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Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or Minilateralism?

Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or Minilateralism? The slow progress of the international climate negotiations has generated calls for a shift from large-n multilateralism (inclusive multilateralism) to more streamlined negotiations that are confined to the major emitters whose support is crucial for an effective climate treaty (exclusive minilateralism). This article pushes critical theory in an applied direction to explore under what circumstances, if any, minilateralism might help to advance the climate negotiations. I show that inclusive multilateralism is unlikely to produce a timely climate treaty, while exclusive minilateralism is elitist, procedurally unjust, and likely to be self-serving. Instead, I defend inclusive minilateralism, based on “common but differentiated representation,” or representation by the most capable, the most responsible, and the most vulnerable. I also offer some practical suggestions as to how a minilateral climate council might be constituted, what its remit should be, and how it might be embedded in and answerable to the UNFCCC. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Global Environmental Politics MIT Press

Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or Minilateralism?

Global Environmental Politics , Volume 12 (2) – May 1, 2012

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References (53)

Publisher
MIT Press
Copyright
© 2012 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Subject
Research Articles
ISSN
1526-3800
eISSN
1536-0091
DOI
10.1162/GLEP_a_00107
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The slow progress of the international climate negotiations has generated calls for a shift from large-n multilateralism (inclusive multilateralism) to more streamlined negotiations that are confined to the major emitters whose support is crucial for an effective climate treaty (exclusive minilateralism). This article pushes critical theory in an applied direction to explore under what circumstances, if any, minilateralism might help to advance the climate negotiations. I show that inclusive multilateralism is unlikely to produce a timely climate treaty, while exclusive minilateralism is elitist, procedurally unjust, and likely to be self-serving. Instead, I defend inclusive minilateralism, based on “common but differentiated representation,” or representation by the most capable, the most responsible, and the most vulnerable. I also offer some practical suggestions as to how a minilateral climate council might be constituted, what its remit should be, and how it might be embedded in and answerable to the UNFCCC.

Journal

Global Environmental PoliticsMIT Press

Published: May 1, 2012

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