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Turf and Illegal Drug Market Competition between Gangs

Turf and Illegal Drug Market Competition between Gangs Abstract Street-level illegal drug markets generate much of the violence and intimidation that local communities face nowadays. These markets are mainly driven by territorial gangs who finance their activities through the sale of drugs. Understanding how the existence of both turf and drug market competition may have unintended consequences of law enforcement policies on violence is the main contribution of the paper. We propose a two-stage game-theoretical model where two profit maximizing gangs compete in prices and invest in guns. We find that policies such as traditional or community policing can have different and unexpected effects on the level of violence. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy de Gruyter

Turf and Illegal Drug Market Competition between Gangs

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Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by the
ISSN
2194-6108
eISSN
1935-1682
DOI
10.1515/bejeap-2013-0161
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract Street-level illegal drug markets generate much of the violence and intimidation that local communities face nowadays. These markets are mainly driven by territorial gangs who finance their activities through the sale of drugs. Understanding how the existence of both turf and drug market competition may have unintended consequences of law enforcement policies on violence is the main contribution of the paper. We propose a two-stage game-theoretical model where two profit maximizing gangs compete in prices and invest in guns. We find that policies such as traditional or community policing can have different and unexpected effects on the level of violence.

Journal

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy – de Gruyter

Published: Oct 1, 2015

References

  • What Can the Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?
    Weisburd
  • The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity
    Hirschleifer
  • Markets with Consumer Switching Costs
  • Paying Customers to Switch
    Chen
  • “Finding community policing to reduce crime: have cops grants made a difference?.”
    Zhao