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Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets

Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets Abstract In this paper, we survey non‐competitive theories of training. With competitive labour markets, firms never pay for investments in general training, whereas when labour markets are imperfect, firm‐sponsored training arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. We discuss a variety of evidence which support the predictions of non‐competitive theories, and we draw some tentative policy conclusions from these models. This content is only available as a PDF. Author notes We thank Steve Machin, Jim Robinson and an anonymous referee for useful comments. Acemoglu acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation Grant SBR-9602116. Some of the data used in this paper have been obtained from the German Zentralarchiv fuÈ r Empirische Sozialforschung at the University of KoÈln (ZA). The data for the study `Qualifikation and Berufsverlauf' were collected by the Bundesinstitut fuÈ r Berufsbildung and the Institut fuÈ r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung and documented by the ZA. Neither the producers of the data nor the ZA bear any responsibility for the analysis and interpretation of the data in this paper. © Royal Economic Society 1999 http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Economic Journal Oxford University Press

Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets

The Economic Journal , Volume 109 (453) – Feb 1, 1999

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References (84)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© Royal Economic Society 1999
ISSN
0013-0133
eISSN
1468-0297
DOI
10.1111/1468-0297.00405
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract In this paper, we survey non‐competitive theories of training. With competitive labour markets, firms never pay for investments in general training, whereas when labour markets are imperfect, firm‐sponsored training arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. We discuss a variety of evidence which support the predictions of non‐competitive theories, and we draw some tentative policy conclusions from these models. This content is only available as a PDF. Author notes We thank Steve Machin, Jim Robinson and an anonymous referee for useful comments. Acemoglu acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation Grant SBR-9602116. Some of the data used in this paper have been obtained from the German Zentralarchiv fuÈ r Empirische Sozialforschung at the University of KoÈln (ZA). The data for the study `Qualifikation and Berufsverlauf' were collected by the Bundesinstitut fuÈ r Berufsbildung and the Institut fuÈ r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung and documented by the ZA. Neither the producers of the data nor the ZA bear any responsibility for the analysis and interpretation of the data in this paper. © Royal Economic Society 1999

Journal

The Economic JournalOxford University Press

Published: Feb 1, 1999

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