howard, 2015, p. 290). However, he also concedes that BI could be seen as ‘a retreat from the aspirations of Marxism’ ( Howard, 2015, p. 283).There is a difficulty here in deciphering exactly what those aspirations were. As Hudis (2013, p. 35) observes, ‘Marx never devoted a work to the alternative to capitalism’ and his thinking on this subject has to be ‘gleaned from a careful study of an array of diverse and difficult texts.’ This difficulty notwithstanding, Marx’s radical vision of human emancipation clearly goes beyond capitalism – and even communism – to what he described as ‘a totality of human manifestations of life’ (Marx in Hudis, 2013, p. 74).Marx stressed the critical importance of time as ‘the measure of human life’ and ‘the space for its development’ (Marx in Hudis, 2013, p. 144). It is on this point – the relationship between human freedom and time – that there is perhaps an overlap between the aspirations of Marxism and the potential effects of BI. An unconditional basic income would enhance the capacity of individuals to command time, in the sense that they could engage in more freely chosen activity during their finite and indeterminate lifespans.For Gorz (1999) such a shift to freely chosen ‘multi-activity’ would presage the end of wage labour and mark an “exit route” from capitalism. However, it is at least as likely that BI could co-exist with both a modified system of wage labour and the self-expansion of value as the key driver of the economic system. Even so, BI, as Marx argued in relation to ‘shortening of the working day’, could still function to expand the ‘realm of freedom’ within capitalist society ( Marx, 1981, p. 959).If we accept that BI is an institutional means to the end of human emancipation, a related question goes to the compatibility between BI maximisation and different economic systems. In RFA Van Parijs examines the question of whether capitalism or socialism would perform better on the criterion of ‘constrained basic income maximisation’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 187). He differentiates capitalism from socialism ‘in terms of private versus public ownership of society’s (non-human) capital, of its (material) means of production’ and investigates whether ‘the optimal variant of capitalism would perform better … than the optimal variant of socialism in terms of our criterion’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 6, 187).Van Parijs identifies optimal socialism’s key advantage as ‘popular sovereignty’ defined as ‘a political community’s ability to steer the use of its resources according to democratically determined will’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 190). However, he argues that this advantage would not be sufficient to outweigh the ‘dynamic impulse capitalism owes to the imperative to innovate or perish’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 221).In truth, the question of whether the dynamism of capitalist competition would trump the democratic authority of socialism on the criterion of constrained BI maximisation is impossible to answer in the abstract. Only the parallel existence of optimal capitalist and optimal socialist societies with BI would provide the evidence on which an assessment of their respective claims could be made. Given the breadth and depth of global capitalism today, there is a strong likelihood that any experiments with BI will occur first within capitalist societies.The final point I wish to emphasise in this section is that the pragmatic and utopian aspects of the normative justification of BI should be held in tension. Kathi Weeks’ ( 2011) framing of BI as a utopian demand captures both these dimensions when she writes ( 2001, p. 221): ‘to function effectively as a utopia, the demand must constitute a radical and potentially far-reaching change, generate critical distance, and stimulate the political imagination. To function optimally as a demand, a utopian demand should be recognisable as a possibility grounded in actually existing tendencies.’The demand for BI is utopian in that it threatens a (partial) rupture of the link between paid work and income; a rupture that goes beyond means-tested, conditional transfers. Weeks characterises this demand as ‘a provocation to freedom and … of desire’ that is radical in ‘its anti-ascetism’ ( Weeks, 2011, p. 145–146). The demand is pragmatic in the sense that it can be better understood as a renovation of the existing social order rather than its wholesale replacement.ConclusionInterest in BI experiences peaks and troughs within academic discourse and public debate. The 2016 Swiss referendum on introducing BI – although attracting just 23 % of the vote – together with the BI trial in Finland that commenced in 2017, demonstrate a renewed level of enthusiasm for this radical reform.In the 1960s and 1970s economists were prominent contributors to the BI literature, but since the 1980s philosophers have led the debate. This disciplinary shift has generated important contributions to – and refinements of – the normative justifications of BI, foremost among these being Philippe Van Parijs’ work.In this paper I attempted to contribute to this literature via a critical reappraisal of Van Parijs’ real-libertarian justification of BI. I argued that his principle of justice – real freedom for all – tied to an institutional policy mechanism – the highest sustainable BI – should form a key plank of any progressive case for BI.On the other hand, I rejected Van Parijs’ use of undominated diversity as a single criterion for providing compensation for unequal internal endowments, and suggested some pragmatic alternatives.I also argued against Van Parijs’ treatment of jobs as assets – and the external resources approach in general – as a means of identifying legitimate funding sources for a substantial BI. I introduced the concept of TSP as an alternative way to understand the production and reproduction of society as a fundamentally social and evolutionary process, and argued that this approach anchors the justification of BI in a deep form of social reciprocity.The article concluded by situating the case for BI in relation to both Marx’s vision of human emancipation and Van der Veen and Van Parijs’ discussion of optimal variants of socialism and capitalism. Finally, I argued that BI should be framed as a pragmatic-utopian reform, with the pragmatic and utopian dimensions of BI held in tension.BibliographyAlperovitz, G (2016). Technological inheritance and the case for a basic income. Economic Security Project, . 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Basic Income Earth Network Retrieved from http://basicincome.org/basic-income/ About basic income.BIENXXXXBasic Income Earth NetworkRetrieved from http://basicincome.org/basic-income/About basic incomeBirnbaum, S (2013). Self-ownership, liberal neutrality and the realm of freedom: New reflections on the justification of basic income. Jurisprudence, 4(2), 344–357.BirnbaumS2013Self-ownership, liberal neutrality and the realm of freedom: New reflections on the justification of basic incomeJurisprudence42344357Callinicos, A (2000). Equality. Cambridge: Polity.CallinicosA2000EqualityCambridgePolityCole, G.D.H. (1935). G.D.H. Cole. Cunliffe, J & G Erreygers (Eds.) (2004). The origins of universal grants: an anthology of historical writings on basic capital and basic income. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.ColeG.D.H.1935G.D.H. ColeCunliffeJErreygersG2004The origins of universal grants: an anthology of historical writings on basic capital and basic incomeNew YorkPalgrave MacmillanDe Wispelaere, J (2000). Sharing job resources: Ethical reflections on the justification of basic income. Analyse & Kritik, 22/2000, 237–256.De WispelaereJ2000Sharing job resources: Ethical reflections on the justification of basic incomeAnalyse & Kritik22/2000237256Dworkin, R (1981). What is equality? Part 2: Equality of resources. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10(3), 283–345. (Summer, 1981).DworkinR1981What is equality? Part 2: Equality of resourcesPhilosophy and Public Affairs103283345(Summer, 1981)Fraser, N (2001). Recognition without ethics? Theory, Culture (Society), 18(2–3), 21–42.FraserN2001Recognition without ethics?Theory, Culture (Society)182–32142Friedman, M (1968). The case for a negative income tax: A view from the right. Widerquist, K., J. A. Noguera, Wanderborght & J. D. Wispelaere (Eds.), Basic income: An anthology of contemporary research (pp. 11–16). Chichester: Wiley Blackwell 2013.FriedmanM1968The case for a negative income tax: A view from the rightWiderquistK.NogueraJ. A.WanderborghtWispelaereJ. D.Basic income: An anthology of contemporary research1116ChichesterWiley Blackwell2013Gleeson-White, J (2014). Six capitals: The revolution capitalism has to have – or can accountants save the planet?. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.Gleeson-WhiteJ2014Six capitals: The revolution capitalism has to have – or can accountants save the planet?SydneyAllen & UnwinGorz, A (1999). Reclaiming work: Beyond the wage-based society. Cambridge: Polity Press.GorzA1999Reclaiming work: Beyond the wage-based societyCambridgePolity PressHoenig, S. & Page, A (2012). 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Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14(3), 223–251.RawlsJ1985Justice as fairness: political not metaphysicalPhilosophy and Public Affairs143223251Raventós, D (2007). Basic income: The material conditions of freedom. London: Pluto Press.RaventósD2007Basic income: The material conditions of freedomLondonPluto PressRobeyns, I (2003). Is Nancy Fraser’s critique of theories of distributive justice justified? Constellations, 10(4), 538–553.RobeynsI2003Is Nancy Fraser’s critique of theories of distributive justice justified?Constellations104538553Sen, Amartya (2005). Human Rights and Capabilities. Journal of Human Development, 6(2), 151–166. June 11 2017. DOI:10.1080/14649880500120491.SenAmartya2005Human Rights and CapabilitiesJournal of Human Development62151166June 11 201710.1080/14649880500120491Simon, H (2013). Universal basic income and the flat tax. Widerquist, K., J. A. Noguera, Wanderborght & J. De Wispelaere (Eds.), Basic income: An anthology of contemporary research (pp. 240–241). Chichester: Wiley Blackwell.SimonH2013Universal basic income and the flat taxWiderquistK.NogueraJ. A.WanderborghtDe WispelaereJ.Basic income: An anthology of contemporary research240241ChichesterWiley BlackwellVan Der Veen, R. & Van Parijs, P (2006). A capitalist road to communism. Basic Income Studies, 1(1), 6. .Van Der VeenR.Van ParijsP2006A capitalist road to communismBasic Income Studies116Van Parijs, P (1990). Equal endowments as undominated diversity. Louvain Economic Review, 56(¾), 327–355.Van ParijsP1990Equal endowments as undominated diversityLouvain Economic Review56¾327355Van Parijs, P (1997). Real freedom for all: What (if Anything) can justify capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Van ParijsP1997Real freedom for all: What (if Anything) can justify capitalismOxfordOxford University PressVan Parijs, P (2001). Real freedom, the market and the family. Analyse & Kritik, 23/2001, 106–131.Van ParijsP2001Real freedom, the market and the familyAnalyse & Kritik23/2001106131Weeks, K (2011). The problem with work: Feminism, marxism, antiwork politics, and postwork imaginaries. Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books.WeeksK2011The problem with work: Feminism, marxism, antiwork politics, and postwork imaginariesDurham, NCDuke University Press BooksWiderquist, K (2013). Why we demand a basic income. Widerquist, K., J. A. Noguera, Wanderborght & J. De Wispelaere (Eds.), Basic income: An anthology of contemporary research (pp. 32–38). Chichester: Wiley Blackwell.WiderquistK2013Why we demand a basic incomeWiderquistK.NogueraJ. A.WanderborghtDe WispelaereJ.Basic income: An anthology of contemporary research3238ChichesterWiley BlackwellWright, E. O (2006). Basic income as a socialist project. Basic Income Studies, 1(1), 12. .WrightE. O2006Basic income as a socialist projectBasic Income Studies1112 http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Basic Income Studies de Gruyter

Real Freedom for All Revisited – Normative Justifications of Basic Income

Henderson, Troy
Basic Income Studies , Volume 12 (1): 1 – Jun 22, 2017
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Abstract

IntroductionThinkers occupying starkly different positions on the ideological spectrum have sought to justify some form of basic incomeAfter making the point that basic income is defined in a wide variety of ways in the introduction, my subsequent use of the term refers to the Basic Income Earth Network definition which states: ‘A basic income is a periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an individual basis, without means-test or work requirement’ ( BIEN). (BI). According to Barry (1996), p. 272: ‘It is both a strength and a weakness of basic income that it is ideologically ambiguous.’ I want to argue that this ideological promiscuity is more handicap than asset. Right-wing libertarians like Friedman (1968) and Murray (2013) who frame BI as a replacement for the welfare state have little in common with radicals like Gorz (1999) and Weeks (2011) who see BI as one step along the road to a post-capitalist future. Progressives should be up front about the redistributive implications of a meaningful BI and, therefore, which justifications of BI are valid from a progressive perspective. This paper aims to make a contribution to the ongoing debates regarding the normative justifications of BI. Table 1 provides a summary of the approach taken in this article.Table 1:Real freedom for all vs real freedom for all revisited.Real Freedom for AllReal Freedom for All RevisitedPrinciple of JusticeReal Freedom for AllReal Freedom for AllBasic PremisesCapitalist societies replete with unacceptable inequalities, freedom is of paramount importanceCapitalist societies replete with unacceptable inequalities, freedom is of paramount importanceTheoretical PerspectiveReal-LibertarianPragmatic-UtopianCriterion of compensation for unequal internal resourcesUndominated DiversityNo Single Criterion. Capabilities Approach and Participatory Parity as alternative.Legitimate sources of funding for BIRents from external resources, including jobs as assetsRedistribution of economic resources (in form of cash) from (over)remunerated forms of work and investment to (under)unremunerated forms of work (Total Social Productivity approach)Form of BIRegular Cash PaymentRegular Cash PaymentEconomic SystemOptimal CapitalismOptimal Socialism or Optimal CapitalismRelevant TheoristsJohn Rawls, Amartya Sen, Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman, G.A. Cohen, John RoemerPhilippe Van Parijs, Amartya Sen, Nancy Fraser, G.D.H. Cole, Herbert Simon, Kathi Weeks, André Gorz, Carole Pateman, Erik Olin Wright, Michael HowardSource: Henderson, 2017The paper is centred on a critical engagement with Philippe Van Parijs’ ( 1997) seminal contribution to the literature. Van Parijs, as De Wispelaere (2000, p. 238) writes, endeavours to justify BI as a ‘particular institutional solution’ to ‘the enduring competition between freedom and equality.’ I begin with a reappraisal of Philippe Van Parijs’ ( 1997) real-libertarian perspective on BI and argue that it provides an elegant linking of a principle of justice (real freedom for all) and a policy mechanism (the highest sustainable BI) that should be retained as part of any progressive case for BI.Van Parijs’ treatment of the issue of compensation for unequal internal endowments within a BI framework is less successful. Here, Sen’s (2005)capability approach and Fraser (2001) participatory parity framework may provide better alternatives to Van Parijs’ criterion of undominated diversity. The next section examines Van Parijs’ novel jobs as assets argument in relation to the legitimacy and adequacy of different sources of funding for BI. I conclude that Van Parijs’ specific argument – and the external resources approach in general – are both flawed and unnecessary. Here, I introduce the concept of total social productivity as an alternative to the external resources approach.This approach grounds a justification of BI in a commitment to deep form of social reciprocity. The paper concludes by addressing the compatibility between BI and different economic systems, arguing that BI should be framed as a pragmatic-utopian reform.Real for freedom for all – Van Parijs’ real-libertarian case for basic incomeThe Belgian philosopher Philippe Van Parijs is the pivotal figure in the BI literature of the last three decades. In his key work Real Freedom for All: What (if anything) can justify capitalism? [hereafter RFA] ( 1997), Van Parijs develops a normative justification of BI grounded in a real-libertarian theory of justice. His aim was ‘to spell out a conception of social justice that would articulate to our satisfaction the importance we attach to freedom, equality and efficiency’ that ‘would provide concrete guidance for progressive policy-making as we enter the new century’ ( Van Parijs, 2001, p. 106). The scope of Van Parijs’s ambition can be seen in two aspects of RFA. Firstly, his real-libertarian theory is the product of a sustained critical engagement with the liberal-egalitarian theories of justice developed by Rawls, Ackerman, Dworkin and Sen, among others. Second, he is interested in whether his vision of real-libertarian justice – with BI at its core – is more compatible with socialism or capitalism. The first four sections of this paper focus on the first aspect of Van Parijs’ framework, while the second aspect is explored briefly in the paper’s final section.Van Parijs begins RFA by stating his two basic premises: ‘One: Our capitalist societies are replete with unacceptable inequalities. 2. Freedom is of paramount importance’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 2). He equates social justice with freedom and states that the ‘ideal of a free society must be expressed as a society whose members are maximally free’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 24). Van Parijs (1997, p. 23, 22, 5) rejects as inadequate the narrow conception of freedom as ‘negative liberty’ (formal freedom from coercion) championed by libertarians such as Buchanan and Hayek. While he accepts that ‘security and self-ownership’ are ‘necessary’ conditions of freedom, he argues they are insufficient to ensure it ‘because doing anything requires the use of external objects which security and self-ownership alone cannot guarantee.’ This leads him to adopt the term real freedom to express a notion of liberty that combines ‘having the right to do what one might want to do’ with ‘having the means for doing it.’This is a radical and expansive conception of freedom that, while it shares with them the principle of non-discrimination between rival conceptions of the good life, goes further than many liberal theories in its non-utilitarian and non-welfarist approach to justice. Real freedom does not privilege current preferences over future preferences, or even actual preferences over possible preferences. Rather, it is centred on the principle of keeping the doorway to autonomous decisions and activities permanently ajar for all individuals throughout their lives.In summary, Van Parijs’ real-libertarian justice demands that security, self-ownership and leximin opportunity be guaranteed. To provide leximin opportunity, he argues, the real freedom of the least advantaged members of a given society should be maximinned subject to the security and self-ownership of all members of society being protected ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 21, 27).There is a clear family resemblance here between Van Parijs’ real-libertarian framework and Rawls’ ( 1985) justice as fairness approach. In Rawls’ schema, liberty takes lexical priority over equality of opportunity, while Van Parijs accords a ‘soft lexicographic priority’ to security and self-ownership over leximin opportunity. Rawls argues that inequality is only justified if it is ‘to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged’ and that access to an index of ‘primary social goods’ should be maximinned. For Van Parijs, it is access to real freedom that should be maximinned (Rawls in Callinicos, 2000, p. 46, Van Parijs, 1997, p. 27–28).Van Parijs argues that the optimal way to achieve maximin real freedom would be to provide each individual with an unconditional BI set at the highest sustainable level ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 32). He describes this as a ‘radical suggestion’ that challenges both ‘libertarians and their close kin’s desperate groping for a narrow concept of freedom’ and social democrats ‘so concerned with the real freedom to consume as abundantly as one might wish that they lose sight of the real freedom to live as unconventionally as one might fancy’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 34).The concept of real freedom and the place of BI within real-libertarian theory have been critiqued (see Barry, 1996), and alternatives to Van Parijs’s framework have been advanced (see Widerquist, 2013). Many scholars – including Gorz (1999), Pateman (2004), Wright (2006), and Weeks (2011) – stress the importance of BI providing an exit option from oppressive relationships, such as the wage relation and the sexual contract. These perspectives suggest that BI would need to reach a specific threshold level in order for it to provide effective freedom to individuals.The key implication here in relation to Van Parijs’ framework is the relationship between this threshold level of BI and his sustainability constraint. This sustainability constraint on the level of BI will never be fixed and stable due to the shifting economic, social, ideological and political conditions that obtain in a given society at different points in time.In specific contexts, this constraint may operate to ensure that only a very low universal BI is feasible and, therefore, the exit option threshold will not be reached. In such a case, while the real freedom horizons for individuals will be clearly reduced when compared with BI at the threshold level, the capacity of the least advantaged to achieve their objectives may still be enhanced due to the poverty reduction effects of even a small, regular cash payment.Barry (1996) raises issues related to the measurement of real freedom and its relationship to BI. He argues that it is ‘generally … impossible to discover who is the worst-off in terms of real freedom in a given situation’ and that Van Parijs’ treatment of ‘income at market prices as a true measure of real freedom is a heroic solution to the problem of the incommensurability of choice sets’ ( Barry, 1996, p. 256).These are serious criticisms for which there is, at best, a pragmatic response. It is possible – as a thought experiment – to imagine a real freedom super computer that could provide individualised bundles of goods and services (in cash and in kind) that generate maximin real freedom outcomes superior to a uniform BI in cash. However, such a system would obviously face major informational, political, economic and institutional barriers that make it less practically feasible than a BI in cash.Van Parijs concedes that some public goods (law and order, defence, clean air, education, infrastructure) should be supplied via collective provision, but defends a cash income paid to individuals over an exclusively in-kind provision of BI via a bundle of goods and services ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 42–46). Money incomes constitute a flexible claim over heterogeneous sets of goods and services, including leisure. For this reason, at least in a capitalist society, it is difficult to identify any clearly superior alternative to the highest sustainable BI if the goal is maximin real freedom.If real freedom is defined as the freedom to do what one might want to do and having the means to do it, a regular income will likely produce superior outcomes to those generated by a stakeholder grant. However, a regular income will clearly not suit the preferences of some individuals – including some among the least advantaged – and there may be a case for permitting individuals to receive part of their BI in the form of a grant. (For example, individuals could elect not to receive a $15,000 annual BI for five years in order to then receive a $75,000 lump sum that could be used for various purposes).These and other criticisms notwithstanding, Van Parijs has done BI scholars a great service by developing a theoretical framework that provides such an elegant linking of an egalitarian principle of justice (real freedom for all) with a practical policy mechanism (the highest sustainable BI). This debt acknowledged, his thesis could be further strengthened via a revision of his treatment of unequal internal endowments and the jobs as assets argument.Compensation for unequal internal endowmentsHaving made the case for an equal right to an unconditional BI in RFA, Van Parijs turns his attention the question of whether there are legitimate grounds for compensating some individuals for various ‘handicaps’ – unequal internal endowments – that affect their capacity to ‘pursue their conception of a good life’ ( Van Parijs, 1990, p. 344). Compensation here refers to whether some individuals should receive a higher BI (or additional transfer/service) than others on the basis of their handicaps.He deploys an adaptation of Ackerman’s criterion of undominated diversity in order to interrogate this issue. Raventós (2007), p. 42 explains the criterion as follows: ‘The internal endowments of X ‘dominate’ (can be seen as more valuable than) the internal endowments of Z if and only if every individual, given his or her conception of a good life, would prefer X’s endowment to Z’s.’Van Parijs applies the criterion to the task of differentiating the internal endowments of the ‘normal’ and the ‘handicapped.’ He argues that for ‘any “normal” person X … it is very unlikely that there will be any single person which all would regard as better endowed than X’ whereas ‘for any “handicapped” person Y … it will be easy to find people whom all would regard as better endowed.’ Therefore, he argues, ‘all the “handicapped” will be entitled to compensation from some other (less) “handicapped” and from many (not necessarily) all “normal” persons.’ He argues that compensation could be paid by reducing the universal BI until ‘for each pair of comprehensive, i. e. internal cum external, endowments, there is at least one person who prefers either endowment to the other.’ For a detailed discussion of his treatment of this criterion see Van Parijs (1990, 1997) .Van Parijs concedes that there would be ‘quite a bit of guesswork about what people’s judgements would be with full information and understanding’ but that ‘it seems plausible that a set of specific transfers to various categories of standard “handicaps”, coupled with a basic health insurance, would be the best approximation’ ( Van Parijs, 1990, p. 346–351).However, I argue that this approach is unlikely to prove workable in any practical sense and that there are preferable alternatives. Specifically, Sen’s capability approach and Fraser’s participatory parity framework may be better suited to the task of assessing the need for additional compensation on the grounds of unequal internal endowments and misrecognition.The capability approach focuses on the differing ability of individuals to convert personal, social and environmental resources into specific functionings and beings ( Robeyns, 2003, p. 543–544). It calls for a pragmatic, context-specific assessment of the different barriers individuals face in relation to achieving desired outcomes, and of the remedies that may reduce/remove these obstacles. Robeyns (2003, p. 547) argues that, unlike various liberal perspectives, the ‘capability approach could provide a useful framework when we want to address the injustice created by the gender division of labour’ because ‘preference formation, socialisation, subtle forms of discrimination and the impact of social and moral norms are not taken for granted or assumed away, but analysed up front.’Similarly, Fraser invites us to identify – and remove – the barriers that prevent individuals (often members of subordinated groups) from achieving the status of ‘a full member of society, capable of participating on a par with other members’ ( Fraser, 2001, p. 24). Thus, she argues, participatory parity requires both redistribution and recognition.Redistribution must change ‘social arrangements that institutionalise deprivation, exploitation and gross disparities in wealth, income and leisure time’, while recognition must remove the ‘institutionalised patterns of cultural value [that] constitute some actors as inferior, excluded, wholly other or simply invisible, hence as less than full partners in social interaction’ ( Fraser, 2001, p. 29, 24). Fraser (2001) rejects an identity politics that engenders ‘separatism and group enclaving’ in favour of a species of recognition that encourages participatory parity by not ‘burdening’ individuals and groups ‘with excessive ascribed “difference” or … failing to acknowledge their distinctiveness.’Robeyns (2003, p. 548–549) sees a strong overlap between the two approaches but concludes that the capability approach has wider applicability as it valorises functionings and beings that are of ‘intrinsic importance’ to individuals while not necessarily being related to their ‘participation in society.’ Whatever their relative merits, both approaches make clear that there is no single criterion on which compensation for unequal internal endowments can be based.This has obvious implications for Van Parijs’ framework as it leaves open the question of how to weight the relative importance of a universal right to a universal BI set at the highest sustainable level against the requirements of enhancing the capabilities of disadvantaged individuals and of universalising participatory parity.This is not, in my view, an argument against a universal BI which, as long as it results in a net transfer of economic resources from the most advantaged to the least advantaged members of a given society, should be expected to improve the capacity of many individuals with a disability – and of those suffering social exclusion – to better pursue their conception of the good life. However, there will still be a case for reducing the level of the universal BI in order to increase the real freedom available to the least advantaged individuals.There is no easy answer as to how to deal with this problem in practical terms. However, it is likely that, at least in wealthy societies, these goals (i. e. universal BI, expanded disability support services, universal childcare, progressive legal and educational reform) can be pursued simultaneously. The precise policy mix and distribution of resources can only be decided by the messy process of continuous democratic deliberation, complemented by ongoing analysis of the evidence regarding the relationship between specific policies and desired social ends.The legitimacy of a substantial basic incomeIn RFA Van Parijs investigates whether there are real-libertarian grounds for taxing external resources in order to fund a substantial BI. Here, he draws on Ronald Dworkin’s (1981)equality of resources approach to distributive justice, adding his own novel twist.Dworkin was concerned with theorising an ideal mechanism for equalising the external resources/endowments available to individuals in a manner that promoted ‘envy-freeness’ (i. e. individuals would not envy each other’s bundles of external resources). He was interested in articulating a scheme that would reduce the effects of brute luck (circumstances you are born into, talents you have) on an individual’s life, while allowing for option luck (choices you make, ambitions you have) to operate.Dworkin proposed the ideal mechanism of a clamshell auction, where each individual would be given an equal number of clamshells to bid for the available external resources in a given society. These auctions would be supplemented by various insurance schemes to deal with handicaps and other manifestations of brute luck. While arguing that his scheme may have some practical application, Dworkin conceded that, in its initial formulation, it was ‘in the main … entirely theoretical’ (Dworkin, 1981, p. 284–292).In RFAVan Parijs (1997), p. 102 defines external endowments broadly as the ‘external wealth with which people endowed.’ This includes everything from ‘factories … private homes and public bridges’ to ‘computer programmes, nuclear technology … beaches, pumpkins, and parrots.’ He argues that a yield-maximising tax on all gifts and bequests of these external endowments would provide a legitimate tax base for a universal BI. However, he calculates that any such BI would be ‘pathetically low to frankly negligible’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 103).At this point he introduces an innovation by proposing that jobs be treated as assets and, therefore, as part of the stock of society’s external resources. He argues that, because most labour markets are not perfectly competitive, job-holders receive a rent that could be legitimately appropriated as a source of funding for BI.Van Parijs appears to have two concepts of rent in his treatment of jobs as assets. Firstly, the ‘rents are given by the difference between income (and other advantages) the employed derive from their job, and the (lower) income they would need to get if the markets were to clear.’ Second, ‘the existence of large employment rents, as manifested by the presence of envy over job endowments, and not the fact that many people are without a job at all’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 102–103, 109–110).He puts forward the idea of a Dworkinian auction to establish ‘the competitive price for each [job]’ and ‘hence the employment rents associated to each type of job’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 114). Here again, Van Parijs concedes that in ‘practical terms … the idea of organising a large independent set of auctions, each matched to a particular type of job, does not make much sense’ and suggests instead that a yield-maximising progressive income tax could serve as a second-best option for taxing employment rents to fund a higher BI ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 116, 124–125).Van Parijs’ treatment of jobs as assets is unsatisfactory and, in my view, unnecessary. Firstly, once we accept of the second-best option of using progressive income tax as a proxy for employment rents it is clear that there is no precise, quantifiable relationship between the rents that would be established under the auctions (that do not take place) and the level of income tax that is levied at any given point in time. We have moved from a precise theoretical scheme to a second-best practical measure.Second, there are good grounds for rejecting any requirement to identify specific external resources (land, inherited wealth, carbon emissions, intellectual property, bandwidth, jobs) that can be legitimately taxed to fund BI. This is because the material wealth of a given society is the product of the overwhelmingly social character of economic relations and the evolutionary nature of economic change.On this point, I agree with Herbert Simon’s Simon (2013) contention that social capital is ‘a major source of differences in income, between and within countries.’ Simon defines social capital as ‘knowledge, and participation in kinship and other privileged social relations’ and estimates that ‘it is hard to conclude that social capital can produce less than about 90 % of income in wealthy societies’ (Simon in Widerquist et al., 2013, p. 240–241). In terms of the BI literature, this approach to conceptualising the material wealth of society can be seen in the Fabian socialist economist G.D.H. Cole’s (1935) argument for a social dividend based on ‘a recognition of each citizen’s claim as a consumer to share in the common heritage of productive power’ (Cole in Cunliffe and Erreygers, 2004, p. 235). Alperovitz (2016) has also linked this ‘gift from the past’ or ‘technological inheritance’ to the case for BI.Furthermore, all individuals are subject to the triple-accident of birth: they have no choice over the time, place and class into which they emerge. Individuals with diverse internal endowments born in mediaeval England shared a common constraint of lower material living standards when compared to individuals with diverse internal endowments born in late-twentieth century Japan.These arguments serve to demote the individual and the static in favour of the social and the evolutionary in relation to our understanding of the production and reproduction of material wealth. Put simply, it is not possible to quantify, with any rigour, the precise contribution of discrete individuals to the magnitude of social wealth and, therefore, to assign to each individual (in money terms) their legitimate share of this social wealth.On this basis, I would like to put forward the idea of total social productivity (TSP) as an alternative means of conceptualising the relationship between social wealth and individual rights. I define TSP for a given society as the sum of the value of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and unremunerated work (UW) for a given period of time (i. e. a year).This can be expressed as TSP = GDP + UWThe practical task here is two estimate the value of the magnitudes of GDP and UW (in money terms) and their ratio for a particular country or region.GDP is a measure of the final market value of all goods and services produced in a given territory within a given period of time. It is far from perfect as a measure of wealth and progress and has been critiqued on numerous grounds (see Gleeson-White, 2014). However, it remains the case that, in most instances, sustained GDP growth is positively associated with rising per capita incomes (a flow) and increasing per capita wealth (a stock) over time. While these averages tell us nothing about the distribution of income and wealth within a particular society, the magnitude of GDP is an important measure of the economic resources available to fund the highest sustainable BI for the society concerned. For example, a comparison of the respective GDP figures for Switzerland and Zimbabwe since 1950 will clearly show that Switzerland has the capacity to fund a higher BI today. In summary, GDP is one way of describing socially produced wealth and its magnitude defines one constraint on the highest sustainable BI.UW, the second component of TSP, can be defined and measured in different ways. For example, in one study based on analysis of time-use surveys, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) used three separate methods to estimate the total value of unpaid for the years 1992 and 1997. The ABS calculated a ratio of the value of unpaid work to GDP of between 43 % and 54 % for the reference years (ABS, 2001).A more recent study based on ABS data estimated the ‘imputed value’ (in Australian dollar terms) of unpaid care work (domestic activities, child care, and voluntary work and care) at ‘between $601 billion (replacement cost valuation method) and $699 billion (opportunity cost valuation method). The mid-point ($650 billion), which if actually transacted, equates to just over half of Australia’s GDP’ ( Hoenig & Page, 2012, p. vii).There are, of course, questions that can be raised regarding the reliability of the data generated by self-reported time-use surveys and the merits of the various methods employed for estimating the value of UW. However, just as GDP is an imperfect indicator of a country or region’s wealth, attempts to quantify the aggregate value of UW provide an imperfect way of representing the different activities that comprise UW as a single magnitude that can be compared to GDP, as in the examples cited above. This allows us to better comprehend both scale on which UW takes place and gives us estimates of the aggregate opportunity cost – in terms of market income, career opportunities and voluntary leisure foregone – for those who perform it.Feminist scholars, among others, have consistently pointed to evidence showing that women perform a disproportionate share of UW, and that the production and reproduction of society is heavily dependent on that labour. If we accept Van Parijs’ ( 1997, p. 5) argument that real freedom combines ‘having the right to do what one might want to do’ with ‘having the means for doing it’ – and that the highest sustainable BI is the optimal way of providing the means to real freedom – it follows that those who perform a disproportionate share of UW are more likely to be disadvantaged in real freedom terms than other members of society.Therefore, to the extent that BI results in a net transfer of economic resources (in cash) from (over)remunerated forms of work and investment to (under)unremunerated forms of work, it should be expected to contribute to a fairer distribution of the financial and non-financial benefits that accrue to individuals in the form of labour and capital income while, at the same time, enhancing the real freedom available to those who perform a disproportionate share of UW.TSP requires further theoretical development and empirical testing. For example, regarding whether Net National Income should be used instead of GDP, and the best method for estimating the value of UW. However, the TSP approach, I argue, has the considerable merit of grounding the normative justification of BI in a commitment to a deep form of social reciprocity.GDP and UW – and their interrelationship – are the product of cumulative, cyclical and heterogeneous forms of social interaction. Therefore, I argue, an individual’s right to maximin real freedom in the form of BI stems from said individual’s participation in a complex social order that produces wealth and work in different forms, magnitudes and ratios. (By participation, here I mean existence within rather than the performance of any specific activities).In summary, the TSP approach abandons any attempt to justify a substantial BI in relation to particular external resources, including jobs. Instead, this approach argues that: (1) an individual’s right to maximin real freedom in the form of BI stems from his/her (involuntary) participation in a complex social order, (2) the magnitude of GDP for a given society represents a constraint on the highest sustainable BI, and (3) the magnitude of UW (and its ratio to GDP) for a given society provides an estimate of the value (and opportunity cost) of forms of uncompensated (but socially important) activity that may disadvantage individuals in real freedom terms and, thereby, strengthen the case for BI.The capitalist road to communism?Van Parijs has a long-standing connection to Marxist analysis as evidenced by his involvement in the ‘September group’, a network ‘primarily associated with the analytical exploration of Marxian themes’ that was set up by G. A. Cohen, Jon Elster and John Roemer in 1978 ( Birnbaum, 2013, p. 345). However, it was in his paper ‘A Capitalist Road to Communism’ ( Van Der Veen & Van Parijs, 2006) that he explored the potential of BI to achieve the emancipatory outcome encapsulated in the principle of ‘from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs’ that Marx equated with the ‘higher stage of communism’ ( Marx, 1970).Van Der Veen & Van Parijs (2006, p. 4) argue that increasing the level of BI over time would result in ‘a gradual increase of the part of the social product distributed according to needs vis-à-vis the part distributed according to contribution.’ They acknowledge that inequality and exploitation would still exist with BI, but suggest that if the emancipatory aspect of Marx’s thought is given primacy ‘we need not be bothered by the persistence of substantial inequalities, because everyone’s fundamental needs are covered anyway.’ Defining ‘fundamental needs’ and setting a BI threshold adequate to meet these needs is clearly of great importance here ( Van Der Veen & Van Parijs, 2006, p. 20).Howard (2015, p. 283) is another scholar who emphasises the ‘liberatory element’ of Marx’s vision in relation to justifying BI. He contends that, with BI covering basic needs, ‘Labour that is volunteered would … count as “exploitative”, but not as “unjust”’( Howard, 2015, p. 290). However, he also concedes that BI could be seen as ‘a retreat from the aspirations of Marxism’ ( Howard, 2015, p. 283).There is a difficulty here in deciphering exactly what those aspirations were. As Hudis (2013, p. 35) observes, ‘Marx never devoted a work to the alternative to capitalism’ and his thinking on this subject has to be ‘gleaned from a careful study of an array of diverse and difficult texts.’ This difficulty notwithstanding, Marx’s radical vision of human emancipation clearly goes beyond capitalism – and even communism – to what he described as ‘a totality of human manifestations of life’ (Marx in Hudis, 2013, p. 74).Marx stressed the critical importance of time as ‘the measure of human life’ and ‘the space for its development’ (Marx in Hudis, 2013, p. 144). It is on this point – the relationship between human freedom and time – that there is perhaps an overlap between the aspirations of Marxism and the potential effects of BI. An unconditional basic income would enhance the capacity of individuals to command time, in the sense that they could engage in more freely chosen activity during their finite and indeterminate lifespans.For Gorz (1999) such a shift to freely chosen ‘multi-activity’ would presage the end of wage labour and mark an “exit route” from capitalism. However, it is at least as likely that BI could co-exist with both a modified system of wage labour and the self-expansion of value as the key driver of the economic system. Even so, BI, as Marx argued in relation to ‘shortening of the working day’, could still function to expand the ‘realm of freedom’ within capitalist society ( Marx, 1981, p. 959).If we accept that BI is an institutional means to the end of human emancipation, a related question goes to the compatibility between BI maximisation and different economic systems. In RFA Van Parijs examines the question of whether capitalism or socialism would perform better on the criterion of ‘constrained basic income maximisation’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 187). He differentiates capitalism from socialism ‘in terms of private versus public ownership of society’s (non-human) capital, of its (material) means of production’ and investigates whether ‘the optimal variant of capitalism would perform better … than the optimal variant of socialism in terms of our criterion’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 6, 187).Van Parijs identifies optimal socialism’s key advantage as ‘popular sovereignty’ defined as ‘a political community’s ability to steer the use of its resources according to democratically determined will’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 190). However, he argues that this advantage would not be sufficient to outweigh the ‘dynamic impulse capitalism owes to the imperative to innovate or perish’ ( Van Parijs, 1997, p. 221).In truth, the question of whether the dynamism of capitalist competition would trump the democratic authority of socialism on the criterion of constrained BI maximisation is impossible to answer in the abstract. Only the parallel existence of optimal capitalist and optimal socialist societies with BI would provide the evidence on which an assessment of their respective claims could be made. Given the breadth and depth of global capitalism today, there is a strong likelihood that any experiments with BI will occur first within capitalist societies.The final point I wish to emphasise in this section is that the pragmatic and utopian aspects of the normative justification of BI should be held in tension. Kathi Weeks’ ( 2011) framing of BI as a utopian demand captures both these dimensions when she writes ( 2001, p. 221): ‘to function effectively as a utopia, the demand must constitute a radical and potentially far-reaching change, generate critical distance, and stimulate the political imagination. To function optimally as a demand, a utopian demand should be recognisable as a possibility grounded in actually existing tendencies.’The demand for BI is utopian in that it threatens a (partial) rupture of the link between paid work and income; a rupture that goes beyond means-tested, conditional transfers. Weeks characterises this demand as ‘a provocation to freedom and … of desire’ that is radical in ‘its anti-ascetism’ ( Weeks, 2011, p. 145–146). The demand is pragmatic in the sense that it can be better understood as a renovation of the existing social order rather than its wholesale replacement.ConclusionInterest in BI experiences peaks and troughs within academic discourse and public debate. The 2016 Swiss referendum on introducing BI – although attracting just 23 % of the vote – together with the BI trial in Finland that commenced in 2017, demonstrate a renewed level of enthusiasm for this radical reform.In the 1960s and 1970s economists were prominent contributors to the BI literature, but since the 1980s philosophers have led the debate. This disciplinary shift has generated important contributions to – and refinements of – the normative justifications of BI, foremost among these being Philippe Van Parijs’ work.In this paper I attempted to contribute to this literature via a critical reappraisal of Van Parijs’ real-libertarian justification of BI. I argued that his principle of justice – real freedom for all – tied to an institutional policy mechanism – the highest sustainable BI – should form a key plank of any progressive case for BI.On the other hand, I rejected Van Parijs’ use of undominated diversity as a single criterion for providing compensation for unequal internal endowments, and suggested some pragmatic alternatives.I also argued against Van Parijs’ treatment of jobs as assets – and the external resources approach in general – as a means of identifying legitimate funding sources for a substantial BI. I introduced the concept of TSP as an alternative way to understand the production and reproduction of society as a fundamentally social and evolutionary process, and argued that this approach anchors the justification of BI in a deep form of social reciprocity.The article concluded by situating the case for BI in relation to both Marx’s vision of human emancipation and Van der Veen and Van Parijs’ discussion of optimal variants of socialism and capitalism. Finally, I argued that BI should be framed as a pragmatic-utopian reform, with the pragmatic and utopian dimensions of BI held in tension.BibliographyAlperovitz, G (2016). Technological inheritance and the case for a basic income. Economic Security Project, . 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Journal

Basic Income Studies – de Gruyter

Published: Jun 22, 2017

References

  • Equal endowments as undominated diversity Louvain Economic
    Van Parijs
  • Justice as fairness : political not metaphysical Philosophy and
    Rawls
  • What is equality ? Part : Equality of resources Philosophy and
    Dworkin
  • Survey article : Real freedom and basic income The Journal of
    Barry
  • Recognition without ethics ? Theory , Culture
    Fraser
  • Human Rights and Capabilities Journal of
    Sen