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Subsidized Crop Insurance under Limited Access to Incomplete Financial Markets

Subsidized Crop Insurance under Limited Access to Incomplete Financial Markets AbstractAlmost universally, crop insurance uptake has been very low in the absence of significant governmental subsidies. We proposed an explanation for the low uptake by analyzing farmers’ optimal behavior in the presence of subsidized crop insurance and incomplete financial markets. Under specific replication conditions, farmers’ valuation of crop insurance is lower than insurers’ valuation if farmers have access to fewer financial assets than insurers. A potential rationalization is that farmers and insurers have dissimilar price formation processes. Our model implies that subsidized crop insurance changes farmers’ production choices by altering both the relative returns across states of Nature and their risk choices. However, because of the separation between consumption and production decisions, farmers will use crop insurance in a manner consistent with profit maximization, independent of risk preferences. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy de Gruyter

Subsidized Crop Insurance under Limited Access to Incomplete Financial Markets

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Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
© 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
ISSN
1935-1682
eISSN
1935-1682
DOI
10.1515/bejeap-2021-0073
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractAlmost universally, crop insurance uptake has been very low in the absence of significant governmental subsidies. We proposed an explanation for the low uptake by analyzing farmers’ optimal behavior in the presence of subsidized crop insurance and incomplete financial markets. Under specific replication conditions, farmers’ valuation of crop insurance is lower than insurers’ valuation if farmers have access to fewer financial assets than insurers. A potential rationalization is that farmers and insurers have dissimilar price formation processes. Our model implies that subsidized crop insurance changes farmers’ production choices by altering both the relative returns across states of Nature and their risk choices. However, because of the separation between consumption and production decisions, farmers will use crop insurance in a manner consistent with profit maximization, independent of risk preferences.

Journal

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policyde Gruyter

Published: Jan 1, 2023

Keywords: uncertainty; portfolio analysis; incomplete financial markets; D21; D81; G11

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