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Purpose – This paper aims to explore the influence of specific characteristics of the public sector in developing countries (i.e. a low‐institutional capacity, a limited involvement of stakeholders, and high levels of corruption and informality), and of reforms of this sector, on public sector performance measurement (PSPM). Design/methodology/approach – Based on a review of prior literature, the paper develops understanding of the demand for and supply of performance information in developing countries, and of changes in this area. Findings – The paper argues that public sector organisations in developing countries are likely to face an unbalanced position, i.e. disequilibrium between the demand for and supply of performance information. More precisely, the public sector reforms – which are partly stimulated by a growing involvement of some stakeholders – lead to an increasing demand for performance information but, because of the low‐institutional capacity and the high level of corruption, this increasing demand is not always followed by a sufficient supply of performance information. This leads to an “unsatisfied demand” position. Research limitations/implications – The paper concludes with an overview of issues related to PSPM in a developing country context that require further investigation. Practical implications – The arguments presented in this paper are summarised in an overview of factors that influence the demand for and supply of performance information in the public sector in developing countries. This overview might be helpful to those who are involved in the design of performance measurement systems in these countries. Originality/value – So far, relatively little is known about PSPM in a developing country context. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap.
Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change – Emerald Publishing
Published: Sep 25, 2007
Keywords: Performance measurement (quality); Public sector reform; Government; Developing countries; Decentralized control
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