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/lp/de-gruyter/screening-stringency-in-the-disability-insurance-program-VXQc5XeTqO
- Publisher
- de Gruyter
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2014 by the
- ISSN
- 2194-6108
- eISSN
- 1935-1682
- DOI
- 10.1515/bejeap-2013-0095
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Abstract We propose a strategy for assessing how the inflow to the disability insurance program has been governed over time. Using ex-post mortality, we analyze the ex-ante health of individuals entering the program, compared to individuals not entering the program in the same year. Applying this strategy to Sweden, we find large variation in the relative health of new beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries over time. Some of the fluctuations correspond well to formal changes to screening stringency. However, we also find large variation in health during periods when no changes to formal eligibility criteria have been pursued.
Journal
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy – de Gruyter
Published: Jul 1, 2014