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How the introduction of new regulatory forms shapes firm self-regulation in the US automobile industry

How the introduction of new regulatory forms shapes firm self-regulation in the US automobile... The current research aims to explore how the implementation of new regulatory forms contributes to firm self-regulation.Design/methodology/approachLongitudinal analysis of firm-initiated product recalls for 15 manufacturers in the US automobile industry from 1966–2012.FindingsExamining firm-initiated product recalls for 15 manufacturers in the US automobile industry from 1966–2012 has several important findings regarding how the introduction of specific regulatory forms contributes to firm-initiated vehicle recalls. Firms are not likely to self-regulate in response to surveillance or standards-based regulation while information-based regulation results in a greater likelihood of firm self-regulation.Originality/valueThis result suggests that even at the product level; firms become increasingly motivated to self-regulate as regulators introduce information-based regulations. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Journal of Business Emerald Publishing

How the introduction of new regulatory forms shapes firm self-regulation in the US automobile industry

Cavazos, David
American Journal of Business , Volume 37 (3): 13 – Aug 3, 2022
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Publisher
Emerald Publishing
Copyright
© Emerald Publishing Limited
ISSN
1935-5181
DOI
10.1108/ajb-08-2021-0101
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The current research aims to explore how the implementation of new regulatory forms contributes to firm self-regulation.Design/methodology/approachLongitudinal analysis of firm-initiated product recalls for 15 manufacturers in the US automobile industry from 1966–2012.FindingsExamining firm-initiated product recalls for 15 manufacturers in the US automobile industry from 1966–2012 has several important findings regarding how the introduction of specific regulatory forms contributes to firm-initiated vehicle recalls. Firms are not likely to self-regulate in response to surveillance or standards-based regulation while information-based regulation results in a greater likelihood of firm self-regulation.Originality/valueThis result suggests that even at the product level; firms become increasingly motivated to self-regulate as regulators introduce information-based regulations.

Journal

American Journal of Business – Emerald Publishing

Published: Aug 3, 2022

Keywords: Firm self-regulation; Regulation; Automobile industry

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