Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Subscribe now for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Underreporting and premature sign‐off in public accounting

Underreporting and premature sign‐off in public accounting This study uses the ethical decision-making model to examine underreporting and premature audit sign-off in public accounting. Structural equation modelling results indicate that accountants view premature sign-off activities differently from underreporting activities. For example, those accountants who use a teleological moral evaluation process, and who perceive a greater likelihood of reward are more likely to underreport. That these variables are not significantly related to the likelihood of premature sign-off suggests that accountants may use a consequences-based approach when making decisions having lesser ethical content (like underreporting), but employ a different decision process when faced with decisions having greater ethical content (like whether to prematurely sign-off). The results also suggest that supervisors and managers are less likely to underreport, and to prematurely sign-off, than senior and staff-level accountants, and that accountants with an internal locus of control are less likely (than externals) to either underreport or prematurely sign-off. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Managerial Auditing Journal Emerald Publishing

Underreporting and premature sign‐off in public accounting

Loading next page...
 
/lp/emerald-publishing/underreporting-and-premature-sign-off-in-public-accounting-rtm60fCKOw

References (47)

Publisher
Emerald Publishing
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 MCB UP Ltd. All rights reserved.
ISSN
0268-6902
DOI
10.1108/02686900310482623
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This study uses the ethical decision-making model to examine underreporting and premature audit sign-off in public accounting. Structural equation modelling results indicate that accountants view premature sign-off activities differently from underreporting activities. For example, those accountants who use a teleological moral evaluation process, and who perceive a greater likelihood of reward are more likely to underreport. That these variables are not significantly related to the likelihood of premature sign-off suggests that accountants may use a consequences-based approach when making decisions having lesser ethical content (like underreporting), but employ a different decision process when faced with decisions having greater ethical content (like whether to prematurely sign-off). The results also suggest that supervisors and managers are less likely to underreport, and to prematurely sign-off, than senior and staff-level accountants, and that accountants with an internal locus of control are less likely (than externals) to either underreport or prematurely sign-off.

Journal

Managerial Auditing JournalEmerald Publishing

Published: Aug 1, 2003

Keywords: Public sector accounting; Cognition; Auditing principles

There are no references for this article.