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A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics*

A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics* We develop a novel model of campaigns, elections, and policy-making in which the ex ante objectives of national party leaders differ from the ex post objectives of elected legislators. This generates a distinction between “policy rhetoric” and “policy reality” and introduces an important role for “party discipline” in the policy-making process. We identify a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics. When trade policy is chosen by the majority delegation and legislators in the minority have limited means to influence choices, the parties announce trade policies that favor specific factors, and the expected tariff or export subsidy is positive. Positions and expected outcomes monotonically approach free trade as party discipline strengthens. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Quarterly Journal of Economics Oxford University Press

A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics*

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References (14)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© Published by Oxford University Press.
Subject
Articles
ISSN
0033-5533
eISSN
1531-4650
DOI
10.1162/003355305775097498
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We develop a novel model of campaigns, elections, and policy-making in which the ex ante objectives of national party leaders differ from the ex post objectives of elected legislators. This generates a distinction between “policy rhetoric” and “policy reality” and introduces an important role for “party discipline” in the policy-making process. We identify a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics. When trade policy is chosen by the majority delegation and legislators in the minority have limited means to influence choices, the parties announce trade policies that favor specific factors, and the expected tariff or export subsidy is positive. Positions and expected outcomes monotonically approach free trade as party discipline strengthens.

Journal

The Quarterly Journal of EconomicsOxford University Press

Published: Nov 1, 2005

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