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Optimizing Advertising Expenditures in a Dynamic Duopoly

Optimizing Advertising Expenditures in a Dynamic Duopoly The marketing problem of determining the optimal timing of advertising expenditures over a finite planning horizon in a duopoly conflict situation is portrayed as a non-zero-sum differential game. Advertising expenditures are determined which optimize multiobjective performance indices in a Nash equilibrium sense. The dynamics of the market are described by utilizing an extension of the Vidale-Wolfe model of the sales response to advertising. A numerical algorithm is used to solve the model. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Operations Research INFORMS

Optimizing Advertising Expenditures in a Dynamic Duopoly

Operations Research , Volume 27 (4): 11 – Aug 1, 1979
11 pages

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References (10)

Publisher
INFORMS
Copyright
Copyright © INFORMS
Subject
Research Article
ISSN
0030-364X
eISSN
1526-5463
DOI
10.1287/opre.27.4.682
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The marketing problem of determining the optimal timing of advertising expenditures over a finite planning horizon in a duopoly conflict situation is portrayed as a non-zero-sum differential game. Advertising expenditures are determined which optimize multiobjective performance indices in a Nash equilibrium sense. The dynamics of the market are described by utilizing an extension of the Vidale-Wolfe model of the sales response to advertising. A numerical algorithm is used to solve the model.

Journal

Operations ResearchINFORMS

Published: Aug 1, 1979

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