Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Fair ways to share benefits from community forests? How commodification is associated with reduced preference for equality and poverty alleviation

Fair ways to share benefits from community forests? How commodification is associated with... and DOI. This research is concerned with the trend towards commodification of forestry, in the context of community forest governance for sustainable development in the tropics. In these contexts, commodification takes different forms, including sales of certified timbers and sales of carbon credits. In addition to the general aim to enhance income, these market-based forestry interventions typically aim to align with sustainable development agendas, including (a) safeguarding ecological integrity and (b) promoting poverty alleviation. Our concern here is that the process of forest commodification might lead to a shift in local norms of benefit-sharing, in ways that can hinder these key components of sustainable development goals. We report the results of a survey (N=519) conducted across sites in Bolivia, China and Tanzania that shows that switching from non-monetary to monetary benefits is associated with changes in preferences for distributional fairness in ways that may be detrimental to the poor. In particular, we show that forest commodification is associated with a lower likelihood of selecting pro-poor or egalitarian approaches to benefit sharing and higher likelihood of selecting to distribute benefits in a way that rewards individual contributions or compensates losses. Introduction Kouchaki et al 2013). In the context of environmental conservation, this raises concern because virtues In Antigone, the character Creon claims that ‘There’s associated with social responsibility, including com- nothing in the world so demoralising as money’ whilst passion, reciprocity, trust and cooperation, are often D H Lawrence observed that ‘Money poisons you essential requirements for successful environmental when you have got it, and starves you when you have governance (Ostrom 1990) and are also widely held to not’ (Lawrence 1994 (1928)). Most academic research be central requirements—or capabilities—for achiev- into this phenomena focuses on the institutional ing human wellbeing (Nussbaum 2011). To put this in arrangements surrounding monetary exchange, iden- a way that has underpinned mainstream environment- tifying market exchange as a driver of declining social alism for at least three decades, social equity is a responsibility (Polanyi 1944, Satz 2010, Sandel 2012, necessary condition for achieving sustainable develop- Falk and Szech 2013, Bartling et al 2014). More ment (WCED 1987, Pearce et al 1989, Holden et al recently, evidence has emerged that money itself— 2017). indeed even brief exposure to an image or symbol of Our particular interest in this paper is the commo- money—can erode our empathy and responsibility dification of forests within the context of community towards others (Vohs et al 2006, Caruso et al 2013, forestry in the tropics. Communities are increasingly © 2019 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 064002 Figure 1. Hypothesised factors affecting preferred fairness principles. supported to develop money-based forest economies MBIs can foster mentalities in which inequitable dis- through what are generically termed market-based tribution of costs and benefits are conceived as accep- instruments (MBIs). In our case locations, these table (Caney 2010, Spash 2010,O’Neill 2016) and in include the marketing of forest timbers through forest which monetary incentives crowd out superior certification and labelling schemes, payments for eco- motives for caring for nature (Bowles 2008, Cor- system services (PES) schemes for carbon offsetting bera 2012, Sandel 2012, Bolderdijk et al 2013, García- and soil stabilisation and development of ecotourism Amado et al 2013, Agrawal et al 2015, Neuteleers and products. Whilst we adopt the convention of collec- Engelen 2015, Rode et al 2015). tively describing these as ‘market-based’, many PES This paper adds to this literature through field- schemes involve government or NGO procurement in based empirical research into the effects of forest com- the absence of competitive market institutions (Fer- modification on principles of fairness within local raro 2009, Milne and Adams 2012, Calvet-Mir et al communities. In particular, we investigate whether 2015, Gómez-Baggethun and Muradian 2015). What commodification changes conceptions of fairness in defines MBIs in this research is therefore the progres- ways that appear to diminish concern about poverty sion from non-monetary to monetary benefits from and inequality. In line with the United Nations Sus- managing local forests. This change is often associated tainable Development Goals (SDGs) we assume that with a shift in the kind of goods and services that are both the prioritisation of the poorest and the pursuit valued and exploited. For example, the United of equality (e.g. ‘leave no one behind’) are important Nations’ programme on Reducing Emissions from conditions for progress towards sustainable develop- Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) has ment. If commodification of forests is diminishing the newly valorised the carbon stored in forest biomass as salience of these norms, this might be a hindrance to a basis for paying forest managers in the tropics for progress towards sustainable development. conserving or enhancing their forest stock Our focus here is on the conceptions of fairness (Corbera 2012). held within local communities. This is increasingly The commodification of local forest economies pertinent for the governance of forest resources has the potential to bring important new income because of the increasing proportion of forests in low streams to local communities and to incentivise forest and middle income countries that are coming under conservation over conversion to other land uses. forms of community management (Larson et al 2017). However, there are concerns about how well such We investigate the effects on fairness preferences of (a) development and conservation objectives are being monetary versus non-monetary benefits, (b) societal met. For example, reviews find that there is currently context and (c) individual characteristics. insufficient evidence to conclude that these objectives We explore three hypotheses about how individual have been widely achieved in practice by either certifi- moral preferences might be predicted by different cation schemes (Blackman and Rivera 2011, Romero types of independent variables (figure 1). Firstly, et al 2013) or PES schemes (Muradian et al 2013, Samii addressing the primary research interest of this paper, et al 2014, Börner et al 2017). But critiques of MBIs go we propose that conceptions of distributional and beyond concerns about effectiveness, to include fears procedural fairness are both plural and dynamic (Wal- that commodification of environmental stewardship zer 2008) and that the preferred conceptions in a given erodes the moral basis for caring, both for nature and situation will be shaped by the nature of the benefit, i.e. for other people. Previous research has found that whether it is monetary or non-monetary. For many of 2 Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 064002 us it is intuitive that we apply different principles of greatest collective benefit (‘Invest’), 4. Prioritise those distributional fairness according to the nature of the who experience losses arising from forest conservation good being distributed: we might for example think (‘Compensate’), 5. Reward those who have con- that ‘need’ is the fairest principle for distributing food, tributed to forest conservation (‘Reward’). Views ‘equality’ the fairest way to distribute votes and per- about procedural fairness were investigated in much haps ‘merit’ as the best way to allocate jobs the same way, but with four alternative arrangements for decision-making authority: 1. Village leaders, 2. (Deutsch 2011). More specific to our hypothesis, there Village assembly, 3. District government and 4. Non- is a body of evidence from experimental psychology government partner (in China this was private sector that suggests that being primed to think about money forest companies; in Tanzania and Bolivia, non-profit induces a distinct normative response (Vohs 2015). organisations). Whilst our primary interest is in the effect of mon- Both sets of principles have been adapted from sets etisation, we also expect contexts of place to have an that we developed and tested during earlier research in important bearing on social moralities. Our second Rwanda, Uganda and Laos (Martin 2017) and thus we hypothesis is therefore that conceptions of fairness will are confident that they are well understood by respon- be shaped by the societal context in which the decision dents, that they do not omit any widely preferred prin- is to be taken. Here, we are following literature that ciples and that they are appropriate for this new suggests that cultural, economic, political and legal research question about effects of commodification. contexts are not only shaped by ethical values, but also However, with both sets of statements there are varia- play a role in shaping the salience of different princi- tions of meaning between countries that we acknowl- ples of fairness (Haidt 2012, Miller 2013, Saucier et al edge may have some bearing on comparisons. Firstly, 2015, Almås et al 2019). Thirdly, we propose that indi- as we will mention in the discussion, the distributional vidual characteristics and circumstances will similarly statement for ‘Reward’ had a somewhat unique inter- shape conceptions of fairness, as some research has pretation in Bolivia. In all other sites, we found this found for gender and age (Ruegger and King 1992), statement to be understood as referring to those who education (Hungerford and Volk 1990) and economic helped out in the day to day management activities of wealth (Armantier 2006, Zhang and Yu 2018). forests, including guard patrols, boundary marking etc. In Bolivia it was understood in more strategic, lea- Methods dership terms, as referring to elders who had fought to secure territorial rights. Secondly, the procedural We compare how monetary and non-monetary bene- statement about non-governmental partners was fits from local forests effect judgments about distribu- interpreted in Tanzania and Bolivia as referring to tional and procedural fairness for villagers in four non-government organisations who were supporting cultural groups across three countries: (i) Monkox local forestry initiatives whereas in Chinese sites there indigenous territory in Lomerio, Bolivia, (ii) Han was no such NGO presence and it referred instead to villages, China, (iii) ethnic minority (Lisu and Dai) private sector forest contractors. villages, China and (iv) Tanzanian villages in Kilwa To test the first hypothesis (the effect of benefit district. We investigate villagers’ views about fairness, type) we employed two versions of our survey. One both in terms of principles for distributing forest version (monetary) defined the benefit as cash income benefits, and procedures for deciding this. We survey from sale of forest benefits, whilst the other (non- 519 respondents using a form (supplementary infor- monetary version) defined the benefit to be shared as mation is available online at stacks.iop.org/ERL/14/ the forest benefits themselves. In other words, the 064002/mmedia) translated into local language and monetary version imagines that there has been cash conducted face to face with in-country research team payment (e.g. from sale of timber) and asks respon- members. dents how that money should be distributed; in con- Faced with the scenario of material benefits arising trast, the non-monetary version imagines that forest from community forests, all respondents were asked benefits (e.g. construction materials or fruits) are to be to rank, in order of preference, (a) alternative distribu- distributed directly. Each site level sample was ran- tional principles and (b) alternative institutional domly split so that half the respondents used the arrangements for decision-making. Distributional monetary version and half the non-monetary version. principles were based on well-established philosophi- To test the second hypothesis (the effect of societal cal approaches to defining fair distribution, including contexts) we selected respondents from different loca- those that argue that fairness is best pursued by prior- tions, across three countries and four cultural groups. itising need, equality, utility maximisation or desert To test the third hypothesis (the effect of individual (how deserving a person is)(Miller 1999). Applying characteristics) we collected basic profile information these different ethical traditions to the context of for- about respondents (age, gender, education level and est governance, we generated five alternative distribu- wealth). Wealth was measured by proxy, using a sim- tional principles: 1. Prioritise the poorest (‘Pro-poor’), ple count of selected durable assets, a method that has 2. Distribute equally (‘Equality’), 3. Invest to generate been found to adequately correlate with more research 3 Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 064002 Table 1. Survey sample. Country Village Total population Survey sample Qualitative Interview Sample Participatory Video Tanzania Ruhatwe 979 60 12 Yes Kikole 1490 60 12 Yes China Baojiachun (Han) 5180 60 10 Yes Xinqi (Han) 4577 60 10 Yes Shiba (Lisu) 1901 60 10 No Manhong (Dai) 286 62 10 No Bolivia Palmira 391 50 Focus groups Yes (collective) San Lorenzo 333 50 Focus groups Yes (collective) Santa Rosario 82 20 Focus groups Yes (collective) Todos Santo 166 40 Focus groups Yes (collective) intensive measures of income or expenditure (Morris Sampling strategies differed between countries et al 2000). (table 1). In Bolivia community sizes were small and Sites were selected in locations where the team we selected one person from each household. In Tan- already worked and could take advantage of estab- zania we acquired lists of households from the 2012 lished trust and successful local partnership. They census and randomly selected 60 households from were selected not to be representative of the regions or each village. In China we had to use convenience sam- countries where they are situated, but to provide con- pling but sought to reduce bias by ensuring different textual difference, especially in relation to culture. In locations in the village were covered and that surveys all sites, there is some form of community forestry in took place across different days and times. operation, meaning that communities themselves Qualitative data collection involved participatory have some responsibility for local benefit sharing and video (PV) and semi-structured interviews. PVs pro- therefore that local norms of distribution are impor- vided communities the opportunity to highlight local tant. In Tanzania, we selected two villages (Ruhatwe forest justice concerns of particular significance to and Kikole) in Kilwa district, an economically poor them, in the absence of any substantial direction from part of the country with high dependence on natural the research team. In essence, this informed us about resources. These villages are seeing a progression what really mattered in that time and place, providing towards market exchange for forest goods, through a kind of benchmark of what might be prominent in sales of Forest Stewardship Council certified timber people’s minds as they thought about issues of dis- under Participatory Forest Management and through tribution and procedure. The main function of this carbon offsets generated by a REDD+ pilot project information was to triangulate with survey findings, (Corbera et al 2017). In Bolivia, we worked with com- helping us to validate and make sense of key findings. munities within the indigenous territory (Territorios Indigena Originario Campesino) of Lomerio, an area PVs were made in Ruhatwe, Kikole, Baojiachun, Xinqi of 256 000 hectares that has been legally owned by the and Lomerio (in Lomerio, the communities collabo- Monkox people since 2006. As with the Tanzanian rated over a shared film). Semi-structured interviews sites, there have been moves towards community- and (focus groups in Bolivia) were conducted with a sub- market-based forestry, in this case through Rainforest sample of survey respondents and served a similar Alliance ‘Smartwood’ forest certification and sub- function, seeking to explain some of the differences sequent NGO mediated commercial partnerships recorded between locations and thereby strengthening between communities and private contractors (McDa- our confidence in the main findings from the regres- niel 2003, de Pourcq et al 2009, Martin 2017).Of29 sion analysis. communities in Lomerio, we selected 4 that were cur- Survey data was analysed using econometric rently active in community forest operations (Palmira, (regression) analysis to control for the potential con- Santo Rosario, San Lorenzo and Todos Santos).In founding effects of many variables such as location, China we selected sites representing some of the cul- gender, age, education and wealth. We used ordered tural diversity within Yunnan province. Baojiachun logits because the dependent variables are ordinal and Xinqi are Han Chinese settlements, the majority indicators and the tables of regression results report ethnic group. Shiba is a village of the Lisu people whilst odds ratios. The calculation of standard errors takes Manhong is settled by another ethnic minority group, clustering at the village level into account. the Dai people. All Chinese sites had experienced some commodification of forest benefits through PESs (the Sloping Land Conversion Programme) as well as more location-specific enterprises such as ecotourism (Bao- jiachun) and collective commercial forestry (Xinqi). 4 Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 064002 Table 2. Factors affecting distribution principles: ordered logits (odds ratios). (1)(2)(3)(4)(5) Variables Pro-poor (need) Equality (equality) Invest (utilitarian) Compensate (desert 1) Reward (desert 2) Dummy variable for monetary version (non-monetary as reference) *** *** * *** Monetary 0.453 0.545 1.317 1.507 2.233 (0.123)(0.127)(0.395)(0.357)(0.545) Dummy variables for location (Bolivia as reference) * *** *** *** Tanzania 1.308 0.0764 4.438 8.207 0.582 (0.192)(0.0219)(1.573)(2.502)(0.201) * ** *** *** Han China 1.244 0.589 2.128 5.346 0.246 (0.158)(0.242)(0.750)(1.327)(0.0923) ** *** *** Lisu and Dai China 0.809 3.494 1.243 7.017 0.0759 (0.208)(1.818)(0.812)(3.261)(0.0351) Individual characteristics (no education as reference for education variables) Male 1.006 0.747 1.308 1.199 0.905 (0.243)(0.120)(0.281)(0.280)(0.178) * *** Age (log) 0.780 0.707 1.864 0.581 1.235 (0.226)(0.195)(0.653)(0.114)(0.379) ** Primary education 1.577 0.649 1.575 0.922 0.823 (0.477)(0.274)(0.293)(0.301)(0.149) Secondary education 1.695 0.683 1.408 1.022 0.698 (0.573)(0.273)(0.418)(0.371)(0.207) *** * Higher education 2.557 0.489 1.598 1.496 0.664 (0.866)(0.223)(0.454)(1.020)(0.212) *** ** * ** Assets count (wealth) 0.848 0.966 1.188 0.909 1.109 Observations 515 516 517 515 512 *** ** * Note. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses; p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1. Results effort (OR 2.233, p<0.01). Similarly, there is also rather weak evidence (only at 10% level) that people Factors affecting choices of distributional fairness prefer the other desert principle of ‘Compensate’ principle when the monetary version is given (OR=1.507, The three sets of hypotheses outlined above are tested p<0.10). It is also interesting to note that ‘Invest’ is using regression analysis; specifically, ordered logits not significantly correlated to the monetary version. are used since each of the five distribution principles— We might summarise this as finding that non-mone- pro-poor, equality, invest, compensate and reward— tary benefits composed of forest goods such as con- are ranked from the least (1) to the most preferred (5). struction materials and fruits are more likely to be These ranks are regressed on indicators of the mone- distributed in a pro-poor or an egalitarian way whilst tary version, location of sites and individual character- monetary benefits are more likely to be distributed istics of participants (gender, age, education and an according to meritocratic principles. To confirm this index measuring household assets). Table 2 presents effect we ran regressions with interactive terms the results. between location dummies and the variable ‘mone- The ‘monetary’ variable shows the odds of select- tary’ (supplementary materials). All of the interactive ing a given distributional principle when money is to terms for ‘Pro-poor’ and ‘Equality’ are statistically be distributed against a baseline where ‘non-mone- insignificant (only one significant at 10%), showing tary’ forest goods are to be distributed. The data show that the main result is robust across the different study that changes to this variable are significantly correlated locations. with preferred fairness principle. Respondents given Turning to our second hypothesis, the odds ratios the monetary version are less than half as likely to pre- for location variables (our indicator of societal differ- fer a ‘Pro-poor’ distribution of benefits compared to ence) are expressed against the baseline of our Bolivian those with the non-monetary version (OR=0.453, location. The results confirm that societal contexts are p<0.01). Those with the monetary version were strongly correlated with preferred conceptions of fair- similarly less likely to prefer an ‘Equality’ distribu- ness. Given our deliberate selection of culturally dis- tional principle (OR=0.545, p<0.01). Compared tinct locations, it is not surprising that we see multiple to non-monetary benefits, respondents were more evidence of location-associated moral pluralism. Boli- likely to distribute monetary benefits according to one vian Monkox communities are seen to be quite dis- of the desert (deservedness) principles and, in part- tinct to other locations, with very low preference for icular, were more than twice as likely to prefer the the ‘Compensate’ principle compared to all other principle to ‘Reward’ those who have put in the most locations and low preference for the ‘Invest’ principle 5 Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 064002 Table 3. Factors affecting procedural principles: ordered logits (odds ratios). (1)(2)(3)(4) Variables Village leader Village assembly District government Non-government partner Dummy variable for monetary version (non-monetary as reference) Monetary 1.307 1.083 0.788 0.787 (0.375)(0.260)(0.297)(0.241) Dummy variables for location (Bolivia as reference) * *** *** Tanzania 1.293 0.389 0.0387 12.50 (0.483)(0.217)(0.0223)(4.380) ** ** ** *** Han China 2.839 0.269 0.374 0.0974 (1.377)(0.180)(0.146)(0.0284) *** *** *** ** Lisu and Dai China 3.189 0.137 0.386 0.318 (0.656)(0.0824)(0.107)(0.169) Individual characteristics (no school education as reference) Male 0.824 1.879 0.867 1.445 (0.327)(0.822)(0.211)(0.349) Age (log) 1.325 0.582 1.005 0.534 (0.284)(0.278)(0.217)(0.220) Primary education 0.959 1.371 0.857 1.081 (0.393)(0.382)(0.242)(0.234) Secondary education 0.891 1.606 0.800 1.125 (0.314)(0.555)(0.228)(0.454) *** Higher education 0.663 2.553 0.958 2.233 (0.298)(0.852)(0.443)(1.929) Assets count (wealth) 0.996 1.072 1.046 0.942 (0.0381)(0.0496)(0.0722)(0.0735) Observations 512 516 512 514 *** ** * Note. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses; p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1. compared to Tanzania and Han China. Whilst Tanza- characteristics are smaller and less frequent than those nian village respondents display a comparatively high observed for the monetary and location variables. likelihood of preferring the ‘Compensate’ principle (OR=8.207, p<0.01), they are much less likely to Factors affecting choices of procedural fairness prefer ‘Equality’ (OR=0.0764, p<0.01) and much principles more likely than Bolivians to prefer the principle to While the results in the previous section focus on an ‘Invest’ to maximise returns (OR=4.438, p<0.01). aspect of distributional fairness, the principles in Han villagers are comparatively more likely than the table 3 represent one aspect of procedural fairness that Monkox from Bolivia to prefer the ‘Invest’ is especially pertinent to distribution, regarding where (OR=2.128, p<0.05) or ‘Compensate’ principles primary decision-making authority resides or, in other (OR=5.346, p<0.01). The ethnic minority Dai and words, who decides who gets what. The most striking Lisu villages in China reveal a distinctive profile. Com- feature of table 3 is that there are no significant pared to the Bolivian reference, these communities differences arising from the monetary/non-monetary favour ‘Equality’ (OR=3.494, p<0.05) and ‘Com- variable. Thus, a switch from distributing forest pensate’ (OR=7.017, p<0.01) principles but are benefits directly to distributing money from sales of unlikely to prefer the ‘Reward’ principle these benefits, does not appear to be associated with (OR=0.0759, p<0.01). how respondents think decisions should be made. In When we turn to the individual characteristics of other words, while commodification of benefits is our global data we see that these have a less prominent significantly correlated with preferred distributional association with preferred distributional fairness prin- fairness principles, it is not correlated with procedural ciples. Men are somewhat less likely than women to fairness (at least with regard to the specific procedures prefer ‘Equality’ of distribution (OR=0.747, considered here). p<0.10), older people are less likely to prefer the By contrast, the location variables again have a ‘Compensate’ principle (OR=0.581, p<0.01), robust and almost universal correlation with preferred those with higher levels of education significantly principle. Lomerio (Bolivia) differs greatly from other favour the ‘Pro-poor’ principle compared with those locations across all principles. All other locations with no school education (OR=2.557; p<0.01) and except Tanzania are significantly more likely to prefer those with greater economic assets are slightly less decisions by village/community leaders than in Boli- likely to prefer ‘Pro-poor’ distribution (OR=0.848, via; all are significantly less likely to prefer decision p<0.01). These correlations with individual making by a village assembly; all are significantly less 6 Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 064002 likely to prefer district government authority; and all as some previous studies of commodification have except Tanzania are significantly less likely to prefer found? That would not be a safe conclusion for this decisions by a non-government partner. Tanzania is study because all of our fairness principles were selec- notable for a much higher preference for a non-gov- ted for being reasonable in some contexts at least. ernment decision maker (OR=12.50, p<0.01). However, we do think that a shift away from pro-poor Both Chinese locations show a similar profile of differ- and pro-equality principles for distribution might be contradictory to ambitions to pursue sustainable ences to Bolivia, with all more likely to prefer decisions development. Poverty alleviation and equality are pro- by a village leader and less likely to prefer any of the minent elements of the current global commitment to other principles. Han and ethnic minority (Lisu and the SDGs and our findings suggest that the shift to Dai) Chinese villages reveal a particularly low like- commodification of local forests is likely to induce lihood of preferring decision-making by a non-gov- changes in local moral preferences that could act ernment partner (OR=0.0974, p<0.01; against these. This association with local fairness prin- OR=0.318, p<0.05). ciples is especially relevant in the context of commu- Again, after controlling for locational and other nity forest governance, in which decision making variables, we see hardly any correlation attributable to about benefit-sharing is at least partly devolved to local individual characteristics. Those with the highest level institutions. of education are more likely to prefer collective deci- We also confirmed the hypothesis that fairness sion-making through a village assembly (OR=2.553, preferences are associated with locational, contextual p<0.01), but we see no significant correlation with factors. This has considerable implications for design gender, age or wealth. of policy and project interventions because distribu- tional and procedural principles considered fair in one Discussion place might be considered unjust in another and meet with strong latent or overt resistance. From what we Contemporary theories of human behaviour accept have learned through complementary qualitative that preferences are not formed by self-interest alone, research, there are often important local reasons for but also by social morality (Graham et al 2012) which attributing particular meanings and values to the sur- is itself shaped by contextual circumstances such as vey principles. In Tanzanian sites, for example, culture and institutions (Graham et al 2012, damage caused by elephants is a huge concern to villa- Haidt 2013). In Polanyi’s analysis of The Great gers and we think this contributes to high levels of pre- Transformation, norms of social responsibility and ference for compensation. In Lomerio, Bolivia, we caring were eroded by the widespread transition from were surprised that ‘Reward’ was more favoured than subsistence to market-based exchange (Polanyi 1944). in other sites because this ostensibly meritocratic prin- Recent research in psychology has suggested that ciple does not seem to resonate with the prevailing disruption to social norms from exposure to monetary communalism of the indigenous Monkox people. exchange can occur much more quickly and locally Here, however, we found that ‘Reward’ for those who (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000, Vohs et al 2006, Vohs had helped look after the forests was interpreted as et al 2008, Gino and Mogilner 2014), with some studies meaning those who had struggled for the Monkox to suggesting that the mere priming of people with the gain legal rights to their forests. In effect, this refers to idea of money induces preferences that benefit the rich the elders and we think this explains its cultural fit and at the expense of the poor (Caruso et al 2013, Kouchaki why it is favoured. In both the Han and Dai villages et al 2013). These research findings provide some cause surveyed in China, there are strong histories of com- for concern about the rapid growth in commodifica- munal forest management in which forest revenues tion as a putative solution for sustainability, leading us have been successfully used to secure public goods to explore the effects of monetisation, along with such as roads and schools. It is likely that this historical locational and individual variables, on local concep- experience is a key factor in the popularity of an tions of fairness. ‘Invest’ distributional principle. What we are seeing The most interesting result of our survey is to con- then is that locational associations with distributional firm the hypothesis that a change from non-monetary fairness preferences can arise from a variety of local to monetary benefits from forests is associated with material and cultural histories. Such complexity is also changing preferences for principles of distributional seen for procedural fairness. In Bolivia, the compara- (but not procedural) fairness, a finding that is robust tive dislike for decisions by village leaders alone is across the different research locations. The results almost certainly linked to quite fundamental cultural show that when thinking about the fair way to dis- preference for communalism over individualism. By tribute monetary forest revenues, respondents were contrast, the comparatively strong appeal of non-gov- less likely to prefer ‘Pro-poor’ or ‘Equality’ as princi- ernment partner decision-making in Tanzania is likely ples of distribution and more likely to prefer desert- to be more circumstantial, arising from the presence of based principles of ‘Compensation’ and ‘Reward’. a non-governmental organisation (the Mpingo Con- Does this constitute an erosion of social responsibility, servation and Development Initiative) that is highly 7 Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 064002 active in local forest governance initiatives. In the Han Caney S 2010 Markets, morality and climate change: what, if anything, is wrong with emissions trading? New Political Chinese village, the most active non-government part- Econ. 15 197–224 ners are private sector forestry companies, again pro- Caruso E M, Vohs K D, Baxter B and Waytz A 2013 Mere exposure viding a more circumstantial explanation of to money increases endorsement of free-market systems and preferences. social inequality J. Exp. Psychol.: Gen. 142 301 Corbera E 2012 Problematizing REDD+ as an experiment in Finally, we were surprised to find so little evidence payments for ecosystem services Curr. Opin. Environ. that individual characteristics such as age and gender Sustainability 4 1–8 are associated with fairness preferences. We do not yet Corbera E, Martin A, Springate-Baginski O and Villaseñor A 2017 understand the reasons for this but suspect it relates to Sowing the seeds of sustainable rural livelihoods? An assessment of participatory forest management through the specific focus of our study, i.e. that these factors are REDD+ in Tanzania Land Use Policy (https://doi.org/ less important in determining conceptions of fairness 10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.09.037) related to forest goods and related revenues. Regarding de Pourcq K, Thomas E and van Damme P 2009 Indigenous age, it should also be noted that all respondents were community-based forestry in the Bolivian lowlands: some basic challenges for certification Int. Forestry Rev. 11 12–26 adults and we may therefore have missed important Deutsch M 2011 Justice and conflict Conflict, Interdependence, and differences across adolescence that has been observed Justice (Berlin: Springer) in previous experimental studies (Almås et al 2010). Falk A and Szech N 2013 Morals and markets Science 340 707–11 Ferraro P J 2009 Regional review of payments for watershed services: sub-saharan Africa J. Sustain. Forestry 28 525–50 Acknowledgments García-Amado L R, Pérez M R and García S B 2013 Motivation for conservation: assessing integrated conservation and development projects and payments for environmental We are thankful to the United Kingdom’s Economic services in La Sepultura Biosphere Reserve, Chiapas, Mexico and Social Research Council for grant funding of the Ecol. Econ. 89 92–100 project Conservation, Markets and Justice (Grant Ref: Gino F and Mogilner C 2014 Time, money, and morality Psychol. Sci. 25 414–21 ES/K005812/1). We are also thankful to two anon- Gneezy U and Rustichini A 2000 A fine is a price J. Leg. Stud. 29 1–17 ymous reviewers for helping us to improve this paper. Gómez-Baggethun E and Muradian R 2015 In markets we trust? Setting the boundaries of market-based instruments in ecosystem services governance Ecol. Econ. 117 217–24 ORCID iDs Graham J, Haidt J, Koleva S, Motyl M, Iyer R, Wojcik S P and Ditto P H 2012 Moral foundations theory: the pragmatic Adrian Martin https://orcid.org/0000-0003- validity of moral pluralism Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (New York: Academic) vol 47 pp 55–130 2916-7712 Haidt J 2012 The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion (New York: Vintage) References Haidt J 2013 Moral psychology for the twenty-first century J. Moral Educ. 42 281–97 Agrawal A, Chhatre A and Gerber E R 2015 Motivational crowding Holden E, Linnerud K and Banister D 2017 The imperatives of in sustainable development interventions Am. Political Sci. sustainable development Sustain. Dev. 25 213–26 Rev. 109 470–87 Hungerford H R and Volk T L 1990 Changing learner behavior Almås I, Cappelen A W, Sørensen E Ø and Tungodden B 2010 through environmental education J. Environ. Educ. 21 8–21 Fairness and the development of inequality acceptance Kouchaki M, Smith-Crowe K, Brief A P and Sousa C 2013 Seeing Science 328 1176–8 green: mere exposure to money triggers a business decision Almås I, Cappelen A W and Tungodden B 2019 Cutthroat frame and unethical outcomes Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. capitalism versus cuddly socialism: are Americans more Process. 121 53–61 meritocratic and efficiency-seeking than Scandinavians? Larson A M, Monterroso I, Banjade M R and Mwangi E 2017 NHH Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper 4 Community rights to forests in the tropics Comparative Armantier O 2006 Do wealth differences affect fairness Property Law: Global Perspectives ed M Graziadei and L Smith considerations? Int. Econ. Rev. 47 391–429 vol 9 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing) ch 20 Bartling B, Weber R A and Yao L 2014 Do markets erode social pp 435–50 responsibility? Q. J. Econ. 130 219–66 Lawrence D H 1994 Lady Chatterley’s Lover (London: Blackman A and Rivera J 2011 Producer‐level benefits of Penguin)(1928) sustainability certification Conserv. Biol. 25 1176–85 Martin A 2017 Just Conservation: Biodiversity, Wellbeing and Bolderdijk J W, Steg L, Geller E S, Lehman P and Postmes T 2013 Sustainability (London: Routledge) Comparing the effectiveness of monetary versus moral McDaniel J M 2003 Community-based forestry and timber motives in environmental campaigning Nat. Clim. Change certification in Southeast Bolivia Small-Scale Forest Econ. 3 413 Manage. Policy 2 327–41 Börner J, Baylis K, Corbera E, Ezzine-de-Blas D, Honey-Rosés J, Miller D 1999 Principles of Social Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Persson U M and Wunder S 2017 The effectiveness of University Press) payments for environmental services World Dev. 96 359–74 Miller D 2013 Justice for Earthlings: Essays in Political Philosophy Bowles S 2008 Policies designed for self-interested citizens may (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) undermine’ the moral sentiments’: evidence from economic Milne S and Adams B 2012 Market masquerades: uncovering the experiments Science 320 1605–9 politics of community‐level payments for environmental Calvet-Mir L, Corbera E, Martin A, Fisher J and Gross-Camp N services in Cambodia Dev. Change 43 133–58 2015 Payments for ecosystem services in the tropics: a closer Morris S S, Carletto C, Hoddinott J and Christiaensen L J 2000 look at effectiveness and equity Curr. Opin. Environ. Validity of rapid estimates of household wealth and income Sustainability 14 150–62 for health surveys in rural Africa J. Epidemiol. Community Health 54 381–7 8 Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 064002 Muradian R et al 2013 Payments for ecosystem services and the fatal and poverty in low and middle income countries: a systematic attraction of win-win solutions Conservation Lett. 6 274–9 review Campbell Systematic Reviews vol 10 (Oslo, Norway: Neuteleers S and Engelen B 2015 Talking money: how market-based Campbell Collaboration) no. 11 valuation can undermine environmental protection Ecol. Sandel M J 2012 What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets Econ. 117 253–60 (London: Macmillan) Nussbaum M 2011 Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Satz D 2010 Why Some Things Should Not Be for sale: The moral Approach (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard Limits of Markets (Oxford: Oxford University Press) University Press) Saucier G, Kenner J, Iurino K, Bou Malham P, Chen Z, O’Neill J 2016 Markets, ethics, and environment The Oxford Thalmayer A G, Kemmelmeier M, Tov W, Boutti R and Handbook of Environmental Ethic ed S Gardiner and Metaferia H 2015 Cross-cultural differences in a global A Thompson (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp 40–6 ‘survey of world views J. Cross-Cultural Psychol. 46 53–70 Ostrom E 1990 Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Spash C L 2010 The brave new world of carbon trading New Political Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge Econ. 15 169–95 University Press) Vohs K D 2015 Money priming can change people’s thoughts, Pearce D W, Markandya A and Barbier E 1989 Blueprint for a Green feelings, motivations, and behaviors: an update on 10 years of Economy (London: Earthscan) experiments J. Exp. Psychol.: Gen. 144 e86 Polanyi K 1944 The Great Transformation: Economic and Political Vohs K D, Mead N L and Goode M R 2006 The psychological Origins of Our Time (New York: Rinehart) consequences of money Science 314 1154–6 Rode J, Gómez-Baggethun E and Krause T 2015 Motivation Vohs K D, Mead N L and Goode M R 2008 Merely activating the crowding by economic incentives in conservation policy: a concept of money changes personal and interpersonal review of the empirical evidence Ecol. Econ. 117 270–82 behavior Curr. Directions Psychol. Sci. 17 208–12 Romero C, Putz F E, Guariguata M R, Sills E O, Cerutti P O and Walzer M 2008 Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality Lescuyer G 2013 An overview of current knowledge about the (New York: Basic Books) impacts of forest management certification: A proposed WCED 1987 Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University framework for its evaluation CIFOR Occasional Paper vol 99 Press) no. 91 Zhang Y and Yu F 2018 Which socio-economic indicators influence Ruegger D and King E W 1992 A study of the effect of age and gender collective morality? Big data analysis on online chinese social upon student business ethics J. Bus. Ethics 11 179–86 media Emerg. Markets Financ. Trade 54 792–800 Samii C, Lisiecki M, Kulkarni P, Paler L and Chavis L 2014 Effects of payment for environmental services (PES) on deforestation http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Environmental Research Letters IOP Publishing

Fair ways to share benefits from community forests? How commodification is associated with reduced preference for equality and poverty alleviation

Loading next page...
 
/lp/iop-publishing/fair-ways-to-share-benefits-from-community-forests-how-commodification-YVr1WoobT7

References (61)

Copyright
Copyright © 2019 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
eISSN
1748-9326
DOI
10.1088/1748-9326/ab114f
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

and DOI. This research is concerned with the trend towards commodification of forestry, in the context of community forest governance for sustainable development in the tropics. In these contexts, commodification takes different forms, including sales of certified timbers and sales of carbon credits. In addition to the general aim to enhance income, these market-based forestry interventions typically aim to align with sustainable development agendas, including (a) safeguarding ecological integrity and (b) promoting poverty alleviation. Our concern here is that the process of forest commodification might lead to a shift in local norms of benefit-sharing, in ways that can hinder these key components of sustainable development goals. We report the results of a survey (N=519) conducted across sites in Bolivia, China and Tanzania that shows that switching from non-monetary to monetary benefits is associated with changes in preferences for distributional fairness in ways that may be detrimental to the poor. In particular, we show that forest commodification is associated with a lower likelihood of selecting pro-poor or egalitarian approaches to benefit sharing and higher likelihood of selecting to distribute benefits in a way that rewards individual contributions or compensates losses. Introduction Kouchaki et al 2013). In the context of environmental conservation, this raises concern because virtues In Antigone, the character Creon claims that ‘There’s associated with social responsibility, including com- nothing in the world so demoralising as money’ whilst passion, reciprocity, trust and cooperation, are often D H Lawrence observed that ‘Money poisons you essential requirements for successful environmental when you have got it, and starves you when you have governance (Ostrom 1990) and are also widely held to not’ (Lawrence 1994 (1928)). Most academic research be central requirements—or capabilities—for achiev- into this phenomena focuses on the institutional ing human wellbeing (Nussbaum 2011). To put this in arrangements surrounding monetary exchange, iden- a way that has underpinned mainstream environment- tifying market exchange as a driver of declining social alism for at least three decades, social equity is a responsibility (Polanyi 1944, Satz 2010, Sandel 2012, necessary condition for achieving sustainable develop- Falk and Szech 2013, Bartling et al 2014). More ment (WCED 1987, Pearce et al 1989, Holden et al recently, evidence has emerged that money itself— 2017). indeed even brief exposure to an image or symbol of Our particular interest in this paper is the commo- money—can erode our empathy and responsibility dification of forests within the context of community towards others (Vohs et al 2006, Caruso et al 2013, forestry in the tropics. Communities are increasingly © 2019 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 064002 Figure 1. Hypothesised factors affecting preferred fairness principles. supported to develop money-based forest economies MBIs can foster mentalities in which inequitable dis- through what are generically termed market-based tribution of costs and benefits are conceived as accep- instruments (MBIs). In our case locations, these table (Caney 2010, Spash 2010,O’Neill 2016) and in include the marketing of forest timbers through forest which monetary incentives crowd out superior certification and labelling schemes, payments for eco- motives for caring for nature (Bowles 2008, Cor- system services (PES) schemes for carbon offsetting bera 2012, Sandel 2012, Bolderdijk et al 2013, García- and soil stabilisation and development of ecotourism Amado et al 2013, Agrawal et al 2015, Neuteleers and products. Whilst we adopt the convention of collec- Engelen 2015, Rode et al 2015). tively describing these as ‘market-based’, many PES This paper adds to this literature through field- schemes involve government or NGO procurement in based empirical research into the effects of forest com- the absence of competitive market institutions (Fer- modification on principles of fairness within local raro 2009, Milne and Adams 2012, Calvet-Mir et al communities. In particular, we investigate whether 2015, Gómez-Baggethun and Muradian 2015). What commodification changes conceptions of fairness in defines MBIs in this research is therefore the progres- ways that appear to diminish concern about poverty sion from non-monetary to monetary benefits from and inequality. In line with the United Nations Sus- managing local forests. This change is often associated tainable Development Goals (SDGs) we assume that with a shift in the kind of goods and services that are both the prioritisation of the poorest and the pursuit valued and exploited. For example, the United of equality (e.g. ‘leave no one behind’) are important Nations’ programme on Reducing Emissions from conditions for progress towards sustainable develop- Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) has ment. If commodification of forests is diminishing the newly valorised the carbon stored in forest biomass as salience of these norms, this might be a hindrance to a basis for paying forest managers in the tropics for progress towards sustainable development. conserving or enhancing their forest stock Our focus here is on the conceptions of fairness (Corbera 2012). held within local communities. This is increasingly The commodification of local forest economies pertinent for the governance of forest resources has the potential to bring important new income because of the increasing proportion of forests in low streams to local communities and to incentivise forest and middle income countries that are coming under conservation over conversion to other land uses. forms of community management (Larson et al 2017). However, there are concerns about how well such We investigate the effects on fairness preferences of (a) development and conservation objectives are being monetary versus non-monetary benefits, (b) societal met. For example, reviews find that there is currently context and (c) individual characteristics. insufficient evidence to conclude that these objectives We explore three hypotheses about how individual have been widely achieved in practice by either certifi- moral preferences might be predicted by different cation schemes (Blackman and Rivera 2011, Romero types of independent variables (figure 1). Firstly, et al 2013) or PES schemes (Muradian et al 2013, Samii addressing the primary research interest of this paper, et al 2014, Börner et al 2017). But critiques of MBIs go we propose that conceptions of distributional and beyond concerns about effectiveness, to include fears procedural fairness are both plural and dynamic (Wal- that commodification of environmental stewardship zer 2008) and that the preferred conceptions in a given erodes the moral basis for caring, both for nature and situation will be shaped by the nature of the benefit, i.e. for other people. Previous research has found that whether it is monetary or non-monetary. For many of 2 Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 064002 us it is intuitive that we apply different principles of greatest collective benefit (‘Invest’), 4. Prioritise those distributional fairness according to the nature of the who experience losses arising from forest conservation good being distributed: we might for example think (‘Compensate’), 5. Reward those who have con- that ‘need’ is the fairest principle for distributing food, tributed to forest conservation (‘Reward’). Views ‘equality’ the fairest way to distribute votes and per- about procedural fairness were investigated in much haps ‘merit’ as the best way to allocate jobs the same way, but with four alternative arrangements for decision-making authority: 1. Village leaders, 2. (Deutsch 2011). More specific to our hypothesis, there Village assembly, 3. District government and 4. Non- is a body of evidence from experimental psychology government partner (in China this was private sector that suggests that being primed to think about money forest companies; in Tanzania and Bolivia, non-profit induces a distinct normative response (Vohs 2015). organisations). Whilst our primary interest is in the effect of mon- Both sets of principles have been adapted from sets etisation, we also expect contexts of place to have an that we developed and tested during earlier research in important bearing on social moralities. Our second Rwanda, Uganda and Laos (Martin 2017) and thus we hypothesis is therefore that conceptions of fairness will are confident that they are well understood by respon- be shaped by the societal context in which the decision dents, that they do not omit any widely preferred prin- is to be taken. Here, we are following literature that ciples and that they are appropriate for this new suggests that cultural, economic, political and legal research question about effects of commodification. contexts are not only shaped by ethical values, but also However, with both sets of statements there are varia- play a role in shaping the salience of different princi- tions of meaning between countries that we acknowl- ples of fairness (Haidt 2012, Miller 2013, Saucier et al edge may have some bearing on comparisons. Firstly, 2015, Almås et al 2019). Thirdly, we propose that indi- as we will mention in the discussion, the distributional vidual characteristics and circumstances will similarly statement for ‘Reward’ had a somewhat unique inter- shape conceptions of fairness, as some research has pretation in Bolivia. In all other sites, we found this found for gender and age (Ruegger and King 1992), statement to be understood as referring to those who education (Hungerford and Volk 1990) and economic helped out in the day to day management activities of wealth (Armantier 2006, Zhang and Yu 2018). forests, including guard patrols, boundary marking etc. In Bolivia it was understood in more strategic, lea- Methods dership terms, as referring to elders who had fought to secure territorial rights. Secondly, the procedural We compare how monetary and non-monetary bene- statement about non-governmental partners was fits from local forests effect judgments about distribu- interpreted in Tanzania and Bolivia as referring to tional and procedural fairness for villagers in four non-government organisations who were supporting cultural groups across three countries: (i) Monkox local forestry initiatives whereas in Chinese sites there indigenous territory in Lomerio, Bolivia, (ii) Han was no such NGO presence and it referred instead to villages, China, (iii) ethnic minority (Lisu and Dai) private sector forest contractors. villages, China and (iv) Tanzanian villages in Kilwa To test the first hypothesis (the effect of benefit district. We investigate villagers’ views about fairness, type) we employed two versions of our survey. One both in terms of principles for distributing forest version (monetary) defined the benefit as cash income benefits, and procedures for deciding this. We survey from sale of forest benefits, whilst the other (non- 519 respondents using a form (supplementary infor- monetary version) defined the benefit to be shared as mation is available online at stacks.iop.org/ERL/14/ the forest benefits themselves. In other words, the 064002/mmedia) translated into local language and monetary version imagines that there has been cash conducted face to face with in-country research team payment (e.g. from sale of timber) and asks respon- members. dents how that money should be distributed; in con- Faced with the scenario of material benefits arising trast, the non-monetary version imagines that forest from community forests, all respondents were asked benefits (e.g. construction materials or fruits) are to be to rank, in order of preference, (a) alternative distribu- distributed directly. Each site level sample was ran- tional principles and (b) alternative institutional domly split so that half the respondents used the arrangements for decision-making. Distributional monetary version and half the non-monetary version. principles were based on well-established philosophi- To test the second hypothesis (the effect of societal cal approaches to defining fair distribution, including contexts) we selected respondents from different loca- those that argue that fairness is best pursued by prior- tions, across three countries and four cultural groups. itising need, equality, utility maximisation or desert To test the third hypothesis (the effect of individual (how deserving a person is)(Miller 1999). Applying characteristics) we collected basic profile information these different ethical traditions to the context of for- about respondents (age, gender, education level and est governance, we generated five alternative distribu- wealth). Wealth was measured by proxy, using a sim- tional principles: 1. Prioritise the poorest (‘Pro-poor’), ple count of selected durable assets, a method that has 2. Distribute equally (‘Equality’), 3. Invest to generate been found to adequately correlate with more research 3 Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 064002 Table 1. Survey sample. Country Village Total population Survey sample Qualitative Interview Sample Participatory Video Tanzania Ruhatwe 979 60 12 Yes Kikole 1490 60 12 Yes China Baojiachun (Han) 5180 60 10 Yes Xinqi (Han) 4577 60 10 Yes Shiba (Lisu) 1901 60 10 No Manhong (Dai) 286 62 10 No Bolivia Palmira 391 50 Focus groups Yes (collective) San Lorenzo 333 50 Focus groups Yes (collective) Santa Rosario 82 20 Focus groups Yes (collective) Todos Santo 166 40 Focus groups Yes (collective) intensive measures of income or expenditure (Morris Sampling strategies differed between countries et al 2000). (table 1). In Bolivia community sizes were small and Sites were selected in locations where the team we selected one person from each household. In Tan- already worked and could take advantage of estab- zania we acquired lists of households from the 2012 lished trust and successful local partnership. They census and randomly selected 60 households from were selected not to be representative of the regions or each village. In China we had to use convenience sam- countries where they are situated, but to provide con- pling but sought to reduce bias by ensuring different textual difference, especially in relation to culture. In locations in the village were covered and that surveys all sites, there is some form of community forestry in took place across different days and times. operation, meaning that communities themselves Qualitative data collection involved participatory have some responsibility for local benefit sharing and video (PV) and semi-structured interviews. PVs pro- therefore that local norms of distribution are impor- vided communities the opportunity to highlight local tant. In Tanzania, we selected two villages (Ruhatwe forest justice concerns of particular significance to and Kikole) in Kilwa district, an economically poor them, in the absence of any substantial direction from part of the country with high dependence on natural the research team. In essence, this informed us about resources. These villages are seeing a progression what really mattered in that time and place, providing towards market exchange for forest goods, through a kind of benchmark of what might be prominent in sales of Forest Stewardship Council certified timber people’s minds as they thought about issues of dis- under Participatory Forest Management and through tribution and procedure. The main function of this carbon offsets generated by a REDD+ pilot project information was to triangulate with survey findings, (Corbera et al 2017). In Bolivia, we worked with com- helping us to validate and make sense of key findings. munities within the indigenous territory (Territorios Indigena Originario Campesino) of Lomerio, an area PVs were made in Ruhatwe, Kikole, Baojiachun, Xinqi of 256 000 hectares that has been legally owned by the and Lomerio (in Lomerio, the communities collabo- Monkox people since 2006. As with the Tanzanian rated over a shared film). Semi-structured interviews sites, there have been moves towards community- and (focus groups in Bolivia) were conducted with a sub- market-based forestry, in this case through Rainforest sample of survey respondents and served a similar Alliance ‘Smartwood’ forest certification and sub- function, seeking to explain some of the differences sequent NGO mediated commercial partnerships recorded between locations and thereby strengthening between communities and private contractors (McDa- our confidence in the main findings from the regres- niel 2003, de Pourcq et al 2009, Martin 2017).Of29 sion analysis. communities in Lomerio, we selected 4 that were cur- Survey data was analysed using econometric rently active in community forest operations (Palmira, (regression) analysis to control for the potential con- Santo Rosario, San Lorenzo and Todos Santos).In founding effects of many variables such as location, China we selected sites representing some of the cul- gender, age, education and wealth. We used ordered tural diversity within Yunnan province. Baojiachun logits because the dependent variables are ordinal and Xinqi are Han Chinese settlements, the majority indicators and the tables of regression results report ethnic group. Shiba is a village of the Lisu people whilst odds ratios. The calculation of standard errors takes Manhong is settled by another ethnic minority group, clustering at the village level into account. the Dai people. All Chinese sites had experienced some commodification of forest benefits through PESs (the Sloping Land Conversion Programme) as well as more location-specific enterprises such as ecotourism (Bao- jiachun) and collective commercial forestry (Xinqi). 4 Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 064002 Table 2. Factors affecting distribution principles: ordered logits (odds ratios). (1)(2)(3)(4)(5) Variables Pro-poor (need) Equality (equality) Invest (utilitarian) Compensate (desert 1) Reward (desert 2) Dummy variable for monetary version (non-monetary as reference) *** *** * *** Monetary 0.453 0.545 1.317 1.507 2.233 (0.123)(0.127)(0.395)(0.357)(0.545) Dummy variables for location (Bolivia as reference) * *** *** *** Tanzania 1.308 0.0764 4.438 8.207 0.582 (0.192)(0.0219)(1.573)(2.502)(0.201) * ** *** *** Han China 1.244 0.589 2.128 5.346 0.246 (0.158)(0.242)(0.750)(1.327)(0.0923) ** *** *** Lisu and Dai China 0.809 3.494 1.243 7.017 0.0759 (0.208)(1.818)(0.812)(3.261)(0.0351) Individual characteristics (no education as reference for education variables) Male 1.006 0.747 1.308 1.199 0.905 (0.243)(0.120)(0.281)(0.280)(0.178) * *** Age (log) 0.780 0.707 1.864 0.581 1.235 (0.226)(0.195)(0.653)(0.114)(0.379) ** Primary education 1.577 0.649 1.575 0.922 0.823 (0.477)(0.274)(0.293)(0.301)(0.149) Secondary education 1.695 0.683 1.408 1.022 0.698 (0.573)(0.273)(0.418)(0.371)(0.207) *** * Higher education 2.557 0.489 1.598 1.496 0.664 (0.866)(0.223)(0.454)(1.020)(0.212) *** ** * ** Assets count (wealth) 0.848 0.966 1.188 0.909 1.109 Observations 515 516 517 515 512 *** ** * Note. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses; p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1. Results effort (OR 2.233, p<0.01). Similarly, there is also rather weak evidence (only at 10% level) that people Factors affecting choices of distributional fairness prefer the other desert principle of ‘Compensate’ principle when the monetary version is given (OR=1.507, The three sets of hypotheses outlined above are tested p<0.10). It is also interesting to note that ‘Invest’ is using regression analysis; specifically, ordered logits not significantly correlated to the monetary version. are used since each of the five distribution principles— We might summarise this as finding that non-mone- pro-poor, equality, invest, compensate and reward— tary benefits composed of forest goods such as con- are ranked from the least (1) to the most preferred (5). struction materials and fruits are more likely to be These ranks are regressed on indicators of the mone- distributed in a pro-poor or an egalitarian way whilst tary version, location of sites and individual character- monetary benefits are more likely to be distributed istics of participants (gender, age, education and an according to meritocratic principles. To confirm this index measuring household assets). Table 2 presents effect we ran regressions with interactive terms the results. between location dummies and the variable ‘mone- The ‘monetary’ variable shows the odds of select- tary’ (supplementary materials). All of the interactive ing a given distributional principle when money is to terms for ‘Pro-poor’ and ‘Equality’ are statistically be distributed against a baseline where ‘non-mone- insignificant (only one significant at 10%), showing tary’ forest goods are to be distributed. The data show that the main result is robust across the different study that changes to this variable are significantly correlated locations. with preferred fairness principle. Respondents given Turning to our second hypothesis, the odds ratios the monetary version are less than half as likely to pre- for location variables (our indicator of societal differ- fer a ‘Pro-poor’ distribution of benefits compared to ence) are expressed against the baseline of our Bolivian those with the non-monetary version (OR=0.453, location. The results confirm that societal contexts are p<0.01). Those with the monetary version were strongly correlated with preferred conceptions of fair- similarly less likely to prefer an ‘Equality’ distribu- ness. Given our deliberate selection of culturally dis- tional principle (OR=0.545, p<0.01). Compared tinct locations, it is not surprising that we see multiple to non-monetary benefits, respondents were more evidence of location-associated moral pluralism. Boli- likely to distribute monetary benefits according to one vian Monkox communities are seen to be quite dis- of the desert (deservedness) principles and, in part- tinct to other locations, with very low preference for icular, were more than twice as likely to prefer the the ‘Compensate’ principle compared to all other principle to ‘Reward’ those who have put in the most locations and low preference for the ‘Invest’ principle 5 Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 064002 Table 3. Factors affecting procedural principles: ordered logits (odds ratios). (1)(2)(3)(4) Variables Village leader Village assembly District government Non-government partner Dummy variable for monetary version (non-monetary as reference) Monetary 1.307 1.083 0.788 0.787 (0.375)(0.260)(0.297)(0.241) Dummy variables for location (Bolivia as reference) * *** *** Tanzania 1.293 0.389 0.0387 12.50 (0.483)(0.217)(0.0223)(4.380) ** ** ** *** Han China 2.839 0.269 0.374 0.0974 (1.377)(0.180)(0.146)(0.0284) *** *** *** ** Lisu and Dai China 3.189 0.137 0.386 0.318 (0.656)(0.0824)(0.107)(0.169) Individual characteristics (no school education as reference) Male 0.824 1.879 0.867 1.445 (0.327)(0.822)(0.211)(0.349) Age (log) 1.325 0.582 1.005 0.534 (0.284)(0.278)(0.217)(0.220) Primary education 0.959 1.371 0.857 1.081 (0.393)(0.382)(0.242)(0.234) Secondary education 0.891 1.606 0.800 1.125 (0.314)(0.555)(0.228)(0.454) *** Higher education 0.663 2.553 0.958 2.233 (0.298)(0.852)(0.443)(1.929) Assets count (wealth) 0.996 1.072 1.046 0.942 (0.0381)(0.0496)(0.0722)(0.0735) Observations 512 516 512 514 *** ** * Note. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses; p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1. compared to Tanzania and Han China. Whilst Tanza- characteristics are smaller and less frequent than those nian village respondents display a comparatively high observed for the monetary and location variables. likelihood of preferring the ‘Compensate’ principle (OR=8.207, p<0.01), they are much less likely to Factors affecting choices of procedural fairness prefer ‘Equality’ (OR=0.0764, p<0.01) and much principles more likely than Bolivians to prefer the principle to While the results in the previous section focus on an ‘Invest’ to maximise returns (OR=4.438, p<0.01). aspect of distributional fairness, the principles in Han villagers are comparatively more likely than the table 3 represent one aspect of procedural fairness that Monkox from Bolivia to prefer the ‘Invest’ is especially pertinent to distribution, regarding where (OR=2.128, p<0.05) or ‘Compensate’ principles primary decision-making authority resides or, in other (OR=5.346, p<0.01). The ethnic minority Dai and words, who decides who gets what. The most striking Lisu villages in China reveal a distinctive profile. Com- feature of table 3 is that there are no significant pared to the Bolivian reference, these communities differences arising from the monetary/non-monetary favour ‘Equality’ (OR=3.494, p<0.05) and ‘Com- variable. Thus, a switch from distributing forest pensate’ (OR=7.017, p<0.01) principles but are benefits directly to distributing money from sales of unlikely to prefer the ‘Reward’ principle these benefits, does not appear to be associated with (OR=0.0759, p<0.01). how respondents think decisions should be made. In When we turn to the individual characteristics of other words, while commodification of benefits is our global data we see that these have a less prominent significantly correlated with preferred distributional association with preferred distributional fairness prin- fairness principles, it is not correlated with procedural ciples. Men are somewhat less likely than women to fairness (at least with regard to the specific procedures prefer ‘Equality’ of distribution (OR=0.747, considered here). p<0.10), older people are less likely to prefer the By contrast, the location variables again have a ‘Compensate’ principle (OR=0.581, p<0.01), robust and almost universal correlation with preferred those with higher levels of education significantly principle. Lomerio (Bolivia) differs greatly from other favour the ‘Pro-poor’ principle compared with those locations across all principles. All other locations with no school education (OR=2.557; p<0.01) and except Tanzania are significantly more likely to prefer those with greater economic assets are slightly less decisions by village/community leaders than in Boli- likely to prefer ‘Pro-poor’ distribution (OR=0.848, via; all are significantly less likely to prefer decision p<0.01). These correlations with individual making by a village assembly; all are significantly less 6 Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 064002 likely to prefer district government authority; and all as some previous studies of commodification have except Tanzania are significantly less likely to prefer found? That would not be a safe conclusion for this decisions by a non-government partner. Tanzania is study because all of our fairness principles were selec- notable for a much higher preference for a non-gov- ted for being reasonable in some contexts at least. ernment decision maker (OR=12.50, p<0.01). However, we do think that a shift away from pro-poor Both Chinese locations show a similar profile of differ- and pro-equality principles for distribution might be contradictory to ambitions to pursue sustainable ences to Bolivia, with all more likely to prefer decisions development. Poverty alleviation and equality are pro- by a village leader and less likely to prefer any of the minent elements of the current global commitment to other principles. Han and ethnic minority (Lisu and the SDGs and our findings suggest that the shift to Dai) Chinese villages reveal a particularly low like- commodification of local forests is likely to induce lihood of preferring decision-making by a non-gov- changes in local moral preferences that could act ernment partner (OR=0.0974, p<0.01; against these. This association with local fairness prin- OR=0.318, p<0.05). ciples is especially relevant in the context of commu- Again, after controlling for locational and other nity forest governance, in which decision making variables, we see hardly any correlation attributable to about benefit-sharing is at least partly devolved to local individual characteristics. Those with the highest level institutions. of education are more likely to prefer collective deci- We also confirmed the hypothesis that fairness sion-making through a village assembly (OR=2.553, preferences are associated with locational, contextual p<0.01), but we see no significant correlation with factors. This has considerable implications for design gender, age or wealth. of policy and project interventions because distribu- tional and procedural principles considered fair in one Discussion place might be considered unjust in another and meet with strong latent or overt resistance. From what we Contemporary theories of human behaviour accept have learned through complementary qualitative that preferences are not formed by self-interest alone, research, there are often important local reasons for but also by social morality (Graham et al 2012) which attributing particular meanings and values to the sur- is itself shaped by contextual circumstances such as vey principles. In Tanzanian sites, for example, culture and institutions (Graham et al 2012, damage caused by elephants is a huge concern to villa- Haidt 2013). In Polanyi’s analysis of The Great gers and we think this contributes to high levels of pre- Transformation, norms of social responsibility and ference for compensation. In Lomerio, Bolivia, we caring were eroded by the widespread transition from were surprised that ‘Reward’ was more favoured than subsistence to market-based exchange (Polanyi 1944). in other sites because this ostensibly meritocratic prin- Recent research in psychology has suggested that ciple does not seem to resonate with the prevailing disruption to social norms from exposure to monetary communalism of the indigenous Monkox people. exchange can occur much more quickly and locally Here, however, we found that ‘Reward’ for those who (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000, Vohs et al 2006, Vohs had helped look after the forests was interpreted as et al 2008, Gino and Mogilner 2014), with some studies meaning those who had struggled for the Monkox to suggesting that the mere priming of people with the gain legal rights to their forests. In effect, this refers to idea of money induces preferences that benefit the rich the elders and we think this explains its cultural fit and at the expense of the poor (Caruso et al 2013, Kouchaki why it is favoured. In both the Han and Dai villages et al 2013). These research findings provide some cause surveyed in China, there are strong histories of com- for concern about the rapid growth in commodifica- munal forest management in which forest revenues tion as a putative solution for sustainability, leading us have been successfully used to secure public goods to explore the effects of monetisation, along with such as roads and schools. It is likely that this historical locational and individual variables, on local concep- experience is a key factor in the popularity of an tions of fairness. ‘Invest’ distributional principle. What we are seeing The most interesting result of our survey is to con- then is that locational associations with distributional firm the hypothesis that a change from non-monetary fairness preferences can arise from a variety of local to monetary benefits from forests is associated with material and cultural histories. Such complexity is also changing preferences for principles of distributional seen for procedural fairness. In Bolivia, the compara- (but not procedural) fairness, a finding that is robust tive dislike for decisions by village leaders alone is across the different research locations. The results almost certainly linked to quite fundamental cultural show that when thinking about the fair way to dis- preference for communalism over individualism. By tribute monetary forest revenues, respondents were contrast, the comparatively strong appeal of non-gov- less likely to prefer ‘Pro-poor’ or ‘Equality’ as princi- ernment partner decision-making in Tanzania is likely ples of distribution and more likely to prefer desert- to be more circumstantial, arising from the presence of based principles of ‘Compensation’ and ‘Reward’. a non-governmental organisation (the Mpingo Con- Does this constitute an erosion of social responsibility, servation and Development Initiative) that is highly 7 Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 064002 active in local forest governance initiatives. In the Han Caney S 2010 Markets, morality and climate change: what, if anything, is wrong with emissions trading? New Political Chinese village, the most active non-government part- Econ. 15 197–224 ners are private sector forestry companies, again pro- Caruso E M, Vohs K D, Baxter B and Waytz A 2013 Mere exposure viding a more circumstantial explanation of to money increases endorsement of free-market systems and preferences. social inequality J. Exp. Psychol.: Gen. 142 301 Corbera E 2012 Problematizing REDD+ as an experiment in Finally, we were surprised to find so little evidence payments for ecosystem services Curr. Opin. Environ. that individual characteristics such as age and gender Sustainability 4 1–8 are associated with fairness preferences. We do not yet Corbera E, Martin A, Springate-Baginski O and Villaseñor A 2017 understand the reasons for this but suspect it relates to Sowing the seeds of sustainable rural livelihoods? An assessment of participatory forest management through the specific focus of our study, i.e. that these factors are REDD+ in Tanzania Land Use Policy (https://doi.org/ less important in determining conceptions of fairness 10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.09.037) related to forest goods and related revenues. Regarding de Pourcq K, Thomas E and van Damme P 2009 Indigenous age, it should also be noted that all respondents were community-based forestry in the Bolivian lowlands: some basic challenges for certification Int. Forestry Rev. 11 12–26 adults and we may therefore have missed important Deutsch M 2011 Justice and conflict Conflict, Interdependence, and differences across adolescence that has been observed Justice (Berlin: Springer) in previous experimental studies (Almås et al 2010). Falk A and Szech N 2013 Morals and markets Science 340 707–11 Ferraro P J 2009 Regional review of payments for watershed services: sub-saharan Africa J. Sustain. Forestry 28 525–50 Acknowledgments García-Amado L R, Pérez M R and García S B 2013 Motivation for conservation: assessing integrated conservation and development projects and payments for environmental We are thankful to the United Kingdom’s Economic services in La Sepultura Biosphere Reserve, Chiapas, Mexico and Social Research Council for grant funding of the Ecol. Econ. 89 92–100 project Conservation, Markets and Justice (Grant Ref: Gino F and Mogilner C 2014 Time, money, and morality Psychol. Sci. 25 414–21 ES/K005812/1). We are also thankful to two anon- Gneezy U and Rustichini A 2000 A fine is a price J. Leg. Stud. 29 1–17 ymous reviewers for helping us to improve this paper. Gómez-Baggethun E and Muradian R 2015 In markets we trust? Setting the boundaries of market-based instruments in ecosystem services governance Ecol. Econ. 117 217–24 ORCID iDs Graham J, Haidt J, Koleva S, Motyl M, Iyer R, Wojcik S P and Ditto P H 2012 Moral foundations theory: the pragmatic Adrian Martin https://orcid.org/0000-0003- validity of moral pluralism Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (New York: Academic) vol 47 pp 55–130 2916-7712 Haidt J 2012 The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion (New York: Vintage) References Haidt J 2013 Moral psychology for the twenty-first century J. Moral Educ. 42 281–97 Agrawal A, Chhatre A and Gerber E R 2015 Motivational crowding Holden E, Linnerud K and Banister D 2017 The imperatives of in sustainable development interventions Am. Political Sci. sustainable development Sustain. Dev. 25 213–26 Rev. 109 470–87 Hungerford H R and Volk T L 1990 Changing learner behavior Almås I, Cappelen A W, Sørensen E Ø and Tungodden B 2010 through environmental education J. Environ. Educ. 21 8–21 Fairness and the development of inequality acceptance Kouchaki M, Smith-Crowe K, Brief A P and Sousa C 2013 Seeing Science 328 1176–8 green: mere exposure to money triggers a business decision Almås I, Cappelen A W and Tungodden B 2019 Cutthroat frame and unethical outcomes Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. capitalism versus cuddly socialism: are Americans more Process. 121 53–61 meritocratic and efficiency-seeking than Scandinavians? Larson A M, Monterroso I, Banjade M R and Mwangi E 2017 NHH Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper 4 Community rights to forests in the tropics Comparative Armantier O 2006 Do wealth differences affect fairness Property Law: Global Perspectives ed M Graziadei and L Smith considerations? Int. Econ. Rev. 47 391–429 vol 9 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing) ch 20 Bartling B, Weber R A and Yao L 2014 Do markets erode social pp 435–50 responsibility? Q. J. Econ. 130 219–66 Lawrence D H 1994 Lady Chatterley’s Lover (London: Blackman A and Rivera J 2011 Producer‐level benefits of Penguin)(1928) sustainability certification Conserv. Biol. 25 1176–85 Martin A 2017 Just Conservation: Biodiversity, Wellbeing and Bolderdijk J W, Steg L, Geller E S, Lehman P and Postmes T 2013 Sustainability (London: Routledge) Comparing the effectiveness of monetary versus moral McDaniel J M 2003 Community-based forestry and timber motives in environmental campaigning Nat. Clim. Change certification in Southeast Bolivia Small-Scale Forest Econ. 3 413 Manage. Policy 2 327–41 Börner J, Baylis K, Corbera E, Ezzine-de-Blas D, Honey-Rosés J, Miller D 1999 Principles of Social Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Persson U M and Wunder S 2017 The effectiveness of University Press) payments for environmental services World Dev. 96 359–74 Miller D 2013 Justice for Earthlings: Essays in Political Philosophy Bowles S 2008 Policies designed for self-interested citizens may (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) undermine’ the moral sentiments’: evidence from economic Milne S and Adams B 2012 Market masquerades: uncovering the experiments Science 320 1605–9 politics of community‐level payments for environmental Calvet-Mir L, Corbera E, Martin A, Fisher J and Gross-Camp N services in Cambodia Dev. Change 43 133–58 2015 Payments for ecosystem services in the tropics: a closer Morris S S, Carletto C, Hoddinott J and Christiaensen L J 2000 look at effectiveness and equity Curr. Opin. Environ. Validity of rapid estimates of household wealth and income Sustainability 14 150–62 for health surveys in rural Africa J. Epidemiol. Community Health 54 381–7 8 Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 064002 Muradian R et al 2013 Payments for ecosystem services and the fatal and poverty in low and middle income countries: a systematic attraction of win-win solutions Conservation Lett. 6 274–9 review Campbell Systematic Reviews vol 10 (Oslo, Norway: Neuteleers S and Engelen B 2015 Talking money: how market-based Campbell Collaboration) no. 11 valuation can undermine environmental protection Ecol. Sandel M J 2012 What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets Econ. 117 253–60 (London: Macmillan) Nussbaum M 2011 Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Satz D 2010 Why Some Things Should Not Be for sale: The moral Approach (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard Limits of Markets (Oxford: Oxford University Press) University Press) Saucier G, Kenner J, Iurino K, Bou Malham P, Chen Z, O’Neill J 2016 Markets, ethics, and environment The Oxford Thalmayer A G, Kemmelmeier M, Tov W, Boutti R and Handbook of Environmental Ethic ed S Gardiner and Metaferia H 2015 Cross-cultural differences in a global A Thompson (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp 40–6 ‘survey of world views J. Cross-Cultural Psychol. 46 53–70 Ostrom E 1990 Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Spash C L 2010 The brave new world of carbon trading New Political Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge Econ. 15 169–95 University Press) Vohs K D 2015 Money priming can change people’s thoughts, Pearce D W, Markandya A and Barbier E 1989 Blueprint for a Green feelings, motivations, and behaviors: an update on 10 years of Economy (London: Earthscan) experiments J. Exp. Psychol.: Gen. 144 e86 Polanyi K 1944 The Great Transformation: Economic and Political Vohs K D, Mead N L and Goode M R 2006 The psychological Origins of Our Time (New York: Rinehart) consequences of money Science 314 1154–6 Rode J, Gómez-Baggethun E and Krause T 2015 Motivation Vohs K D, Mead N L and Goode M R 2008 Merely activating the crowding by economic incentives in conservation policy: a concept of money changes personal and interpersonal review of the empirical evidence Ecol. Econ. 117 270–82 behavior Curr. Directions Psychol. Sci. 17 208–12 Romero C, Putz F E, Guariguata M R, Sills E O, Cerutti P O and Walzer M 2008 Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality Lescuyer G 2013 An overview of current knowledge about the (New York: Basic Books) impacts of forest management certification: A proposed WCED 1987 Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University framework for its evaluation CIFOR Occasional Paper vol 99 Press) no. 91 Zhang Y and Yu F 2018 Which socio-economic indicators influence Ruegger D and King E W 1992 A study of the effect of age and gender collective morality? Big data analysis on online chinese social upon student business ethics J. Bus. Ethics 11 179–86 media Emerg. Markets Financ. Trade 54 792–800 Samii C, Lisiecki M, Kulkarni P, Paler L and Chavis L 2014 Effects of payment for environmental services (PES) on deforestation

Journal

Environmental Research LettersIOP Publishing

Published: May 22, 2019

There are no references for this article.