Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

A Full-Pull Program for the Provision of Pharmaceuticals: Practical Issues

A Full-Pull Program for the Provision of Pharmaceuticals: Practical Issues Thomas Pogge has proposed a supplement to the standard patent regime whereby innovating companies would be rewarded in proportion to the extent to which their innovations lead to reduction of the global burden of disease (GBD). This paper argues that an expansion of this proposalwhereby provision of already existing medicines are incentivised in a similar waywould provide a more comprehensive solution to the healthcare situation in developing countries. It then considers the practical challenges that the implementation of such a proposal (expanded or otherwise) would entail. Though these include difficulties associated with disease burden metric, I argue that the most serious difficulties are associated with the problem of causal attribution. A basic idea underlying Pogge's proposal is that the disease burden reduction attributable to particular interventions can be determined. Theoretically speaking, in cases involving multiple interacting causal factors, there may be no fact of the matter regarding the extent to which disease burden reduction should be attributed to one intervention as opposed to another; and (even if workable practical solutions to this theoretical challenge can be met) the data requirements for implementation would be daunting. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Public Health Ethics Oxford University Press

A Full-Pull Program for the Provision of Pharmaceuticals: Practical Issues

Public Health Ethics , Volume 1 (2) – Jul 27, 2008

Loading next page...
 
/lp/oxford-university-press/a-full-pull-program-for-the-provision-of-pharmaceuticals-practical-wwrnuYONLj

References (17)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press. Available online at www.phe.oxfordjournals.org
Subject
Original Article
ISSN
1754-9973
eISSN
1754-9981
DOI
10.1093/phe/phn022
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Thomas Pogge has proposed a supplement to the standard patent regime whereby innovating companies would be rewarded in proportion to the extent to which their innovations lead to reduction of the global burden of disease (GBD). This paper argues that an expansion of this proposalwhereby provision of already existing medicines are incentivised in a similar waywould provide a more comprehensive solution to the healthcare situation in developing countries. It then considers the practical challenges that the implementation of such a proposal (expanded or otherwise) would entail. Though these include difficulties associated with disease burden metric, I argue that the most serious difficulties are associated with the problem of causal attribution. A basic idea underlying Pogge's proposal is that the disease burden reduction attributable to particular interventions can be determined. Theoretically speaking, in cases involving multiple interacting causal factors, there may be no fact of the matter regarding the extent to which disease burden reduction should be attributed to one intervention as opposed to another; and (even if workable practical solutions to this theoretical challenge can be met) the data requirements for implementation would be daunting.

Journal

Public Health EthicsOxford University Press

Published: Jul 27, 2008

There are no references for this article.