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Risk Ownership in Contract Manufacturing

Risk Ownership in Contract Manufacturing We consider a supply chain where a contract manufacturer (CM) serves a number of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Investment into productive resources is made before demand realization, hence the supply chain faces the risk of under- or overinvestment. The CM and OEMs differ in their forecast accuracy and in their resource pooling capabilities, leading to a disparity in their ability to minimize costs due to demand uncertainty. We consider two scenarios in which this risk is borne by the OEM and CM, respectively. We determine which party should bear the risk so that maximum supply chain profits are achieved. We investigate the effectiveness of premium-based schemes in inducing the best party to bear the risk, and conclude that they function well despite information asymmetry when double marginalization is not very high. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Manufacturing & Service Operations Management INFORMS

Risk Ownership in Contract Manufacturing

17 pages

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Publisher
INFORMS
Copyright
Copyright © INFORMS
Subject
Research Article
ISSN
1523-4614
eISSN
1526-5498
DOI
10.1287/msom.1060.0141
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We consider a supply chain where a contract manufacturer (CM) serves a number of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Investment into productive resources is made before demand realization, hence the supply chain faces the risk of under- or overinvestment. The CM and OEMs differ in their forecast accuracy and in their resource pooling capabilities, leading to a disparity in their ability to minimize costs due to demand uncertainty. We consider two scenarios in which this risk is borne by the OEM and CM, respectively. We determine which party should bear the risk so that maximum supply chain profits are achieved. We investigate the effectiveness of premium-based schemes in inducing the best party to bear the risk, and conclude that they function well despite information asymmetry when double marginalization is not very high.

Journal

Manufacturing & Service Operations ManagementINFORMS

Published: Jul 1, 2007

Keywords: Keywords : information asymmetry ; risk ownership ; contract manufacturing ; resource pooling

References